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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In spite of years of congestion management effort, the use of highway systems around the globe
reflects a tragedy of an overused commons. Peak demand jams up thoroughfares, consumes
excess energy, and generates both localized pollution and greenhouse gases, not to mention
travelers’ time consumed and stress experienced while sitting in traffic. This project pursues
the distinctly new concept of buying a targeted level of passenger travel by peak period
commuters rather than providing more space in which to travel (as would be the case if road
construction authorities incurred the cost of expanding infrastructure). Congestion-clearing
payments to people who would otherwise be solo drivers—payments that serve to elevate
the average occupancy of peak period vehicles—also represent a distinct and potentially
more politically popular alternative for reducing congestion than setting road user fees that
penalize travelers for driving in peak periods (congestion pricing).
This project explores and advances the concept of ‘congestion-clearing payments to
passengers’ (CCPTP) as a potential solution to the challenge of reducing recurrent
traffic congestion. In the process, the project encountered a minimal amount of prior thought
about this approach, and the project team has had to conceptualize new methodology (referred
to as ‘the Method’) as a result.
The Method outlines the data needed to evaluate a potential route, including a representative
survey of the catchment population to:
• allocate commuters to usage groups of ‘only drive, alone,’ ‘only drive but with
passengers,’ and ‘travel as passengers’;
• find out how travelers and non-travelers would respond to the removal of
congestion; and
• establish the rates of payment required to incentivize people to travel as passengers,
or to drive with passengers, in order to achieve different levels of congestion reduction.
The Method allows for estimating annual costs of the solution for twenty years into
the future, as well as estimating annual benefits; discounting costs and benefits to
the present; and deriving a benefit-to-cost ratio (BCR) and other relevant statistics for
comparison with other approaches to solving the same congestion challenge. The project
team characterizes the approach as a ‘build-nothing-and-pay-passengers’ alternative that
can be included in project alternatives analysis and environmental reviews between the
usual ‘do nothing’ and ‘build infrastructure’ options.
The project included choosing a case-study route and analyzing it to demonstrate how the
Method could be used. The case study results are presented in this report. The results are
encouraging—potentially clearing congestion at a long-standing bottleneck with a benefitto-cost ratio exceeding 4.0 based on the present value of 20 years estimated benefits and
costs discounted at 3%. See Figure 1.
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Figure 1. 20-Year Costs and Benefits
The costs and benefits so estimated are only estimates, and actual experience may or
may not bear them out. The project team is keen to use the Method on other routes in
order to develop an understanding of the range of potential benefit-to-cost ratio outcomes
and to find out how much of the work is generalizable across different routes. The project
team is also keen to test out congestion-clearing payments to passengers (CCPTP) by
actually implementing it on a route (especially the case study route) in order to calibrate
the estimates to actual results. The estimated cost of a five-year pilot project on the case
study route is $40 million.
The key lessons learned from the study include:
• A new appreciation for the magnitude and impact of intra-peak demand shift that
could occur when congestion is removed (specific to the case study, but probably
generalizable). People’s trip making will trend towards their preferred time of travel,
which happens to be everyone else’s preferred time of travel, and without time-oftravel-based bonuses to travel outside peak-of-the-peak, and limits on single occupant
vehicle (SOV) travel during peak-of-the-peak, the congestion will re-form;
• Surprise about the lack of data that facilitate a true understanding of traffic congestion
at a level that helps to manage it in the way the project envisages. Traffic queues form
based on the minute-by-minute differences in the arrival and departure rate of vehicles
at the bottleneck and grow as long as the one exceeds the other. Data collection about
these arrival and departure rates, and the changing length of the queue, together
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with feedback processes to inform managers and travelers, could help to manage
congestion;
• That the traffic reduction efforts are potentially limited by the proportions of commuters
who would a) only drive, alone, or b) only drive, but with passengers, and c) travel
as passengers. The greater the proportion of the first group, the higher the average
occupancy required of the other vehicles on the route during the busiest periods. The
greater the combined proportion of the first two groups, the lower the total congestionclearing potential on the route.
• The need for a combination of incentives: first to shift drivers to being passengers,
and second to encourage passengers to travel earlier (or later) than their preferred
travel time.
• The probable need for a method to limit SOV travel during the peak-of-the-peak.
• The possible need for meeting-place-based parking near the bottleneck to simplify
the higher occupancy vehicle formation whether in bus, van, or car.
The project team proposes investment in a pilot project on the case study route at a cost of
$40 million over five years. The potential value of the solution, if it works as well with real
commuters on congested roads as it does in the planning spreadsheets of this project, is
many multiples of this investment on a nationwide and worldwide basis.
As the revisions to this report are being completed in April 2020, the impacts of Covid-19 are
resulting in wholesale disappearance of traffic congestion around the world. It is possible to
think that some changes will be permanent in the aftermath. The project team foresees two
potential major trends that will have off-setting impacts on traffic congestion as the world
returns to ‘normal’: reduction in use of public and shared transport due to concerns about
future virus transmission; and reduction in commuter traffic as middle and upper management
continue to work from home. The net effect is difficult to predict, in part because there might
be lasting damage to economies depending on how long the disruption continues. Either
way, the aftermath will be an ideal time to test CCPTP. The solution would distribute funds
to people to help offset their losses from the disruption; and encourage, as soon as is
appropriate, a return to shared transport as a mechanism for managing congestion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the passenger-payments project is to develop a method (herein called
‘the Method’) for estimating the long-term costs and benefits of a permanent program of
paying people to travel as passengers, rather than as drivers, on a corridor-by-corridor
basis—to reduce existing congestion in a corridor to a target maximum level of delay—taking
into account the potential impact of suppressed demand for peak period travel and induced
traffic.
The Method would be used to prepare a robust cost estimate for a technology-enabled
‘build nothing (paying passengers)’ alternative to be used when considering investments
in infrastructure. This approach is of particular relevance in the run-up to automated
vehicles and the possibility that new infrastructure investments in the 5-to-20-year timeframe
could become stranded assets under some future scenarios such as low-fare robotaxis.1
It would also be relevant for developing and evaluating proposals for making better use of
existing infrastructure, and for decarbonizing transport. It might be less costly and more
beneficial than other alternatives.
The idea of paying incentives for people to switch modes or time of travel has been around
for many years. Programs are generally short-lived, and often the participants revert to
their original practice at the end of the program.2 Such programs are usually targeted at
a small number of travelers, and the payment amounts are relatively small.
While originally discussed by Vickrey in 1967, the idea of payment of incentives at congestionclearing levels of payments has received little attention. Each decade, there seems to have
been some work on expanding the use of incentives: for example, estimating elasticities
for ridesharing incentives and parking charges in 1993,3 peak-avoidance research in the
Netherlands in 2009,4 incentives experiments in Bangalore in 2009,5 and the larger-scale San
Mateo County Carpool Incentive Pilot Program in 2018.6 Reports in 2010 explored the positive
nature of paying incentives rather than charging tolls. Additionally, in 2018, the FHWA
published a compendium of examples of incentives used to expand traveler choices.7
The idea that incentives should be part of the solution to traffic congestion therefore seems to
be well rooted, but no previous work has gone as far as considering it as a primary strategy
and calculating the twenty-year net present value business case for comparison with the
costs and benefits of alternative solutions.
For this project, a solution is envisaged (herein, the Solution Specification) that would
be enabled by a smartphone application (herein, the App). The App would NOT be used
to arrange rides, but rather, using the App, a highly reliable record would be created
whenever a person travels as a passenger in a carpool, vanpool, or bus, or by other
appropriate congestion-reducing mode, recording the day, time, location, direction
and distance of the trip. Other apps might be used to arrange rides, or other non-app
mechanisms might be used, such as riding with co-workers or neighbors, or turning up
to a flexible carpooling meeting-place.
The record of the passenger trip created by use of the App would be used (likely in real time)
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to generate a reward to the passenger, which could be in the form of cash, points, prize draw
entries, or some combination of these items as set by local business rules for the solution,
on a corridor-by-corridor basis. The amount of the incentive could differ for different days of
the week, times of the day, and location and direction of travel in response to differing levels
of demand and targets for congestion-reduction.
This solution can be seen as the diametric opposite of a congestion toll. Congestion clearing
payments would amount to purchase, by the transportation authorities, of socially useful
behavior from commuters who are selling their efforts to find and use decongesting modes,
rather than—as in a congestion toll—decongestion being sold to people who choose
congesting modes.
The critical difference between this initiative and previous incentive programs is that this
solution would be implemented on a permanent basis. The amount of the payment would be
incremented as needed to remove current excess traffic first, then to remove a volume equal
to any suppressed demand as traffic refills the spaces vacated by the current excess traffic,
and finally to remove a volume equal to any induced demand as it occurred due to economic
growth or other changes in the corridor.
The solution would be implemented in highway corridors with significant peak period commuting
delay. The availability of the incentives would be marketed to local commuters, along with
details of the local business rules. The App would be made available for free to capture trip
details and facilitate payments. The starting incentive would be analytically determined and
then dynamically adjusted as necessary in response to the impact that it had. If the initial
incentive were correctly chosen, it is expected that within a few months enough people would
have switched to being passengers that the traffic would be reduced to the target level. If the
target were not immediately met, the incentive on offer would be raised and would continue
to be raised until the target was achieved. This approach reflects an underlying behavioral
economics assumption that people are price sensitive and more people would respond to
higher incentive offers.
Once the initial mode shift had occurred, and people could see a corridor with reduced
congestion, it is expected that people would change their trip start times or modes or routes
to refill the spaces created: this change reflects suppressed demand for peak period travel.
In response, the Solution Specification would require the incentive to be raised sufficiently
to again return to target congestion levels. This cycle might happen a few times until all the
suppressed demand for peak period travel had been accounted for.
In the following months and years, the incentive would be adjusted dynamically (up or down)
to reflect changes in the total level of person-trip demand and to maintain the target level of
traffic. The management process for setting the incentive would eventually rely on machine
learning and external datasets to ensure that the incentive on offer was always the most
optimal for the expected traffic conditions on a given day.
If these mechanisms hold true, the demand for travel would be decoupled from the amount
of traffic. The amount of traffic would tend to become constant, and average occupancy
would rise or fall with changing levels of travel demand.
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A major challenge for bringing such a concept forward—and testing it in a real environment—
is the lack of an accepted method for estimating its costs and benefits. When planning to
expand infrastructure, there is a long-standing method for calculating benefits and costs.
If an alternative approach is to stand alongside the infrastructure expansion option, it will
require some discipline, sophistication, and robustness to help compare what might be seen
as apples with oranges and respond to the inevitable questioning by the promoters of the
expansion option.
The project followed a research approach of brainstorm, literature search, qualitative research
(focus groups), quantitative research (survey), and analysis. The project team brainstormed
the range of topics that might make up the Method. The resulting components of the draft
Method and relevant topics are shown in Figure 2. The literature search needed to be quite
comprehensive and cross-cutting to track down relevant research for each of these topics.

Figure 2. Components of the Draft Method for Evaluating Congestion-Clearing
Payments to Passengers on a Route
The balance of this report is set out as follows: first, a review of the literature across the
broad range of topics; second, a discussion of the potential method; third, a description
of the project work including analysis of various components, plus the focus groups and
the survey; fourth, the case study background and findings; fifth, a discussion about
the various items of interest that the project raised; and finally, some conclusions and
proposed next steps.
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II. THE LITERATURE
To inform the project, the authors relied on literature related to paying passengers, quantifying
excess traffic, and calculating generated traffic, among others. This review is reported next.

THE SOURCE OF AN IDEA: PAYING PASSENGERS
In 1967 Vickrey posited that it may be possible to pay travelers to adopt travel modes and
times or even different routes that would avoid queueing.8 In his calculation, he found that
this payment approach would initially be the lowest cost option for decongesting the facility.
However, he discounted it as a counterfactual that would be impractical to implement due
to the difficulty of ascertaining who switched to a different mode or time or route and who
just earned a reward by continuing an existing practice. Vickrey also claimed that while
inexpensive in the beginning, such a practice could get extremely expensive over time. He
concluded that congestion tolls constituted a strategy that would be easier to implement
and monitor. Such tolling schemes, however, have been attempted in a very small number
of locations, and they are politically challenging. Many people do not generally support the
concept of charging tolls on formerly un-tolled roads as a congestion management tool.
Since the advent of mobile technologies such as smartphones with computer-based
functional applications (apps), the technical hurdles have lessened significantly, and
the provision of incentives and payments is much more administratively and technically
feasible. Though there have been numerous studies related to Vickrey’s congestion pricing
framework,9 there has been scant research into the possibility of paying for decongestion
at a congestion clearing level rather than charging road users for this outcome. The beauty
of buying decongestion rather than selling it in the form of tolls is that people would be paid
for taking an action rather than being charged for a reduced state of congestion that may
not materialize on any given day.
An incentive is in essence a negative toll, and the opportunity cost of foregoing an incentive
is equivalent to a toll. In a toll situation, drivers who are ‘tolled off’ opt for other means of
traveling or elect not to travel at all, which leads to reduced congestion. Paying people to
travel as passengers has the potential to reduce solo driving trips and thereby similarly
reduce congestion. Such a solution is well worth exploring, because, as stated thoughtfully
by Dutch researchers, while “[a] reward system may be less effective than a tolling system
… if tolling is politically infeasible a more relevant comparison is between a reward system
and the absence of any control through financial mechanisms.”10

CURRENT EXCESS TRAFFIC
Traffic congestion is a challenge that has continued to worsen for decades. It is also not
limited to urban areas. Increasingly, ex-urban and rural places experience traffic congestion
as well. The combined costs of traffic congestion across the USA were estimated to be $166
billion for 2017, up from $142 billion in 2012.11 The 2017 estimate is reported to include
54 hours of yearly delay per auto commuter, a travel time index of 1.23, a freeway-only
planning time index of 1.67, 21 gallons of wasted fuel per auto commuter, and a cost per
auto commuter of $1,010. The 2017 traffic congestion therefore caused a total of 8.8 billion
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hours of delay, 3.3 billion gallons of wasted fuel, and $20.5 billion of excess truck running
costs.
In spite of all this analysis the project team was unable to find any standard method for
determining the amount of current excess traffic at a localized level. There is too much traffic,
but there is no clear measure of how much too much traffic there is on any given route.
In his 1967 paper, Vickrey provided an example of a peak demand period of 90 minutes
(with 4,400 vehicles per hour arriving at a bottleneck where downstream capacity was
4,000 vehicles per hour) that generated a queue of 600 vehicles that lasted two hours, with
maximum delay to any one vehicle of 9 minutes, and average delay to all 8,000 delayed
vehicles of 4.5 minutes.12 The ‘current excess traffic’ in this Vickrey example is 600 vehicles,
because if those 600 vehicles were not there at that time, there would be no queue and all
the delay would be avoided.
The current excess traffic is therefore influenced by the speed at which vehicles arrive at and
depart downstream from a queue of congested traffic at a bottleneck. Hutton explores the
rate at which vehicles can pull away from the queue and finds that 1,800 vehicles per lane
hour is a fair maximum to adopt for a good-quality road without impediments to normal flow
such as signals, sharp bends, parked or turning vehicles, or pedestrian crossings.13

SUPPRESSED DEMAND AND INDUCED TRAFFIC
In the 1990s there was much discussion about whether the addition of road capacity ‘induced’ more travel, and similarly whether reduction of road capacity ‘suppressed’ travel.
The use of both terms was generally intended as a measure of change in total daily traffic
as a result of the change in capacity. Rescheduled departure times, where trips have been
suppressed by congestion and then released in response to an initial reduction in congestion, are not seen in the literature as induced or suppressed traffic but rather as a ‘return
to peak.’14
Under very high levels of congestion, it is expected that any vehicles removed from the
traffic will create spaces that will be immediately filled, demonstrating an overarching concept of generated demand that has a variety of names in the literature.15
The concept of ‘return-to-peak’ demand is described and quantified under an assumption
of an increase in the amount of road provided (adding infrastructure) and the elasticity of
demand to consume that added infrastructure, stated as the elasticity of Vehicle Kilometers (or Miles) Traveled (VKT) to lane-kilometers added, or VKT to generalized travel costs.
Short-term elasticities have been found to range from 0.0 to 0.68 (increase lane kilometers
by 1%, will increase VKT by 0.68%).16
Treatment of induced demand, where the amount of traffic increases due to economic
growth that might itself be induced by the added capacity, is similar. Long-term elasticity
of lane kilometers to VKT is found to range between 0.29 and 1.1.17 In general, induced
demand is expected to use up most of the new capacity within five years.18
The Victoria Transportation Policy Institute combines both types of demand under the
heading of ‘generated traffic’ and refers to ‘diverted trips’ (changes in trip time, route and
mode) and ‘induced travel’ (increased trips and trip length), finding that generally, the first
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year’s generated traffic (after an expansion of capacity) represents diverted trips, while
later generated traffic represents induced travel.19
Downs suggested that growing cities will always experience latent demand for roadways,
demand that will emerge when capacity is increased.20 In a principle he termed ‘triple convergence,’ Downs explained that the improved roadway will attract users who previously
used different routes (spatial convergence); users who travelled during pre- and post-peak
shoulder hours to avoid bottlenecks (temporal convergence); and users who previously
opted for other modes (modal convergence). Downs lamented that “[o]nly road pricing or
higher gasoline taxes are exempt from the principle of triple convergence.”21 That traffic
tends toward equilibrium because of these protean factors makes it even more urgent to
fathom “which transportation investment and management strategies provide the greatest
social and economic payoff.” 22,23

REWARD SCHEMES ON THE ROAD
Given the potential for lasting impacts and providing a better taxpayer bargain than expanding
a congested roadway, the notion of paying solo motorists to opt for a different travel mode has
been tested in a few places around the world. Several of these programs have had promising
results and provide a range of factors to consider when setting out to manage congestion.
As Kelley points out, “[t]he old paradigm of simply building more roads to accommodate
ever-increasing traffic should no longer be the only game in town.”24 Attempts to reduce peak
congestion by using incentives have also been applied to peak hours on transit services.25
One of the most well-known schemes for rewarding road travelers for changing their travel
patterns hails from the Netherlands. In order to reduce vehicle trips during peak periods,
a group of Dutch universities, businesses, and government entities organized a 13-week
long incentive program called “Spitsmijden” or “peak avoidance.” As part of this initiative,
commuters were rewarded with cash or credits toward a smartphone for shifting their travel
time or mode. The results indicated that rewards can promote changes in travel patterns
and may do so at greater levels than those achieved through road pricing, though the effects
seemed to dissipate after the reward was eliminated.26
The elimination of a carpooling requirement in Jakarta provided an interesting case study
for the network benefits of carpooling. For over twenty years, Jakarta required at least
three people in the car in order to access the HOV lane during peak periods on arterials
into the central business district. When the program abruptly ended in 2016, it provided an
excellent opportunity to study the effects of the policy and its elimination. The traffic worsened
considerably, even beyond the roads directly impacted by the policy.27 The Jakarta analysis
suggests that promoting higher vehicular occupancies can have network efficiencies beyond
the time and location where they are in effect.
Various studies have shown that interventions focused on vehicle-occupancy can indeed
reduce vehicle trips. Guiliano, Huang, and Wachs reviewed incentives from employers to
improve average vehicle ridership in response to new regulations and found that financial
incentives to switch from SOV to another option generated the most change across the twoyear period studied.28
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Prabhakar leveraged gamification to achieve a higher rate of participation at a lower cost
per trip in a range of incentive programs to shift commuter trips away from peak periods.
For example, the CAPRI (Congestion and Parking Relief Incentives) program at Stanford
University used a custom-built mobile app and RFID sensors in users’ cars to monitor arrivals
and departures from campus. Users were given the choice between a) a small predetermined
payment for each trip in which they arrived or departed from campus during pre- or post-peak
shoulder hours, or b) foregoing the small, guaranteed amount in favor of an entry in a raffle
with progressively higher likelihoods of payout for increased participation. The vast majority
(87.3%) chose the chance to earn a higher prize, and this structure allowed the program to
achieve average incentives of just 10 cents per person per trip. 29,30 Prabhakar explains that
“when the stakes are small, a random reward is more appealing than a deterministic reward
of the same expected value—a fact underlying lottery systems.”31
Prabhakar also undertook an extensive peak-hour avoidance program experiment in
Bangalore. Employees of a large company were incentivized to commute in off-peak times.
Employees could again earn points toward a weekly raffle. The more frequently they avoided
the peak hours, the more opportunities they had to win cash prizes. The number of employees
commuting at off-peak times doubled under the program.32
Incentive programs have previously been considered in California. In the report 101 in Motion
prepared for Santa Barbara County, one of the proposals was to provide financial incentives
to carpoolers and transit users to avoid the need to expand infrastructure.33 Kelly (2007)
proposed a payment of $10 per driver and $4 per passenger to convince a) 600 people to
switch to being carpool passengers and b) 200 people to switch to being carpool drivers,
and estimated that the annual costs associated with the incentive would still be about $1.5
million dollars lower than the maintenance costs of a proposed facility expansion of a new
HOV lane.34 Neither of these proposals was implemented.
The City/County Association of Governments (C/CAG) of San Mateo County, California,
USA, piloted an incentive program in 2017/2018 that reduced the cost of using a specific
carpooling app for passengers by $2 per one-way trip and increased the payment to drivers
by $2 per one-way trip, up to twice per day—a total of $8 per vehicle-round-trip avoided.35
The sum of one million dollars was allocated to the pilot program. Program reporting stated
that it attracted 11,645 new users to the app, rewarded 907 average daily carpools, and
provided 5 million rider miles. The project period ended before the funding was exhausted.
Payouts totaled $843,000.36
The above C/CAG program was succeeded in 2019 by a new initiative called Carpool 2.0
that offered a significantly lower incentive: $2.50 per carpool day ($5.00 per vehicle-roundtrip avoided), capped at $100 for the 15-month initiative.37 After 10 months, the program
reported that 2.5 million total miles (driver and passenger) had been recorded.38
The reporting for the two C/CAG programs does not show how many of the people who
participated were new carpoolers, so it is difficult to ascertain the impact of the programs on
regional congestion. At the time of writing, C/CAG officials are developing the specification for
a new program called Carpool 2020. As of this writing, they continue to be actively interested
in the use of incentives to help manage traffic congestion.39
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FLEXIBLE CARPOOLING
An informal ridesharing solution involving about 7,500 commuters operates daily from
Oakland, CA to downtown San Francisco, CA is locally termed ‘casual carpooling’. There
are designated meeting places where during the morning rush at different times there might
be a line of cars or a line of riders waiting to form 3- or 4-person carpools on a first-come,
first-served basis with no prearrangement. A similar system existing in Washington, D.C.,
locally referred to as ‘the slug lines,’ also involves several thousand commuters daily. The
Washington, D.C. instance is more complex than the San Francisco case because it involves
multiple destinations as well as multiple meeting places.
These casual carpool/slug-line solutions have been in operation for over forty years,
leveraging existing preferential high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) facilities (HOV lanes). While
acknowledged by local transportation departments, they are non-official solutions that were
not the result of research and development or innovation programs. Minett described these
solutions as ‘flexible carpooling’ in an attempt to differentiate them from app-based carpoolformation systems.40
Traditionally no money changes hands in these solutions, but more recently the imposition
of a toll for carpoolers on the Bay Bridge into San Francisco has resulted in riders making
a contribution to the toll. No incentives are involved apart from the structural incentive of a
HOV lane.41 The systems are perceived by users as being safe to use, in part because each
carpool has at least two passengers for one driver: people see strength in numbers.
Pearce and Minett patented a business process for a formalized version of flexible carpooling.42

SEGMENTATION
The idea of CCPTP raises the important question of whether a large enough fraction of
commuters would travel as passengers if the incentives were sufficient. One study explored
a segmentation methodology that looked at psychographic factors of people related to
their trip-making. Seven segments were identified, of which only one, Car Lovers/Devoted
Drivers, represented people who would be unlikely to respond to an incentive at any level.
In three states across the USA, the other six segments, who would be positively disposed
towards public transportation and carpooling and might respond to rewards, represented
80% (FL), 83% (OR), and 84% (VA) of total travelers.43

IMPACT OF INCENTIVES AND SURCHARGES
Research into Travel Demand Management methods in 1993 (the Comsis Report) gave
estimates of the impact on commuter traffic of combinations of incentives for passenger
travel and surcharges for single occupant vehicles (SOVs) in a series of tables that
considered different configurations of urban density and mix of transit and rideshare
modes.44 The Comsis authors emphasized that their estimates would only be relevant if
the incentives were available to all and SOV charges applied to all. The Comsis tables
were updated for inflation in 2000 by the Victoria Transport Policy Institute (VTPI) and are
currently available on the VTPI website.45 In the VTPI update, the term ‘SOV surcharge’
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was replaced with the term ‘parking charges,’ which—while not inconsistent with the intent
of Comsis—leaves out other mechanisms that might exist for imposing surcharges on
SOVs.

INCENTIVE STRUCTURES
People tend to value an entry in a prize drawing at a higher level than the probabilistic value
of the ticket, especially when the prize is very large.46 A one-in-one-thousand chance to win
$1,000 should be priced at $1, but people may perceive it to be worth $2 or more. In the
Bangalore experiments described earlier, a reward pyramid was used in which the size of
prize was greatest, and the chances of winning higher, for people who participated most
often and earned the most credits. Four levels of prizes were available, and a commuter who
qualified at level 1 (highest) automatically qualified at all lower levels. Even though the prizes
were relatively small, this mechanism encouraged greater participation.47

TECHNOLOGY
With respect to the technology aspects of the passenger-payments project, a number of
providers in the USA and around the world are developing the capability to reliably capture
information about passenger travel in cars, vans, or buses or other non-solo modes. Based
on information in providers’ descriptive online marketing, from informal discussions with their
executives, and from testing of some aspects of their smartphone apps by project team
members, the team is confident that technology exists to provide high quality verification of
mode, time, direction and distance of shared travel.

VALUE OF TIME
When calculating the benefits from congestion reduction (or the cost of congestion),
standardized hourly rates tend to be used. As an example, in the 2019 Urban Mobility Report
that calculates the cost of congestion across the USA, the Passenger Vehicle Motorist’s
Value of Delay Time is an hourly rate of $18.12 per person hour (2017 dollars), and the value
of travel time for commercial vehicles is $52.14 per hour (2017 dollars). The former is based
on the median hourly wage rate for all occupations as produced by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The latter is based on an annual survey of the trucking industry.48

JOB SATISFACTION BENEFITS OF REDUCED CONGESTION
English researchers in 2017 found that an additional 10 minutes (each way) of commuting
time is associated with an equivalent impact on job satisfaction as a salary reduction of
19%.49

COMMONS GOVERNANCE
Roads and highways are one of the largest and perhaps most contested urban commons.
Roads in North America are the most prevalent means of moving goods, services, and people
from one place to another. In urban environments over many hours of usual work days, the
demand for travel via personal automobile has outstripped the capacity of the commons to
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provide it, resulting in congestion and significant temporal and environmental costs. Often,
the attempted solution to this problem has been to enlarge the facility, an option that is not
always at play for a natural commons and is becoming less and less available for road
commons. Minett suggests that rather than an engineering or supply problem, congestion is
a behavioral problem attributable in part to a lack of effective commons governance among
communities of users.50
The commons can be understood not just as a space, but also as a set of social processes
expressed through relationships.51 The social processes and relationships that govern
expectations for mobility often privilege individual mobility without accounting for the ways
that each individual on the road contributes to increased congestion. Emphasizing the social
and environmental imperative behind shifting travel behavior can lead to more deliberate
choices.52
A cautionary tale by commons researchers Van Vugt and colleagues in 1996 considered
the highway commons and the implementation of a carpool lane in the Netherlands as a
structural solution to the pervasive social dilemma of overuse.53 They studied the opinions of
solo drivers two months before and two months after the implementation of the new carpool
lane, which would save users about 20 minutes travel time over the regular lanes, but of
course involved a shift to a cooperative form of travel to enable access. They predicted that
solo drivers would self-justify their existing choices to reduce psychological tension caused
by establishment of the carpool lane. They noted in the study that the lane was closed within
a year due to lack of interest and “enduring resistance among solo drivers.”54 The catalyst for
the closure was a successful legal challenge on the basis that most citizens were excluded
from the new lane.
Shoup extended the metaphor of the commons to considerations of appropriate charges for
parking. Observing that free street parking is a form of commons, he suggests that pricing
for parking should be structured such that it is free when parking-space occupancy is below
85%, because at that level drivers do not congest the street by cruising for parking. Under
such conditions, “it is then a public good in the sense that the marginal cost of adding
another user is zero. But when demand increases, the public good becomes crowded, it
takes time to find a vacant space, and the marginal cost of adding another user increases.”55
Elinor Ostrom received a Nobel Prize for her work on commons governance that
suggests some intriguing models. The central question is whether the users (and
therefore beneficiaries) of the commons, if given time and space, could establish a
governance model that would avoid the overuse described in Hardin’s Tragedy of
the Commons.56 Ostrom established that it is possible to collectively establish usage,
monitoring, and enforcement agreements and rules that result in a better net outcome
than the costs and inefficiencies of state control, or the unequal distribution of benefits
flowing from privatization.57
According to a 2011 post by Jay Walljasper to a website called On the Commons, Ostrom
offered the following eight principles for how commons can be governed sustainably
and equitably in a community:

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

The Literature

14

1. Define clear group boundaries.
2. Match rules governing use of common goods to local needs and conditions.
3. Ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules.
4. Make sure the rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside
authorities.
5. Develop a system, carried out by community members, for monitoring members’
behavior.
6. Use graduated sanctions for rule violators.
7. Provide accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution.
8. Build responsibility for governing the common resource in nested tiers from the lowest
level up to the entire interconnected system.58
The literature review provided the project team with confidence that there are gaps in the
knowledge that could be filled by the work of this project. The team moved forward to develop
and expand a draft method.
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III. THE DRAFT METHOD
The intent behind the Method developed in this research project is a repeatable process
for calculating a ‘build nothing and pay passengers’ scenario for improving road transport
outcomes using incentives paid to people who travel as passengers. Often, when considering what to do about a congested road facility, a range of options are considered, plus
a ‘do nothing’ alternative. The options considered usually involve different configurations
of facility expansion. In some cases, travel demand management (TDM) options are included, either alone or in combination, with facility expansion. These generally involve
provision of public transport.
To the best of the project team’s knowledge there have been no examples of options
considered that sought to achieve the sort of capacity increase that facility expansion
could provide through rewarding people for traveling as passengers, especially if this travel would be in private vehicles. However, it is noted that when the ‘drive alone rate’ is high,
there is a large amount of seat-capacity unused in private vehicles. It would be ideal to
have access to this capacity if it could just be unlocked. For example, 100,000 commuters
could travel in 25,000 four-person carpools rather than 77,000 vehicles with an average
occupancy of 1.3, reducing lane capacity requirements by two-thirds. And while the reference to 100% four-person carpools may be utopian, any increase in average occupancy
that removes vehicles from the road provides a broad range of benefits: reduced vehicle
miles travelled, reduced delay, and reduced emissions, to mention just a few examples.
The Method is designed to consider a corridor where there is traffic congestion and to calculate a) the present value of the future costs of paying incentives at a congestion clearing
(or congestion managing) level, taking into account the current travel market and culture,
the likely impact of induced and latent demand, and the likely growth in trip-making over
time, b) the present value of the future benefits from applying such a solution, and c) the
benefit-to-cost ratio that, if positive, would suggest the solution is worth consideration for
the given location.
The project team does not propose that the results of any individual steps would be able
to be generalized to other situations, but rather that the full method could be generalized.
The team’s expectation is that each step would be applied for each corridor that would be
under consideration for CCPTP. Over time, with repeated application of the Method, the
team envisages that rules of thumb might emerge. However, the Method would initially be
developed and applied without trying to second guess whether the results of any individual
step could be generalized.
Figure 3 and its descriptions of each step reflect the project team’s thinking at the beginning of the project. The commentary that follows describes the steps and provides some
adjustments to the original concepts that came from development of the case study documented in this report.
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Figure 3. The Draft Method for Costs

Step 1: Define the corridor and gather base data
Clearly define the corridor(s) for incentive payment purposes. The working assumption is
that the bottlenecks can be identified, and the source and destination of the traffic established
in order to seek to reduce the traffic at each bottleneck. The ‘build something’ alternative
might involve building several miles of road and expanding several interchanges. It might be
useful to consider each interchange as a separate corridor for the purposes of the ‘build
nothing’ alternative.
This first step is expected to be an iterative process.
The following are examples of base data that could be gathered:
1. Traffic flow data are often available, typically in 15-minute intervals for each
lane, including class of vehicle (based on length) and the speed at an observation
point. The observation point might not be at the bottleneck, so gather data from
nearby observation points as appropriate. Because excess traffic is the result
of arrivals at the bottleneck exceeding departures from the bottleneck, gather
any information that gives insight into this imbalance. Any data that are available
for smaller intervals of time (such as minute-by-minute) would be more useful.
The focus should be on morning traffic flow data. While there is significant evening
congestion, a main driver of evening congestion is the morning mode-choice by
commuters. If people leave home in their own car, it is most likely that they will arrive
home in their own car. By getting people to travel as passengers in the morning, they
are highly likely to travel as passengers in the evening as well, so a morning-focused
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solution will improve the evening congestion as well.
2. Vehicle occupancy information for the vehicles in the congested traffic periods.
3. Vehicle trip purpose information for the vehicles in the congested traffic.
4. The presence and utilization of public transport vehicles along the corridor.
5. Origins and destinations of the vehicles in the congested traffic, in matched pairs if
possible.
6. For each destination area:
a. Parking pricing analysis: how many commuters park for free in employer-provided
facilities; how many commuters pay to park in employer-provided facilities; how
many park for free in public facilities or on-road; how many pay to park in public
facilities or on-road.59
b. Destination congestion statistics: how much local congestion is there at the
destination, either from people circling to find a place to park, or because there are
a lot of people who live at the destination using their cars to get to work or for very
short trips.
c. Existing programs at the destination for managing congestion, if any. For example,
if there is a Transportation Management Association (TMA) for the destination, or
if some employers are active in some way to reduce the amount of arriving SOVs,
these approaches to mitigating congestion should be discovered, documented,
and assessed for their potential to be integrated into the congestion clearing
methodology.
d. Any destination-related factors uncovered through focus groups with people from
the corridor.
7. Existing programs that cover the corridor (not focused on individual destinations) for
managing congestion, if any.
8. The presence of alternative routes and information about these routes, i.e. toll roads,
or less direct routes between the same origins and destinations.

Step 2: Calculate the desired traffic-count reduction
Calculate the desired traffic-count reduction. It might be that this calculation should be carried
out for a single location, or for several locations along the corridor. If congestion backs up
from downstream, it will be important to understand the downstream situation.
Calculating the desired traffic-count reduction involves analysis and judgement. There are
three main steps:
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1. Ignoring induced and latent demand, how many excess vehicles are arriving at
the bottleneck? How long is the queue that is forming? Does the queue form and then
dissipate in a single smooth movement, or does it repeatedly ebb and flow? Create a
model of the traffic arriving and departing the bottleneck on a minute-by-minute basis.
Sum the excess on a 15-minute basis. Test to see whether all days have a similar
shape, or if there is variability.
2. Consider latent demand. If the amount of excess identified in Step 1 could immediately
be removed, then the peak-period traffic would flow smoothly. It is possible that the
existing level of peak-period congestion is causing people who would like to travel at
peak period to travel either before or after peak; to travel by an alternative mode (bus
or train); or to travel by a different route.
3. Given the shape of the traffic flows, is it likely there is a significant amount of pre- and
post-peak ‘shoulder traffic’ (traffic that is in the period immediately before and after
the peak) that might move into an improved peak-period flow? If there is a lot of public
transport use, is it likely that people will switch to driving if there is improved peakperiod flow? Are there lots of people taking a less preferred route who would likely
switch to the focus route if there is improved peak-period flow?
4. Use accumulated experience applied to the base data for the corridor to suggest how
many vehicles would move into the peak period if the current excess were removed.
This estimation is the latent demand adjustment. It could include commuters,
commercial vehicles, and other trip purposes.
5. Consider suppressed demand. Would some people who are not traveling at all now
start traveling on the target corridor if existing congestion were removed? Use
accumulated experience to estimate a number of vehicles for induced demand.
The sum of excess current traffic, plus suppressed demand, is the number of vehicles that need
to be removed to achieve and maintain free-flowing traffic today.

Step 3: Determine the desired percentage reduction in commuting traffic
The peak-period traffic is made up of commuters, freight and commercial vehicles, and
people making a large variety of trips for different purposes, often one-off. The base data
will help to provide some insights into this mix. Consider the mix as it is during peak, not the
averages for the whole day.
1. Calculate the existing number of commuter vehicles during peak.
2. Divide the number of vehicles that need to be removed (step 2) by the existing number
of commuter vehicles during peak—the answer is the percentage reduction required
in total commuter vehicle flows.
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Step 4: Determine the reward required to achieve the desired percentage
reduction
Determine a ‘reward curve’ (see below) based on local survey results, and use the formula
fit to the curve to estimate the amount of reward that would be needed to reduce the traffic
by the desired percentage.
1. Carry out a local survey to understand the local market and the relative propensity
to travel as a passenger at different levels of reward. This survey instrument is
to be standardized as part of the Method, and it is hoped that as the Method
is applied, the findings from an accumulation of surveys will help to clarify the
implications of variations in survey findings. (Note that the survey might be a
source of some of the data in Step 1).
2. Interpret the data from the survey to create a ‘reward curve’: a chart that shows the
relationship between the size of reward and the proportion of commuters who will
respond to the reward at each level.
3. Using appropriate levels of judgment, take the desired percentage reduction and
apply it to the reward curve to find the value of reward required.

Step 5: Calculate the gross cost for the corridor for the volume of traffic to
be removed
A relatively simple calculation comes next: the cost on a per passenger per day basis,
multiplied by the number of vehicles that need to be removed. The result is not yet the total
cost—it is necessary to adjust for people who are already traveling as passengers—but is
the amount of value that will need to be delivered to get existing drivers to change.

Step 6: Determine the incentive-system structure that will be used
Four different components are anticipated for the incentive system:
1. An incentive related to getting started traveling as a passenger, perhaps a bonus for
the first five successful trips, or for a single trip, or even for just registering;
2. An incentive related to reporting trip activity, so that in essence the data are being
purchased. Such an incentive might be fixed on a per-trip basis;
3. An incentive related to how far the person travels as a passenger;
4. An incentive related to what time the trip is taken.
It is anticipated that there will be two main payment mechanisms that could be used for all
four components above:
1. Cash, and/or
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2. Lottery entries.
As mentioned in the literature review, people generally value a lottery entry at about double
its actual value (determined as probability of winning times the amount of the prize), so a
weighting of incentive mix towards lottery entries reduces the actual cost of the incentive
while maintaining the perceived value.
For example, if there were to be a lottery component, and if all participants could convert as
much of their money as they wanted into lottery entries, and if (say) all participants converted
50% of their money into lottery entries then the cost of providing $10 per day in value could
be just $7.50 per day in reality (50% paid out = $5.00, and 50% converted to lottery entries
that cost 50%, therefore = $2.50). The extent to which participants would be likely to convert
their money into lottery entries could be tested in the survey suggested in Step 4.

Step 7: Calculate the total cost for year 1
Working with the expected average in the above calculation, work out how many people in
total need to be paid at the calculated rate. It exceeds the number of vehicles that need to
be reduced, because the incentive will also be paid out to people who are already traveling
as passengers. There is likely no way to avoid paying existing passengers in addition to
new passengers. However, if done carefully, paying any cost of them starting to travel as
passengers can be avoided.
1. Multiply the total number of new passengers required times the year 1 cost per
passenger
2. Multiply the total number of existing passengers times the year 2 cost per passenger
(the year 1 cost less the cost of getting them started)
3. Sum these to arrive at the total incentive cost for year 1.
A couple of caveats for this calculation:
• It needs to be factored based on some assumption about the proportion of days of the
year each person will travel as a passenger;
• It needs to allow for different levels of incentive required on different days of the week,
month, or year—there is no need to pay for passengers on public holidays nor on lazy
Mondays, or other days that less or no congestion is expected

Step 8a: Forecast the growth in demand on the facility and total costs over
time and calculate the present value
1. Decide on the discount factor to use. Research the rate used by the local Department
of Transportation so that estimations for this project can more easily be compared with
estimations for other projects in the area.
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2. Decide on the traffic growth factor to use and adjust for (probably) greater growth in
the percentage of commuter traffic involved—i.e., any growth in commercial or goods
vehicles will require an equal reduction in commuter vehicles.
3. Determine the rate at which the cost of the incentives will increase each year to
maintain the target level of flow.
4. Determine number of years and calculate cost for each year.
5. Discount to the present.

Step 8b: Forecast the benefits from implementing the solution, and calculate
the present value
1. Decide which benefits can be claimed for the solution: reduced delay, reduced fuel
use and emissions, reduced VMT-related running costs, reduced accidents, reduced
inconvenience due to congestion, increased opportunities, reduced stress, etc.
2. Estimate each stream of benefits for the first and subsequent years.
3. Discount to the present.

Step 8c: Calculate the net present value and benefit-to-cost ratio
1. Deduct the present value of the costs from the present value of the benefits to
determine the net present value.
2. Divide the present value of the benefits by the present value of the costs to determine
the benefit-to-cost ratio (BCR).
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IV. PROJECT WORK
CALCULATIONS FOR ESTIMATING COSTS
Estimating excess traffic
Step 1 of the draft Method called for 15-minute data for the corridor, including traffic volumes
through the peak period by class of vehicle, by origin and destination pairs, by trip purpose,
and showing existing delay, daily variations of volumes, and average vehicle occupancy.
The goal is to calculate the current excess traffic, because as will soon be seen, the excess
traffic is the amount of traffic that, if removed from the flow, would remove the queue that is
referred to as ‘the congestion.’
For the purpose of estimating excess traffic and delay, the team expected to be working with
information that would be similar to that shown in Table 1 from a freeway in Massachusetts.60
This same Massachusetts data source contains counts by different classes of traffic with the
same degree of specificity, and the counts can be further broken down by individual lanes.
Table 1.

Example of 15-minute Traffic Counts

The purpose of obtaining the count data was to determine the amount of excess traffic. It
turns out that the information in Table 1 is not sufficient to estimate excess traffic. It only
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shows the traffic that passed through the bottleneck, not the amount of traffic backed up
waiting to get through at any point in time. It also does not tell us if this location is actually a
bottleneck–it is possible that the congestion at this location is caused by traffic backing up
from a downstream bottleneck.
Vickrey had provided an example that included a known quantity of excess traffic, as shown
in Table 2.61
Table 2.

Factors Describing Vickrey’s Bottleneck
Factor

Traffic flow after peak (vehicles per hour)

Value
2,800

Traffic flow during peak (vehicles per hour)

4,400

Bottleneck capacity (vehicles per hour)

4,000

Duration of peak traffic flow (minutes)

90

Excess traffic (vehicles) = (Traffic flow during peak – Bottleneck capacity) / (Duration of
peak flow)

600

Queue duration (minutes) = (Duration of peak flow) + (Excess traffic) / (Bottleneck
capacity – Traffic flow after peak)

120

Maximum delay to any one vehicle (minutes) = (Excess traffic) / (Bottleneck capacity)

9

Total vehicles experiencing some delay (vehicles) = (Duration of queue) × (Bottleneck
capacity)

8,000

Total delay (vehicle minutes) = 0.5 × (Queue duration) × (Excess traffic)

36,000

Average delay per vehicle delayed (minutes) = Total delay / Total vehicles experiencing
delay

4.5

Vickrey’s queue can be represented as shown in Figure 4. The queue grows at the rate of
6.67 vehicles per minute (while the traffic arriving at the bottleneck exceeds the rate at which
it departs) and shrinks at the rate of 20 vehicles per minute (once the traffic departing the
bottleneck exceeds the rate at which traffic is arriving). The total amount of vehicle delay is
the area under the line as each vehicle in the queue for each minute accumulates a vehicleminute of delay.
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Figure 4. Length of Queue by Minute: Vickrey’s Bottleneck
In contrast, the information in Table 1 (from Massachusetts) shows traffic queued-up from
6:45 am to 8:30 am, but it is not possible to derive from Table 1 the length of the queue
backed up behind it. Vickrey’s use of the length of the queue to indicate excess traffic
suggests it is an important factor. In Vickrey’s example, queue length equals excess traffic.
It became evident that the length of the queue was not the whole story. Firstly, it is difficult
to know (for a real situation) the simplified set of facts that Vickrey uses in his example.
Secondly, except in unusual circumstances, the rate of traffic arriving at a queue is unlikely
to be as uniform as Vickrey’s example would suggest. It is known that queues ebb and
flow. Suppose, for example, that instead of a single stream of peak traffic, Vickrey’s traffic
was divided into two peaks, with an initial queue forming, dissipating, and a second queue
forming and dissipating, both queues 600 vehicles deep at their maximum, as shown in
Figure 5. In this modified case, vehicles arrive at the rate of 5,200 vehicles per hour for
30 minutes, 2,800 vehicles per hour for 30 minutes, and 5,200 per hour for the final 30
minutes. (Note that the total traffic in 90 minutes is the same as Vickrey’s initial example:
6,600 vehicles.) To remove both queues, 600 people would need to be convinced to leave
the early peak flow, and 600 to leave the late peak flow, in order to remove the queue all
together. The excess traffic in this case is therefore 1,200 vehicles, while total delay is the
same as in the base case.
The challenge for the project team was to determine a formula for calculating the excess
traffic in an environment where the queue length varied constantly, perhaps as shown in
Figure 6, a hypothetical example to illustrate an important point. The team’s conclusion
is that excess traffic is determined by the difference between the rate at which vehicles
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arrive at the bottleneck (or the back of the queue) and the rate at which vehicles leave the
front of the queue and is the sum of these differences for each minute that the arriving rate
exceeds the departing rate.
Any time the queue grows, the arriving vehicles comprise part of the total excess traffic.
Vehicles arriving while the queue is shrinking do not form part of the excess traffic (even
though they wait in the queue). In the modified Vickrey example above, there are two
30-minute periods during which the arriving traffic rate exceeds the departing traffic rate by
20 vehicles per minute, so the excess traffic is (30 × 20) + (30 × 20) = 1,200.

Figure 5. A Two-Peak Queue Example
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Figure 6. Example of Queue with Fluctuating Length
In the example in Figure 6, there are 49 one-minute periods during which the queue grows,
and the excess traffic is calculated as 550 vehicles, even though the maximum queue length
is less than 250 vehicles, and there are three distinct ‘peaks’ in the queue.
To derive similar information for a real situation, it is desirable to have data about the rate
at which vehicles arrive at the bottleneck or the back of the queue, on a minute-by-minute
basis, as well as the rate at which the vehicles depart. Alternatively, if there is an available
measure of the actual queue length minute-by-minute, and if the departure rate is known, the
net of arrivals and departures could be calculated.
In the event that something temporarily constrains the rate of departure from the queue,
the queue could be growing even with a low rate of vehicles arriving. Hence, the minute-byminute rate of vehicles departing the queue should also be taken into consideration.
Optimal data sources would be minute-by-minute traffic counts from locations beyond the
longest likely length of the queue on each road leading to the bottleneck, plus minute-byminute traffic counts of vehicles leaving the bottleneck. Ideally, data would be accumulated
over some period of time so that averages could be used for each day, recognizing that
there will most likely always be variations. The goal is to arrive at an assessment of the daily
excess traffic, so that an initial price can be set for removing this excess.
An alternative data source would be to survey a random sample of people who drive to the
bottleneck during the peak period, asking what time they typically arrive at the bottleneck
(or perhaps, what time they leave home, and making an adjustment for the time it takes to
get to the bottleneck). Taking this information, together with an assumption about the rate of
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departure from the bottleneck, a minute-by-minute queue could be modeled and compared
with any other available flow data for validation.
By whichever method, a chart could be generated that would show the traffic arriving at the
bottleneck minute-by-minute, as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7.

Vehicles Arriving at the Bottleneck by Minute

Taking into account the available departure capacity, arriving traffic could be classified into
‘within bottleneck capacity’ and ‘excess traffic’ as shown in Figure 8. The top of the blue
columns represents the capacity of the bottleneck (the rate at which traffic can depart), and
the red portions of the columns represent excess traffic.
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Figure 8. Arriving Traffic Analyzed into ‘Within Capacity’ and ‘Excess’ (by minute)

Relating a single bottleneck to a corridor full of congested traffic
Step 1 of the Method called for definition of the corridor and possible analysis of a corridor as
a sequence of individual bottlenecks. The discussion above talks about a single bottleneck.
It makes an unstated assumption that congestion is caused by bottlenecks, and that these
will be at static locations.
Slow-moving traffic can be caused by three major mechanisms. These mechanisms are
bottlenecks, accidents, and random braking.
• A bottleneck is any location where the capacity of the road reduces compared with
the capacity of the immediately upstream section. This can be caused by the classic
situation of a reduction in the number of lanes, such as a narrowing of the road or
the joining of an on-ramp. It can also be caused by the nature of the section of road
such as curves, rises, camber, visibility, or distraction that results in the throughput
of traffic of the downstream section being lower than the throughput of the traffic
from the upstream section. The bottleneck causes slow-moving traffic when the
volume of traffic arriving at the bottleneck exceeds the amount of traffic that can get
through the bottleneck.
• Accidents cause slow-moving traffic by constricting one or more lanes, or by distracting
drivers who like to look at the accident as they drive by. In essence an accident creates
a temporary bottleneck. Greater levels of traffic result in greater numbers of accidents.
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• Traffic moving freely on a section of road, where there is no variability in the capacity
of the road, can also be slowed down by drivers touching their brakes, causing drivers
behind them to touch their brakes, and so on in such a way that a ‘phantom’ bottleneck
is created.
This project focuses on recurrent traffic congestion that is caused by bottlenecks. Stated
another way, it is focused on situations where the amount of arriving traffic repeatedly
exceeds the capacity of the down-stream section of road.
In the situation where there is a corridor, usually comprised of a length of road (or possibly
parallel roads) with intersections or interchanges, and parts of the corridor have recurrent
congestion, part of the challenge for determining the amount of excess traffic will be deciding
where the bottlenecks are and whether the slow-moving traffic at one location such as an
interchange is caused by the bottleneck at that location, or if it is caused by traffic backing up
from a downstream location. For example, a highway that runs in to a central business district
(CBD) might back up from the CBD off-ramp all the way back to and beyond an interchange
a mile from the CBD, and further to an interchange two miles from the CBD. The analysis of
excess traffic would need to consider the rate of traffic departing the CBD off-ramp as the
major bottleneck before analyzing the traffic at the one- and two-mile interchange on-ramps.
Reduction of traffic arriving at the CBD off-ramp would likely include reductions to traffic that
joins at the upstream interchanges. This would be more complicated still if (for example)
there were another interchange at three-miles upstream that the backed-up queue from the
CBD off-ramp did not reach, that had its own localized congestion, and whether a reduction
at the CBD off-ramp would resolve that localized congestion or not.

Estimating suppressed demand, induced demand, and intra-peak demand
shift
The draft Method (Figure 3) called for estimates of the amount of new traffic that would be
generated as a result of removing congestion, assuming the incentive program succeeded
in removing congestion. Unfortunately, the terminology surrounding this part of the topic is
somewhat confusing.
The literature and the focus groups confirmed that where there is a bottleneck causing
congestion, people adjust to the congestion. As discussed in the previous section, survey
questions about current travel, and how respondents’ trip-making would change if congestion
went away, can reveal the amount that people would change their time or mode of travel;
their frequency of travel (if they do not already travel every day); and the amount they would
start to travel (if they do not travel at the moment).
Intra-peak demand shift is the term coined by the project team to refer to the shift of trip times
within the peak period.
Referring back to Vickrey’s example, imagine that the preferred trip times of the people passing
Vickrey’s bottleneck, for all traffic, were actually in the last hour of the current 90-minute peak
demand period. Imagine that no one wanted to travel during the first half hour, but over time,
because of the bottleneck, the traffic had spread itself out so that 6,600 vehicles arrived over
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the 90-minute peak, or 2,200 for each of three 30-minute periods. Vickrey’s suggestion was
that removing the excess of 600 through whatever means would remove the constraint on
the remaining traffic (the queue). However, suppose people in the remaining traffic of 6,000
vehicles decided that, with the reduction in the queue, there is capacity for them to travel
closer to their preferred time. Imagine that as a result of the reduction of 600 vehicles, 2,000
vehicles currently arriving in the first half-hour peak demand period shifted their departure
time and tried to arrive during the second and third half-hour periods. This shift would be an
‘intra-peak demand shift,’ and while Vickrey’s queue would have initially been removed by
incentivizing 600 people to change their trips, the queue would now re-form, starting a little
later but potentially being larger and lasting longer than the removed queue.
Suppressed demand is people not making trips or making fewer trips than they otherwise
would or making trips by a less preferred route or mode (all of which can be found out via
survey). Removal of the congestion will release those trips, which will show up as additional
trips during the peak period.
Induced demand is the expansion of trips caused by expanding economic activity. For
example, if the general population grows, it is expected that there will be an increase in the
number of people who wish to commute.
The new addition to the picture is the intra-peak demand shift. The intra-peak demand shift is
especially important for CCPTP, because the removal of initial excess will create space that
other existing traffic could move into, causing the queue to re-form. In order to maintain the
reduced length of queue, an additional incentive will be required to reward enough additional
passengers to absorb this shift, or to convince passengers to continue traveling at their less
preferred time.
Using an assumption of removed congestion, it is possible to estimate the amount of intrapeak demand shift, new trips from suppressed traffic, and new trips from induced traffic to
predict the future demand situation for each 15-minute period (or minute-by-minute) through
the peak. For each period, the quantity of excess traffic, and therefore the number of people
whom the solution needs to convince to travel as passengers, can be determined.
By dividing the desired number of passengers by the total commuter traffic for each time
period, the required percent reduction of commuter traffic can be calculated.

Calculating the value of incentives required to reduce the traffic
Reward curves
The Comsis Report had created tables that predicted the impact on traffic volumes of
different combinations of incentives and SOV charges.62 These had been updated for
inflation and slightly changed by VTPI in 2000.63 The project team further updated the
tables for inflation to August 2019, now shown in Figure 9. In these tables, the terms
‘rideshare oriented,’ ‘mode neutral,’ and ‘transit oriented’ refer to the level of rideshare
(in this case carpool and vanpool) compared to the level of transit use in a corridor. If the
former is greater, the route is characterized as ‘rideshare oriented.’ If the latter is greater,
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the route is characterized as ‘transit oriented.’ If the amount of rideshare and transit is
about equal, the route is characterized as ‘mode neutral.’

Figure 9. Comsis Reward Tables (updated to 2019)
It can be seen that a rideshare/transit subsidy and a parking charge work in the same
direction: a driver who becomes a passenger avoids paying for parking and receives an
incentive. The combination delivers both a carrot and a stick. It can be seen from the tables
in Figure 9 that the combination of parking and incentives gives slightly more credit to the
stick than to the carrot: Column 2 of Table 1 shows $0 incentive and a $1.98 parking charge,
while Column 1 of Table 1 shows $1.98 incentive and $0 parking charge, and the impact of
the former is slightly greater all the way down the column than the impact of the latter (for
example, Table 1, Column 2, Row 1 shows 5.9% traffic reduction while Table 1, Column 1,
Row 1 shows 5.8% traffic reduction). The Comsis report makes the point that incentives are
easier to implement but create a problem for funders, while parking charges can provide a
source of revenue to fund the incentives.
In Figure 10, the Comsis tables have been converted for this report on the assumption of zero
parking charges, and different levels of incentive, for one example type of corridor (regional
CBD/Corridor, mode neutral). Similar charts can be calculated for different configurations.
The Figure 10 chart can be used to predict the amount of incentive required to achieve any
target level of commuter traffic reduction.
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Figure 10. Comsis Calculated for One Corridor, Incentive Only (2019 dollars)
The challenge for the project team was to find a method of creating a corridor-specific chart
that could be used in the same way as envisaged for Figure 10. The original tables were
derived from work in the early 1990s or earlier, and the project team was unable to locate
any reports of further work that would have validated these tables in the intervening years.
The method chosen to meet the challenge was a series of questions in a representative
survey of people who do and who might use the corridor, asking the following:
a) Are you the sort of person who would travel as a passenger (by bus, carpool, vanpool)
if it were easy to do?
b) If no, would it change your answer if a program were in place to pay an incentive to
people who travel as passengers during the times when there is traffic congestion?
c) If yes to (a) or (b), imagine a fund of money is available (say from a federal program)
to pay people an incentive for traveling as a passenger. Assuming it does not add any
time to your journey to do so—and perhaps it saves time—how much would you need
to be paid to switch from being a driver to be a passenger?
The answers to these questions would provide realistic data that could be used to derive
a reward curve similar to the one shown in Figure 10. Only people who indicate their real
interest in traveling as passengers would contribute a price. As long as the survey was
representative of the people who do or might use the corridor in question, the proportion
of the sample giving any particular price could be assumed to be the proportion of the total
population of travelers who would respond to that price—as long as the caveat is met that “it
Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Project Work

33

is easy to do, and it adds no extra time (perhaps it saves time).”
The reward curve derived through such a survey would be relevant only to the corridor from
which it was gathered. Further, the reliability of the reward curve would depend on a number
of issues including:
1. How people interpreted the question while doing the survey;
2. How carefully people thought about their answers while doing the survey;
3. What people took into account (that the researchers could not be aware of) while
answering the questions.
Significant value will come from using the survey in a corridor, and then running a pilot project
to see whether the response to any given price is consistent with the findings of the survey.
The project team was able to construct a reward curve for the case study corridor that bore
significant resemblance to the one created from Comsis shown in Figure 10.

Segmentation
As well as a reward curve, the responses to the survey questions above would deliver the
proportions that different sorts of people represent in the commute mix in the corridor: people
who will only drive alone; people who will only drive but will take passengers (for money
or not); and people who are prepared to travel as a passenger (for money or not). These
groups could be referred to as segments. In the future, knowing more about how each of
these segments responds to different messages or interventions could be the key to effective
management of vehicle trip demand through use of incentives.
Winters et al had researched commuter segmentation, and the project team explored the
idea that the questions from that study, which assigned every respondent to a segment,
would be a useful complement to the survey for this project.64 The team thought that perhaps
these previously determined segments could be used in future projects as a shortcut for
calculating the reward curve.
The proportions of people in each of Winters’ segments had contributed to the project
team’s expectation that there would be sufficient people willing to travel as passengers,
given sufficient reward. In the locations sampled by Winters et al., 20% of travelers, or fewer,
were ‘car lovers/devoted drivers’ who would be unlikely to participate as either a driver or
passenger in a passenger-focused solution—leaving 80% who might be positively disposed
to a passenger solution. There was a sense that 80% would be sufficient for passenger-based
congestion-resolving solutions to work. This expectation came back later in a surprising way.
The problem with integrating with the Winters et al. work is that to derive the segments of the
respondents would require adding 16 or 17 questions to the survey, potentially increasing
survey fatigue and dropping response rates. Efforts to create a shortened list of questions,
targeting a maximum of three so that the additional questions would have minimal impact
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on survey completion, were unsuccessful. It was decided that use of this segmentation
methodology would not provide sufficient additional value for the potential survey fatigue
impact. It might still be beneficial to link to a useful segmentation methodology, but this
linkage was not made for the case study.

Applying the reward curves to the desired volumes of traffic reduction
Since the project team had not found any evidence of the Comsis tables being used to
drive actual congestion reduction, there was no described method for their use. Initially it
was envisaged that the volume of reduction required would be applied to the formula for the
reward curve on an appropriate basis (every 15 minutes, every half hour, every hour, etc.) as
appropriate to the analysis. The team anticipated that there would be periods when a greater
proportion of people would be required to switch to being passengers due to intra-peak
demand shift, and that therefore the reward curve would be applied differently each period.
An important concern would be what would happen if the modeling found, due to intra-peak
demand shift, that either a) the physical capacity of the corridor in a time period was unable
to handle the number of ‘drive only, alone’ and ‘drive only, with passengers’ vehicles in the
time period; or b) the percentage reduction required for a time period exceeded the range of
pricing on the reward curve. A mechanism would be required to encourage some portion of
the travelers (passengers and drivers) to travel at a different time, either before or after the
peak demand period.
It was realized at this point that the Comsis tables were not designed for removal of congestion
but rather for a percentage reduction in the amount of commuter travel that might lead to a
reduction in congestion. Comsis did not anticipate or address intra-peak demand shift.
The conclusion of the project team was that the reward curve would deliver the cost to shift
the appropriate number of people to being passengers. A separate reward concept would be
required to convince them to travel as passengers at less preferred times.
Judgment and available data should be used to estimate the value required each day of the
week and to convert to an annual value. While many transportation projects use anywhere
from 260 to 365 days per year for their calculations of benefits, for CCPTP the total should
be adjusted to a reasonable estimate of the actual number of days incentives might be paid:
260 week days per year, less school holiday days and national and local long weekends.

CALCULATIONS FOR ESTIMATING BENEFITS
Estimating the benefits of removing congestion
Reduced cost of vehicle delay
The cost of congestion is typically calculated as the amount of vehicle delay multiplied by an
appropriate hourly rate for the people in the delayed vehicles.
The above discussion about excess traffic shows that the area under the line on a minute-

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Project Work

35

by-minute graph of the traffic queue is the quantity of vehicle-minutes of delay for the period
in question. A model of traffic arriving and departing the queue by minute can provide an
estimate of total delay by summing the length of the ending queue each minute. The cost of
delay can then be determined by multiplying the appropriate cost by the total vehicle hours
of delay.

Reduced cost of excess emissions
An additional congestion cost is the environmental cost of emissions from slow-running
traffic sitting in the queue, that is, the amount of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2-e) produced
by vehicles while they are in the queue. (CO2-e combines all the greenhouse gases included
in vehicle emissions, including nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and methane, stated in
a single equivalence to carbon dioxide given the greenhouse effect of each different gas.)65
There are confounding factors that make the amount of CO2-e difficult to estimate. Each
vehicle will have a different rate of emissions, depending on the size of the engine, the fuel
type, and the tuning of the engine. Electric vehicles will have no emissions. Vehicles that
shut off rather than idling will also expel fewer emissions—modified perhaps by the need to
restart to keep moving forward in the queue.
The amount of CO2-e is derived from the literature as a combination of the rate of fuel consumption
per hour while idling (liters per hour), and the rate of emissions of CO2-e in kg per liter.66
These are multiplied by the total delay.

Reduced cost of traveling at a less-preferred time, or not at all
As will be discussed elsewhere, where a bottleneck exists, people adjust their travel to deal
with the bottleneck. This adjustment was confirmed by the focus groups and the survey.
People travel earlier either to avoid the congestion or to allow for the delay. People travel
later to avoid the congestion. Only a small proportion of people travel at whatever time they
are ready and take the congestion as it comes. In addition, some people opt not to travel,
working from or near home rather than seeking employment further afield.
Information about how people adjust to deal with the bottleneck can only realistically be
obtained via survey. There are four questions that can be asked: how much impact does the
congestion have; what do you do as a result; what time do you leave home at the moment (if
at all); and what time would you leave home if the congestion went away?
The answers to these questions expose an ‘inconvenience factor’ that is caused by the
congestion. It is a real cost that is borne in greater levels of stress, reduced family time,
reduced sleeping time, and reduced productivity at work, to mention a few examples. It can
be quantified by taking the difference between departure times with congestion and without
congestion from the survey.
This benefit is not typically calculated for transportation project analysis, so there is no
accepted method nor rate for its calculation. The project team suggests using the same
hourly rate as that used to value delay.
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Reduced cost of suppressed economy
Further, congestion potentially imposes a cost on the local economy. This cost is equivalent
to the net increase in economic activity that might occur if the congestion were removed. In
one report, for Auckland, New Zealand, a net economic uplift of 3% was forecast as a result
of removing traffic congestion.67 The calculation of this benefit is also not usually carried out
for transportation projects, so there is no accepted method nor rate for its calculation. The
project team did not include this benefit in the benefit cost analysis.

Estimating other benefits
Reduced vehicle miles travelled
With CCPTP, a significant proportion of commuters will switch to traveling as passengers,
therefore reducing the miles their own vehicles will travel. Reduced driving will result in
reductions in parking costs at the destination, as well as reduction in vehicle costs such
as repairs and maintenance, fuel consumption, and depreciation. These are benefits that
are usually calculated for transportation projects. Average round trip distances should be
calculated, and assumptions made for average rates for each avoided cost type.

Improved road safety
Crashes are predicted on a per-VMT basis, and the reduction of VMT should therefore lead
to a reduction in crashes and their attendant costs. This benefit is usually calculated for
transportation projects and should be included here. Rates are available from a number of
different sources.68

FOCUS GROUPS
Having carried out a comprehensive search of the literature, the research team used focus
groups to help think about the issues a payments-to-passengers program might encounter.
From the literature there were some specific matters that needed to be explored, including
the extent to which people leave earlier or later to avoid congestion, and the existence and
rates of charges for parking at the destination.
The project team lead three focus groups in San Jose, California, during March 2019. The
focus groups were structured to: allow participants to discuss their personal experiences
with commuting in traffic; elicit from the participants their ideas for improving the transport
system; and then to steer the conversation toward a discussion of carpooling. Having arrived
at a discussion of carpooling, participants were asked to provide suggestions for designing
a carpool incentive program. Once the group had collectively designed this program,
participants were asked whether such a program would influence them to begin carpooling,
and if not, why not.
The main findings from the focus groups were that while there is interest in carpooling, there
are concerns about the challenges of finding suitable partners, and the safety implications
of carpooling with people who are not known to them, as might be the case if carpools were
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arranged through smart-phone apps. Several participants expressed tentative willingness to
carpool on an occasional basis, e.g., one or two days a week. Some would like to be able
to carpool one-way, e.g., ridesharing in the morning but not back in the evening. Third-party
provision of carpool vehicles was proposed as an attractive strategy, as it would enable
drivers as well as passengers to avoid both operating costs and liability issues.
A full description of the focus groups, including the protocols and details of each session, is
included as Appendix A. Participants were largely solicited via an announcement in a traffic
blog affiliated with the local newspaper and social media postings.69
The literature search and the focus groups worked in tandem to inform the survey in order to
make the survey as relevant as possible for the case study. For future projects, consideration
should be given to the need for focus groups, mainly to help understand how commuters in
the residential catchment of the corridor think about their options and to identify the language
they use to describe what they do—which should then flow forward into any rewording
needed for the survey.

SURVEY INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT
An essential part of the Method is the conduct of a representative sample survey of corridor
citizens to gain empirical understanding of their use of the corridor, their response to existing
congestion, how they would respond to removal of the congestion, whether they are the sort
of person who would travel as a passenger, and what amount of payment would be required
to offset any reluctance to doing so.
The survey instrument was developed in the popular and well-used SurveyMonkey.com
service. There were 104 questions, but any one respondent would answer only about 30
of them because there were a variety of pathways that could be taken through the survey,
depending on answers to branching questions. The survey was tested by colleagues outside
the project team and modified based on their feedback. It was further tested by sending to
a small initial sample (see the sampling methodology) and further modified after evaluating
the responses.

SAMPLING METHODOLOGY
Initial plans had anticipated surveying commuters and reaching them via major employers
on the corridor or by hiring relatively inexpensive online survey providers from San Jose
State University or other commercially available providers. The project team was concerned
about the ability to target such services reliably on a specific catchment as narrow as a
few zip codes. As the project progressed, it became clear that the focus should anyway be
broader than just existing commuters in order to connect with people who might start to use
the route if congestion went away.
The project team explored the idea of a random sample of residential properties based on
the property tax assessment roll. Such a sample could be truly random, as all properties,
and therefore all people, could have an equal probability of being selected. To keep costs
to the minimum, it was envisaged that the survey itself would be administered online, but
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the sample would be obtained by visiting randomly selected addresses and engaging
people to request participation, leaving visiting cards for people who were not at home, and
returning several times until the desired engagement could be achieved, and hopefully the
resident would agree to do the survey. It was hoped that a community service organization
in the catchment would provide the delivery and engagement service, however the team
was unable to engage the support of such a community service organization. The sampling
and engagement process described above is what the project team recommends for future
projects, but using paid staff rather than relying on a community service organization for
delivery and engagement.
For the case study a less reliable method was used: people were selected at random from
the registered voter list. See the case study for a full description. This method introduced
self-selection bias into the sample.
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V. CASE STUDY
CASE STUDY ROUTE CHOICE
In order to develop a realistic methodology, the project team needed a route to focus on
that had some level of traffic congestion that might be responsive to congestion-clearing
payments. A number of different routes were suggested, including State Route (Highway) 92
from Half Moon Bay to San Mateo, State Route 4, State Route 17, Highway 101, Interstate
680, and Interstate 880.
Highway 92 is a two-lane east–west route through rolling hills and small mountains across
the San Francisco Peninsula connecting Highways 280 and 101 with Highway 1 (see Figure
11) and is known for significant traffic congestion. The case study route is highlighted in
Figure 11 by the red oval and is described as ‘Highway 92 from Route 1 to Highway 280’.

Figure 11. Highway 92 from Half Moon Bay to Interstate 280
The project team selected Highway 92 as the focal route based on several criteria:
• Existence of significant congestion
• Data available about traffic flows
• Simplicity of the catchment for surveying residents
• Simplicity of the route, not having:
o One or more alternate routes
o Existing treatments such as carpool lanes and tolled express lanes that
might make it more difficult to evaluate traveler response to the proposed
CCPTP solution
Therefore, north–south-oriented highways with parallel routes were discarded as options
because of the complexity introduced where the impact of a potential intervention on one
route might divert traffic from the parallel route. For example, this criterion eliminated
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Highways 280 and 101 (see Figure 12) and Highways 680 and 880 (see Figure 13). This
is not to say that parallel routes should always be a criterion for route rejection, but that for
the development and initial testing of the Method the project team had limited resources
and wished to avoid the added complexity parallel routes would bring.
Additionally, Highway 680 has a variable tolled express lane. Carpool lanes currently exist
on I-880, and these are currently being converted to tolled express lanes.
Highway 92 has no parallel route. Users of Highway 92 for a morning commute would
all come from the single Coastside catchment that was easy to define, being the City of
Half Moon Bay and the surrounding communities–there were no other likely sources of
commuter traffic on the route. Highway 92 traffic counts were available from the Caltrans
website.
That there was congestion to be eliminated was clear from the City of Half Moon Bay
planning documents, which said:
“During peak periods Highways 1 and 92 are heavily congested, often extraordinarily so
during extended weekend peak periods.”70
“In addition to vehicular trips associated with commuting and recreation, a significant
number of large trucks use the same routes. Trucks transport agricultural products out of
the area to market. Deliveries to the Ox Mountain landfill as well as transport of sand and
gravel from the Pilarcitos Quarry—both of which are located north of Highway 92 east
of the city limits—further contribute to a significant presence of truck traffic. Highway 92
is a curving road with increasing grade as it traverses east. Trucks that use these routes
affect visibility, overall speed, and volume characteristics, especially when present
in concentrations and overlapped with commute or recreational traffic including that
associated with commercial entities and residences that take access from Highway 92.”72
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Figure 13. Highways 680 and 880

CASE STUDY DEVELOPMENT
The project team had viewed some statistical data for Highway 92 prior to making the route
choice. However, it became apparent later that the available information did not meet all of
the initial criteria for evaluating a route. Seeing a route listed on the Caltrans website does
not mean that there will be the same level of information available as for any other route
so listed. Also, as the project progressed, the team realized that some of the necessary
information is not collected for any route. This gap is a reflection of the fact that the CCPTP
approach has not previously been considered, so information required by such an approach
is simply not collected.
The best information the team could access for the case study route was a time series of
one-hour counts, shown in Table 3: counts at the bottleneck location in 2003, 2006, 2009,
and 2012, showing the number of vehicles that passed through the bottleneck each hour.
There is no additional detail available either in narrower time bands or in the composition of
the traffic.
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Traffic Counts at the Bottleneck

Note that the time series in Table 3 ends in 2012, six years before this project. Also note
that this route has had a long-standing reputation for bad traffic congestion: for example, it
was known for its congestion by three out of four members of the project team. It was based
on this reputation that the route was chosen—the lack of statistical information mentioned
above was realized much later. After some difficulty and delay in finding other sources, the
team did finally obtain a one-day weekday count of traffic on SR 92 where it crosses Main
Street and found that the results were consistent with the older counts described above and
below.
The paucity of data is expected to be a common problem, so the team developed some
innovative solutions for resolving the data problem, rather than changing to a different case
study route. These solutions are discussed in the next section.

OBTAINING BETTER TRAFFIC DATA
Caltrans advised that they had count data for adjacent locations over a longer period of time.
These were obtained and analyzed. Table 4 shows traffic counts on Tuesday mornings at an
adjacent location that had a high correlation with the case study bottleneck throughput, as
well as some relatively recent counts. The team decided to use the average of the 2017/2018
counts from this location as a basis for analysis.
Early in the project, it was thought that a rate of departure from the queue (through the
bottleneck) of around 1,400 vehicles per hour seemed low. Corroborating evidence was
sought. Also, the team noted that this apparent limit has been impacting this traffic for the
past 17 years and seems to be consistent regardless of the time of year.
The team contacted a commercial provider of traffic information and were advised that the
sources the commercial provider typically relied on for robust data were not available for the
case study route due to the relatively low volumes of traffic on the route.
The team contacted Caltrans who advised that they are opting to use Google Traffic for
much of their own initial analysis of traffic conditions as a much lower-cost and possibly
more flexible method of data acquisition compared to the usual pressure-sensitive tubes laid
across the road. The team therefore turned to Google Traffic to see what could be learned
about the existing traffic at the bottleneck. The objective was to learn about volumes of
traffic, the existence of queues, and the amount of delay. Two sources were used: Google
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Typical Traffic and Google Maps Live Traffic.
Table 4.

Traffic Counts East of the Bottleneck but with High Correlation

Tuesday Mornings, Averages of Actual Readings, at the 'Ahead' Location
After Highway 92 Meets the Junction with Route 35 South, Milepost
5.191, Traffic Going Eastbound from Half Moon Bay to San Mateo.
5–6 am 6–7 am 7–8 am 8–9 am 9–10 am
Month
1,370
1,356
978
839
2002 November
340
1,399
1,196
927
970
2003 February
375
1,267
915
1,378
920
2003 May
306
2003 August
329
845
1,280
1,198
947
2005 October
381
984
1,602
1,388
1,027
1,341
1,433
344
827
2006 January
120
2006 April
869
1,843
1,437
1,231
1,297
2006 July
602
1,229
1,378
1,463
1,417
2008 October
293
819
1,351
1,156
933
887
1,156
1,316
813
320
2009 January
968
1,212
1,379
763
292
2009 April
701
923
1,220
300
1,165
2009 July
2011 October
366
812
1,240
1,519
1,063
2012 January
325
780
1,256
1,407
943
999
2012 April
314
752
1,365
1,233
1,035
1,299
1,325
877
359
2012 July
974
1,243
1,311
896
2014 October
361
1,354
1,463
389
978
127
2015 January
1,164
1,267
1,308
881
419
2015 July
1,242
1,504
1,558
1,027
452
2017 October
1,386
934
1,288
909
2018 January
443
448
2018 April
966
1,337
1,177
1,128
2018 July
473
960
1,347
1,194
1,244
1,069
Average 2002 to 2018
883
1,319
1,298
374
Std Dev 2002 to 2018
149
280
159
118
163
1,125
966
1,303
1,407
454
Average Oct 17 to July 18
Google Typical Traffic
Screenshots were captured showing typical traffic from Google. For example, Table 5 shows
the screenshot for each weekday at 7:55 am, showing the full route from Highway 1 to
Highway 280 (paralleled with a red arrow on the image from Monday). It can be seen that
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Tuesday is the worst day of the week. The team decided to focus on Tuesday as the main
day for which to develop a comprehensive understanding of traffic flows, against which to
test the CCPTP solution concept.
Table 5.

Google Typical Traffic. SR 92: 7:55 am for Five Weekdays

Monday

Tuesday
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Friday
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Typical traffic was observed (on Google Maps) for a variety of different times on Tuesday
mornings to investigate whether the size and duration of queues could be determined.
The congestion issue clearly occurs around the intersection of Highway 1 and SR 92.
Screenshots were captured of this more focused geography looking at the typical traffic
situation every ten minutes from 6 am to 9 am. Tables 6 to 11 show typical Tuesday traffic
on Highway 1 and SR 92 at Half Moon Bay from 6 am to 9 am.
Table 6.

Typical Tuesday Traffic. Highway 1 and SR 92 at Half Moon Bay. 6:00 am
to 6:30 am

6:00 am

6:10 am

6:20 am

6:30 am
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Table 6 shows traffic at 6:00 am, 6:10 am, 6:20 am, and 6:30 am. There is no real delay at
these times, except for outside the Flying Fish Bar and Grill where the traffic is merging into
a single lane, at 6:30 am.
Table 7.

Google Typical Tuesday Traffic. Highway 1 and SR 92 at Half Moon Bay.
6:40 am to 7:10 am

6:40 am

6:50 am

7:00 am

7:10 am

Table 7 shows 6:40 am, 6:50 am, 7:00 am, and 7:10 am. The traffic backs up from the merge
point and is slower moving (orange) across Main Street. There is a traffic signal at this
intersection. By 7:10 am, the traffic on Main Street is impacted, as is the slower traffic back
to Highway 1. Next to the Flying Fish the traffic is slow (now red, compared with ‘slower’
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(orange) earlier). There is also some back-up on Highway 1.
Table 8.

7:20 am

Typical Tuesday Traffic. Highway 1 and SR 92 at Half Moon Bay. 7:20 am
and 7:30 am

7:30 am

Table 8 shows maps for 7:20 am and 7:30 am, showing that the slower traffic extends a
long way up the 92 and back along Highway 1 both from the north and the south. Main
Street continues to be congested with traffic seeking to go in both directions: to Highway
92 and to Highway 1.
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7:30 am

50

Table 10: Typical Tuesday Traffic. Highway 1 and SR 92 at Half Moon
Bay. 7:30 am and 7:40 am (wider view to include El Granada)

7:40 am

Realizing that at 7:40 am the traffic backs up all the way to El Granada, the scale is changed
to reconsider the situation as it appears at 7:30 (see Table 9). There is a tranche of slowermoving traffic coming from El Granada that by 7:40 am represents a full slower-moving
southbound lane over the whole distance. It appears that there is some form of bottleneck
near the Quality Inn on the south side of El Granada. Perhaps the left-turn lane at Medio
Ave. is not long enough.
Also note that Highway 1 is a minor road at this location with local traffic being able to join or
leave, perhaps contributing to the lower speeds.
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Table 10. Typical Tuesday Traffic. Highway 1 and SR 92 at Half Moon Bay. 7:50 am
to 8:15 am

7:50 am

8:00 am

8:05 am

8:15 am

The maps for 7:50 am, 8:00 am, 8:05 am, and 8:15 am (Table 10) show that the traffic speeds
up slightly at the Highway 1/92 intersection but continues to be slow through El Granada,
due to a tranche of traffic that is headed southbound to the Highway 1/92 intersection.
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Table 11. Typical Tuesday Traffic. Highway 1 and SR 92 at Half Moon Bay. 8:25 am
to 8:55 am

8:25 am

8:35 am

8:45 am

8:55 am

Table 11, comprised of screenshots for 8:25 am, 8:35 am, 8:45 am, and 8:55 am, shows
the dissipation of the accumulated traffic as it speeds up and the bottleneck is resolved
by 8:55 am.

Interpreting Google Typical Traffic
Google gives four typical traffic speeds: from green for fastest to dark red for slowest. The
average speeds that correspond with these values are not available. Nor are values to
associate with the progression to slower (orange) and slow (light red). Light red can be
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interpreted as ‘bad,’ but clearly it is still moving. The project team attempted to find out
the algorithm behind these colors (how Google Maps decides which color corresponds to
which speed), and how many days of observations are averaged together and whether
any weightings are applied. These efforts were unsuccessful–while Google has information
online about typical traffic, it does not include the algorithm. Hence, the team does not know
what conditions it would take to get to an average of dark red, nor whether the values are
different if there are different posted speeds, or how quickly changes to the traffic (over time
for the same time and day) would change the ‘typical’ traffic displayed.
The project team expected that the length of the queue could be determined from these
maps, if it were safe to assume light red is in fact a queue, by using the scale of the map,
and converting that scale into a number of vehicles.
It was noted that there are two bottlenecks in these maps: the one at Highway 1/92, and
the one next to the Quality Inn towards El Granada. The project team considered including
both in the project. It was decided that changing the average occupancy at the Highway 1/92
bottleneck could result in changing the average occupancy at the Quality Inn, so both might
be impacted through the same set of incentives.
As a ‘business rule’ for congestion-clearing payments to passengers, it was noted that a
distance-based component could be incorporated in the incentive, so that people who travel
as passengers for greater distances receive larger incentives. In this way it would be expected
that people further from the bottleneck would benefit from making the effort to travel as a
passenger from as close to home as possible. Such a higher incentive for people who travel
as passengers for the whole distance to the I-280 would encourage increased sharing from
points farther north such as El Granada and reduce the impact of an intervening bottleneck
(such as the one that can be seen next to the Quality Inn). However, this additional incentive
has not been included in the modeling for the case study.

Google Maps Live Traffic
The uncertainty referred to above regarding the algorithms used to determine typical traffic
on Google Typical Traffic led to a parallel effort by the project team based on the more easily
understandable Google Maps Live Traffic. In this case it was found that screen capture
software could be used in an automated routine to grab an image of Live Traffic every few
seconds; these images could then be consolidated and compressed to form a time-lapse
video of the peak period traffic. Several such videos were made.
An example video can be viewed here: https://tinyurl.com/HMBvideo

Estimating queue length
Based on the aforementioned work, the longest queue was calculated to be about 287
vehicles long, at 7:25 am, based on the Google map as shown in the screenshot in Figure
14. The segments measured were those that the automated screen captures revealed were
highly congested. What surprised the project team was that the typical traffic displayed by
Google Typical Traffic varied over time to a much greater degree than expected. The team
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therefore decided that Google Typical Traffic is of questionable value for drawing conclusions
about queue length at any given time on any given day of the week. Compare Figure 14 and
Figure 15, screenshots of typical traffic at the Half Moon Bay bottleneck at a similar time of
day and day of week, taken within a couple of weeks of each other. They are quite different
both in terms of the colors representing speed and the apparent length of the queues.

Figure 14. Typical Tuesday Traffic, Half Moon Bay. 7:25 am (showing bars used for
measuring the queue)
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Figure 15. Typical Tuesday Traffic. 7:20 am
The difference between these maps presents a serious limitation on the use of the Google
Typical Traffic tool for estimating queue length. Google Typical Traffic should be used with
caution and should not be a replacement for actual measurement on the ground.
Using the typical traffic in Figure 14 and knowledge from the live traffic videos, however,
the maximum queue was estimated at 6,500 lane feet, or 1.23 miles. This distance was
translated to a number of vehicles using an estimated of jam density (vehicles per mile)
based on recent Google Maps screenshots of slow-moving traffic at border crossings
between the U.S. and Canada, which averaged 233 vehicles per mile (see Figure 16). A
queue length estimate of 287 vehicles was therefore established and compared well with
modeling based on the survey.
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Figure 16. Screenshot of Google Maps Satellite View at U.S.–Canada Border

Selecting a representative sample and testing the survey
The sample for the survey was extracted from the registered voter list for the Half Moon
Bay coastal communities commute shed that uses the SR 92 connection across San Mateo
County between the Pacific Coast and Silicon Valley. Because of the somewhat isolated
location, it is logical that all commuter traffic on the route would be from this catchment. The
voter list was readily available from San Mateo County, held an estimated 80% of all people
aged 16+, and contained both email and phone numbers of registered voters in a Microsoft
Excel format.
Experience found that, compared to expectations, a smaller proportion of the registered
voters had email addresses, and fewer had phone numbers. Later experience revealed that
almost none of the phone numbers worked. It was also found that the age distribution of
people with email addresses was very similar to the age profile of the whole database and
in turn was similar to the age profile of people in the target communities. It was therefore
anticipated that sending an on-line survey link to people with email addresses should yield a
sufficiently representative sample.
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A sample of voters having email addresses was extracted from the database using a Microsoft
Excel spreadsheet random selection method, as follows:
• Each voter on the database was assigned a unique number, sequentially, from 1 to ‘n’
(the total number of voters on the database).
• The formula “=RANDBETWEEN(1,n)” delivered a number, and that was used to look
up the details of the voter who had been assigned that number.
• The =RANDBETWEEN formula was copied for the required number of rows to deliver
the sample.
• The list so generated was compared to the entire database on the basis of age
distribution and was found to be broadly similar.
The survey was tested with an initial selection of 50 email addresses via SurveyMonkey.
After revision, the survey was distributed to a larger sample. Analysis suggested that
further revisions were required. A final revised email survey invitation was sent to 588 email
addresses, with response rates as follows:
• 4 (0.7%) were automatically opted out by SurveyMonkey,
• 22 (3.7%) messages bounced,
• 218 (37.1%) invitations were unopened, and
• 344 (58.5%) were opened, and
• 120 (20.4%) surveys were sufficiently completed for meaningful analysis.
From the demographic classification questions asked in the survey, a comparison with
available Census data showed that the characteristics of respondents closely matched the
total population.
The team was satisfied that the sample was representative. Please refer to the heading
‘Adjusting for self-selection bias’ in the Case Study section for a discussion on the topic of
representativeness.
The full survey is reproduced in Appendix B.

Survey analysis
Respondents were asked whether they use Highway 92 between 5 am and 9 am on a
typical Tuesday throughout the year; if so, how they use it: which residential community
they live in, what time they leave home, where they go and why, what mode of travel they
use; and whether they use it every Tuesday or just some Tuesdays.
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It is useful to note that there are six main residential communities on the Coastside (the
coastal area of San Mateo County from Montara to Pescadero, and survey respondents
travel to as many as 25 different destinations, about 15 of which were the destination of
more than one respondent.72 In all cases, travel to these destinations must be via the
bottleneck at the junction of Main Street and Highway 92 (it is the only route).
The responses from the above questions were converted into arrival times at the bottleneck,
assuming it takes the average amount of time to make the trip from the residential community
to the bottleneck, based on the average of the longest and shortest trip times suggested
by Google Maps. People who indicated less than a regular weekly trip were assigned a
probability of being at the bottleneck on any given Tuesday.
Data from the historic traffic counts (from Table 4) were used to calculate a multiplier to
gross up from the probability-adjusted number of respondents to the full traveling population
as follows.
1. The average of the 2017/2018 hourly counts was reduced by an assumed proportion
for non-commuter traffic (10% was used based on feedback from the City Engineer of
the City of Half Moon Bay), delivering the total commuter traffic;
2. The total commuter traffic was divided by the number of vehicles adjusted for the
probability of being there on a Tuesday morning from the survey, delivering the
multiplier (3,716 / 54.8 = 67.8). See Table 12.
Table 12. Calculating the Multiplier
Average Oct 17 to July 18
Less: Allowance for non-commuter traffic
Average commuter vehicles
Probability Adjusted Traffic from Survey
Multiplier
Commuter vehicles (modeled)
Over/Under

5–6 am
454
45
409

6–7 am
966
97
869

7–8 am
1,407
141
1,266

8–9 am
1,303
130
1,173

Total
4129.6
0.0
3716.7
54.8
67.8

417
9

784
(85)

1,293
27

1,243
71

3737.7
21.0

The peak average hourly traffic of 1,407 vehicles was divided to calculate an average for
vehicles departing the bottleneck each minute, that is, the queue discharge flow rate.
Each respondent’s bottleneck arrival time was calculated, and the probability factor was
multiplied by the calculated multiplier of 67.8 to derive a number of vehicles arriving at
the bottleneck. Each respondent’s multiplied arrival at the bottleneck was spread evenly
across ten minutes to derive a minute-by-minute count of commuter vehicles arriving at
the bottleneck. The spread across ten minutes was an arbitrary method to reflect that if this
number of vehicles arrived, they could not arrive all at once. The non-commuter vehicles
were added.
Minute-by-minute total flows were calculated, showing the opening queue (if any) for the
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minute, the vehicles arriving, the vehicles departing, and the ending queue. An excerpt from
the model calculations is shown in Table 13.
Table 13. Sample of Queue Length Calculations from the Model

The model therefore delivered a quantity of estimated arriving commuter traffic for each hour
derived from the survey data. The modeled quantity was compared with the actual flows
from the historical counts. The results can be seen in Table 12, above. The purpose of this
comparison was to decide if the traffic modeled based on the survey data was a reasonable
representation of the real traffic. Considering the small amount of ‘over/under’ for each hour,
(the last row on Table 12), the project team concluded that the model was a reasonable
representation of the real traffic on Tuesday mornings.

CURRENT EXCESS TRAFFIC
Each minute that the arriving traffic exceeds the departing traffic, the difference forms part of
‘excess traffic.’ The arriving traffic can be divided into ‘within capacity’ and ‘excess.’ Figure 17
shows the various statistics on a minute-by-minute basis: excess traffic, the resulting queue,
and the number of commuters (not vehicles) departing the queue from 7 am to 9 am.
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Figure 17. Current Traffic, Queue, and Delay, Half Moon Bay Bottleneck (modeled
based on survey, Tuesday mornings)

STATISTICS
At the bottleneck, the model suggests that between 7 am and 9 am on typical Tuesdays,
there are currently 514 excess vehicles, 315 in the first hour and 199 in the second, causing
delay to over 2,800 vehicles and total delay of about 13,200 vehicle minutes (220 vehicle
hours) of delay each typical Tuesday morning. The average delay per vehicle is just under 5
minutes, and the maximum delay is almost 10 minutes. See Table 14.
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Table 14. Main Street/Highway 92 Bottleneck Queue Statistics (modeled)

Tuesdays were understood to be the worst day of the week for traffic at the bottleneck based
on the Google Typical Traffic observations. Using the same historical data source that had
been used for Table 4 (page 44), and comparing days of the week for the same 2017/2018
period and the same location, Table 15 was generated. It can be seen from Table 15 that
Mondays have 8% less throughput than Tuesdays in the 7 am to 9 am peak period (last
column, 92 is 8% less than 100). Wednesday traffic flows are about 86% of Tuesday traffic
flows. Total delay and other statistics could be expected to be lower for these other days of
the week compared with Tuesdays.
Table 15. Comparing Morning Traffic Flows by Day of Week (with Tuesday set to
100 for each time period)

However, this expectation was thrown into doubt by some respondents in the survey who
challenged the statement that Tuesdays were the worst days, and also by general statistics
(beyond the case study route) that suggest that traffic builds through the week and is worst
on Fridays.73 Table 15 could be interpreted in a different way: in every time period each day
of the week, fewer vehicles get through the bottleneck than on Tuesdays because traffic
is worse than on Tuesdays. Thus far, the project team has been unable to reconcile the
different sources. For the purposes of calculating benefits and costs for the case study, all
five days have been treated as if they are the same as Tuesday.
As a first step in a pilot project for the route, the traffic will be measured with greater precision
on the ground. In further applications of the method, it is recommended that actual count
data be obtained of queue length and delay for all days of the week.
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INTRA-PEAK DEMAND SHIFT, LATENT DEMAND, AND NEW TRAFFIC
Survey respondents had been asked at the beginning of the survey how much impact the
bottleneck congestion had on them and what they do as a result. Figure 18 shows that 46%
of respondents leave earlier than they would prefer (either to avoid the congestion or to
allow enough time for it), while 37% leave later to avoid the congestion.

Figure 18. How People Adjust to the Congestion
Survey respondents were asked what they would do if the traffic congestion went away.
• If they currently do not travel, would they start to travel?
• If so, at what time would they leave home and by what mode?
• If they currently travel some of the time, would they increase the frequency, and would
they change their time of travel or mode?
• If they currently travel every Tuesday, would they change their time of travel or mode?
Figure 19 shows the shape of the existing travel pattern (labeled ‘current traffic’) that causes
the existing queue with the peak hour of travel (peak-of-the-peak) being 7:00 am to 8:00 am.
The columns labeled ‘current traffic no congestion’ show that the peak-of-the-peak would
shift to later (7:30 am to 8:30 am) if there were no congestion, and demand for travel in
this later hour would be about 45% greater than the existing peak hour. This pattern could
perhaps be anticipated and observed if the facility were (say) doubled in size.
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Figure 19. Trip-Time Shift if Congestion Removed (Intra-Peak Demand Shift)
As well as the time shift, there is also an increase in travel as existing travelers who are not
traveling every Tuesday increase their trip frequency. These travelers account for a 14%
increase in the overall traffic volume in the period from 5 am to 9 am: same people, more
trips, which fits one of the definitions of suppressed demand.
To complete the picture, the removal of congestion would encourage people who do not
currently travel to begin to travel. The estimated 5–9 am traffic would grow by a further 17%
from this group. Figure 20 shows the result, with the shift from the blue existing traffic to the
new total of the orange and grey.
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Figure 20. Intra-Peak Demand Shift Plus Suppressed Demand
A note of caution: the people who do not currently travel have been added at the same
multiplier as each of the other respondents in the sample. There is no information that
confirms (or argues with) an assumption that the survey response rate of people who do
not currently travel during the 5 am to 9 am period is the same as that of those who do.
However, analysis of the rating that this group of people gave for congestion’s impact on
them suggests to the project team that these people might have been more highly motivated
to respond than regular users: they feel trapped by the congestion.
Surveying based on true random sampling of households would remove the above uncertainty.
The size of the intra-peak demand shift is significant. On a probability-adjusted basis, 3,716
people are commuters who currently pass through the bottleneck between 5 am and 9 am.
Of these,
• 2,632 (71%) would shift to a later departure, for a total of 1,735 hours more time
before leaving home, and
• 618 (17%) would shift to an earlier departure, for a total of 490 hours of earlier time at
their destination.
In addition to this shift to more preferred departure times, current commuters would increase
their trips in an amount that would be the same as if 508 additional people travelled regularly,
and 627 people who are not currently travelling would begin to travel. In total, the initial 3,716
probability-adjusted travelers would increase to 4,851, an increase of 31%.
This analysis explains the mechanism by which the removal of congestion through any
means could be followed by re-formed and larger queues.
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TRAVELING AS A PASSENGER
The survey respondents were asked, while waiting and hoping for a change that makes the
traffic congestion disappear, if they would help by traveling as a passenger in the interim, in
a car, van, bus, or “shared Uber” style of transport. If saying no, they were asked whether,
if there were a sufficient incentive payment available for doing so, they would change their
answer. If further saying no, they were asked if they would provide rides for passengers. If
further saying no, they were asked whether, if there were a sufficient payment available for
doing so, they would provide rides for passengers for money. Through the mechanism of
these four questions, respondents classified themselves into three major groups: people who
would travel as passengers if the deal were right, people who only drive but would provide
rides for people if the deal were right, and people who would only ever drive alone. See
Figure 21 for the breakdown of Highway 92 commuters into these groups.

Figure 21. Willingness to Share (by Half Moon Bay Survey Respondents)
The proportions in Figure 21 suggest a limit on the potential traffic reduction from any
passenger strategy on the corridor: the most that could be achieved would be a 50% reduction
of traffic as the potential passengers who are currently driving shifted into vans or buses, or
into the empty seats in the cars of drivers who would take passengers. If all passengers
carpooled in the cars of people who would take passengers, the average occupancy of
those cars would be 3.2 people per car (including the driver). The average occupancy of all
commuter cars would be 2.0 people per car (including the driver). The average occupancy
of the traffic, assuming 10% of the traffic is non-commuter with solo drivers, would be 1.9
people per vehicle.
Even if all the potential passengers shifted into buses and remaining cars were all single
occupant vehicles (SOV), the maximum traffic reduction would be 50%.
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REWARD CURVES
Having determined which respondents were willing to travel as passengers or to drive
passengers, those respondents were then asked how much money they would need to
receive to offset the effort involved in traveling as a passenger or driving passengers. The
former group (potential passengers) were asked how much money they would need for
traveling as a passenger in each of the following modes: a bus, a vanpool, a carpool, or
a shared Uber. The latter group (potential drivers of passengers) were asked how much
money they would need for providing a ride, on the basis it would be in the nature of a
carpool arrangement. All were asked to assume it would be ‘easy to do’ and would not take
any additional time.
The amounts provided were then stacked, for passengers, combining their lowest price
option. The probability-adjusted number of travelers at each price level, cumulatively, were
divided by the total probability-adjusted number of commuters. This calculation provided the
reward curve that is shown in Figure 22.

Figure 22. Reward Curve for Passengers: Half Moon Bay Current Commuters
It is important to note that the pre-condition on the price that respondents stated was that
‘it is easy to travel as a passenger.’ About 12.5% of the respondents indicated that if it
was easy to travel as a passenger, they would do it for no payment. The highest rate of
payment requested was $15. The regression line on the chart helps calculate the value
of reward required to achieve a given level of commute trip reduction. With ease traveling
as a passenger, a 30% reduction in commuter traffic could be achieved, according to this
chart, for a daily payment to passengers of about $5.50. A 45% reduction would require a
daily payment to passengers of $15.
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Turning to the payments required by drivers who would take passengers, Figure 21 shows
the ‘price curve’ for this group. Figure 21 had shown that 23% of commuters would only
drive but would take passengers. Figure 23 shows that for this maximum level of passenger-taking, drivers would expect payment on the order of $15.

Figure 23. Price Curve for Drivers Taking Passengers, Half Moon Bay Commuters

A REWARD-FUELED SHIFT TO HIGH OCCUPANCY VEHICLES THROUGH
THE BOTTLENECK
In order to develop the case study further, it was necessary to make some assumptions
about the protocol that would be used to implement congestion-clearing payments to passengers on this route. It would be relatively easy to introduce a congestion-clearing payment
and remove the current excess traffic on Tuesdays. About 600 people would need to be
incentivized to switch (see Table 14 (page 61): 514 excess vehicles from 7 am to 9 am, plus
a reasonable margin for variability). Other days of the week might require greater or lesser
amounts. However, modeling of the reaction by travelers to the removal of the existing congestion revealed that the limit to traffic reduction (of 50% because 50% of the people say
they will only drive), combined with the dramatic intra-peak demand shift, would result in the
formation of new queues, albeit shorter ones, later in the peak period. Modeling the arrival
of passengers and drivers based on the survey sample revealed an imbalance at peak such
that sometimes the average occupancy of vehicles would need to exceed practical levels. It
was realized that in order to prevent the re-formation of the bottleneck queue, the protocol
would need to encourage people to continue traveling at less preferred times to dampen the
impact of the intra-peak demand shift.
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Three protocols were chosen and are discussed below as follows:
1. The first protocol: flexible carpooling, a meeting-place-based carpooling solution
2. The second protocol: going-early bonuses
3. The third protocol: mechanisms to limit the number of SOVs at peak

The first protocol: flexible carpooling, a meeting-place-based carpooling
solution
The first protocol assumes that incentives will be offered at congestion-clearing levels and
increased as congestion returns. Concurrently, a meeting-place-based carpooling solution
(‘flexible carpooling’ from the literature review) is envisaged such that people arriving at
the bottleneck intending to be passengers catch a ride with the next vehicle going to their
destination. If there are no vehicles about to depart, all passengers for that destination
combine in the vehicles of others who had arrived to be passengers to achieve quick
departures, even though the traffic contributes to the formation of a queue. Figure 24
shows the results of this protocol.

Figure 24. First Protocol Impact of Congestion-Clearing Payments to Passengers
Compared with the current situation shown in Figure 17 (page 60), the first modeled
protocol would deliver a reduction in delay from 202 hours to 79 hours (a 61% reduction)
and would increase the number of people traveling through the bottleneck from 2,783 to
4,308 (a 55% increase). The current queue that forms from 7 am or earlier would dissipate,
but eventually a new queue would begin to form from about 8 am onwards as people
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shifted within the peak period to more preferred times of travel.
The value of payments to passengers associated with the first protocol is as follows,
assuming all days of the week can be expected to be similar to the surveyed Tuesdays:
• Each day (excluding periods such as school holidays) approximately 1,900 passengers
would be rewarded, representing 50% of the commuter traffic. Using the reward curve,
it can be seen that the maximum reward on the curve ($15 per day) is expected to
achieve no more than a 46% reduction. This difference (46% compared with 50%) is
seen as being within the tolerances of a new solution. However, because the required
number of passengers is expected to grow with population growth over the ensuing
years, other work will be needed to ensure that a growing proportion of commuters
can be reached.
• Once the full adjustment has been achieved (1,900 commuters traveling as
passengers), the modeling suggests daily payments to deliver value to commuters in
the order of $28,500 ($15 each). (Note that value can be delivered through prize draw
entries at lower than the face value of the reward, so the cost is not expected to be at
this level.)
• The initial situation will be less costly. The required reduction from 7 am to 9 am is
25% (600 people), which Figure 22 (page 66) suggests will require incentives worth
$4 per day. The initial value transfer could be as low as $2,570 per day. For modeling
purposes, the project team allowed a cost of $5 each for 514 passengers.
The project team has assumed that the actual cost of incentives will be 60% of their face
value, on the expectation that passengers will take prize draw entries instead of cash in the
appropriate proportions.
For modeling, it has therefore been calculated that the first year will start with a cost of $2,570
per day and end with a cost of $17,910 per day, with gradual growth to 1,990 passengers and
adjustment of rates throughout the year. The daily value received by the participants would
start at $4,200 and increase to $29,850 by the end of the first year.
However, under the first protocol, congestion will not be fully removed. It will be cleared from
7 am to 8 am, but a queue will form, as shown in Figure 24, from about 8 am each day.

The second protocol: going early bonuses
Analysis of the makeup of the traffic from 8 am to 9 am finds that there are 210 too many
vehicles with 525 passengers, based on the first protocol, for the traffic to flow freely from 8
am to 9 am. The reason for this high level of demand is the intra-peak demand shift, in which
people have said they will shift to their preferred time of travel. The question is, could those
210 drivers and 525 passengers be enticed to travel earlier (i.e. at a time that is not their
preferred time of travel), or later, and if so, what would it cost? Are there other ways to solve
the problem?
To solve this issue, a second protocol was chosen, in addition to the first protocol, to reward
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people for traveling in the new ‘pre-peak period’ of 7 am to 8 am by paying a bonus to
passengers in that period. Because it is not desirable that all 210 vehicles travel in the last 15
minutes of the pre-peak period, the second protocol proposes a sliding scale that pays the
highest bonus for traveling between 7:00 am and 7:15 am, a little less for traveling between
7:15 am and 7:30 am, a little less again for 7:30 am to 7:45 am, and the lowest bonus for 7:45
am to 8:00 am. Since this concept was not included in the survey, and to the best knowledge
of the project team has not been done before, there is no information to rely on for estimating
this cost. The project team needed to make an estimate.
For the purpose of modeling, $12 has been allowed as a bonus for the first 15 minutes
(i.e., traveling an hour earlier than preference), $9 for the next, $6 for the next, and $3 for
the final 15-minute period. This would be in addition to the passenger incentive and would
be introduced gradually as the congestion rebuilds. Calibration will be required to find out
whether these amounts are sufficient or excessive. The bonus has to be paid to all people
who travel as passengers in each of the time periods covered. The total daily cost of the
second protocol bonuses, by the end of the first year, is modeled to be $8,190.
With the second protocol in place, it is expected that congestion will be cleared. The
combination of paying an incentive for traveling as a passenger and paying a bonus for
traveling early provides a mechanism for modeling ongoing congestion-free travel. As
population growth causes increased demand at the bottleneck, it can be removed by paying
a bonus for earlier and earlier travel. Once the hour from 7 am to 8 am is full, a bonus can be
added to entice people to travel in the 6:45 am to 7 am period. Once that period is full, the
next earlier 15 minutes can be used, and so on. A similar bonus could be applied for ‘going
later,’ but this strategy has not been modeled.

A third protocol: limiting SOV driving at peak
However, the modeling underlying these figures also finds that the peak period becomes
decongested for the benefit of SOV drivers—those who would only drive, alone. As can
be seen in Table 16, without a mechanism for preventing it (and such a mechanism
has not been defined for the case study corridor), SOVs crowd out passenger-carrying
vehicles, and passengers have to be incentivized to travel at ever earlier times to prevent
a new queue forming.
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Table 16. Passenger Volumes per 15-minute Period Over 20 Years
Passengers per 15-Minute Period at End of Each Year
Note 0 Passengers Means 100% SOV Demand in Period.
Note Assumption is that All Passengers are Incentivised,
Those Traveling Before 8 am Receive Going-Early Bonus
From
8:45 AM
8:30 AM
8:15 AM
8:00 AM
7:45 AM
7:30 AM
7:15 AM
7:00 AM
6:45 AM
6:30 AM
6:15 AM
6:00 AM
5:45 AM
5:30 AM
5:15 AM
5:00 AM
5:00 AM

To
9:00 AM
8:45 AM
8:30 AM
8:15 AM
8:00 AM
7:45 AM
7:30 AM
7:15 AM
7:00 AM
6:45 AM
6:30 AM
6:15 AM
6:00 AM
5:45 AM
5:30 AM
5:15 AM
9:00 AM

1
290
242
280
14
428
490
326
86
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2157

2
278
228
268
0
416
486
316
234
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2228

3
266
216
256
0
386
480
306
390
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2303

4
254
202
242
0
360
474
294
392
156
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2378

5
242
186
230
0
330
470
282
384
328
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2457

6
228
172
218
0
298
464
272
376
444
60
0
0
0
0
0
0
2538

7
214
154
202
0
262
458
258
366
436
264
0
0
0
0
0
0
2621

8
200
140
188
0
230
452
246
356
432
456
0
0
0
0
0
0
2708

9
186
124
172
0
198
446
234
348
424
588
68
0
0
0
0
0
2797

Year
10 11
172 154
106 88
160 142
0
0
160 124
438 432
220 206
336 328
418 410
586 584
284 506
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2890 2985

12
140
70
126
0
88
426
192
318
402
582
582
146
0
0
0
0
3084

13
122
50
108
0
46
418
178
306
394
580
580
390
0
0
0
0
3185

14
106
32
92
0
6
414
162
296
386
578
578
578
48
0
0
0
3290

15
88
12
72
0
0
366
148
284
376
574
574
574
314
0
0
0
3397

16
70
0
48
0
0
316
128
272
368
572
572
572
576
0
0
0
3510

17
52
0
4
0
0
266
114
260
360
570
570
570
610
232
0
0
3625

18
34
0
0
0
0
176
96
248
350
568
568
568
610
508
0
0
3744

19
12
0
0
0
0
76
78
234
342
566
566
566
608
608
192
0
3867

20
0
0
0
0
0
0
28
224
330
564
564
564
606
606
486
0
3992

Note in Table 16 that the total number of passengers each year increases. The total of drivers
(drive alone [SOV] and drive with passengers) increases by the same amount because 50%
of the commuters are prepared to be passengers. The total traffic also increases by the
growth in commercial traffic.
A third protocol is therefore required, to establish a mechanism to control or limit the number
of SOVs traveling during the peak-of-the-peak. Limiting SOVs would make the projections
more realistic in terms of the cost and likely success of incentives aiming to achieve the
ongoing congestion-removal goal; it seems unlikely that passengers will travel at such early
hours as are shown in Table 16. Ideas for such a mechanism include:
• The imposition of charges for SOVs during peak (which would provide funds to
offset the costs of incentives, but would have all the challenges of implementing
congestion pricing);
• A HOV bypass that gives HOVs priority access to the bottleneck and forces SOVs
to queue, awaiting a space in the stream of HOVs;
• A solution that allows a fixed number of SOVs per minute.
The project team has not considered rewarding SOV drivers for traveling at earlier or later
times, because this measure would be seen as encouraging SOV driving, which is counter
to the intent of the solution.
A third protocol mechanism would be likely to reduce case study costs because more
passengers would be able to travel in the preferred peak period of 8 am to 9 am. On the
other hand, such a mechanism might incur costs related to the installation of control and
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access equipment.

Subsequent years
In subsequent years, forces of population and economic growth can be expected to result
in increased need for rewards—both the number of people rewarded for traveling as
passengers, and the rate at which they need to receive value for making or maintaining
the shift to travelling at a less preferred time. The increase will also be compounded by any
increase in non-commuter vehicles, to which a response will be required by compensating
with an increase in commuter passenger numbers.
The project team has assumed the following:
• 3.27% annual growth in population, being the average rate of population growth ages
16+ for the catchment over the previous five years;
• 3% annual growth in non-commuter vehicles; and
• that 16% of the population wishes to commute between 7 am and 9 am.
On this basis the number of passengers the solution would need to compensate is
modeled to grow at an average annual growth rate (year on year) of 4.47% over a
twenty-year time horizon.

BENEFIT/COST CALCULATION
With costs of incentives calculated, and the amount of delay removed estimated, as well as
the reduced vehicle trips, a total picture can emerge (see Table 17).
Twenty-year tables are included in Appendix 3 for each line item in the benefit-to-cost
analysis, together with sensitivity analysis for key assumptions, which are described briefly
in Table 18.
Overall, the solution, if implemented on the case study route, is estimated to create about
half a billion dollars in net benefit over 20 years–in 2019 dollars discounted at 3%. The
total benefits are $640 million and the total costs are $141 million. The ratio of benefit to
cost (BCR) is 4.5. The solution is estimated to clear congestion at the bottleneck and keep
it cleared. The project would also deliver 181,000 metric tons of CO2-e greenhouse gas
emission reductions over the 20-year period.
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Table 18. Explanations for Each Line Item in the Benefit-to-Cost Analysis
Cost or Benefit Item

Description and Explanation

Incentives for
Based on the reward curve. The number of people needed to travel as
commuters to travel as passengers, to clear the congestion, is calculated after deduction of nonpassengers
commuter traffic, with an assumption that ‘going early’ bonuses will reduce
demand at preferred travel times. In this case study, perhaps because the
bottleneck has been so long-standing, the maximum number of people prepared
to travel as passengers must be incentivized to do so, and then all demand to
travel as a passenger must be shifted to earlier and earlier travel times: see
next section. The answer obtained for incentives is applied against a factor for
the impact of prize draws, assuming the option will be available for participants
to take an entry in the prize draw rather than taking the cash.
Bonus payments for
going early

Passengers will be paid (or given prize draw entries) to shift away from their
preferred travel time. This has yet to be tested for price with any commuters. It
responds to the survey finding that too many drivers and passengers desire to
travel in the peak-of-the-peak, causing the queue to re-form. Passengers will
be paid greater amounts for each 15 minutes earlier that they travel, thereby
spreading the peak demand. It is assumed that passengers will be paid this
bonus and therefore will demand rides that people who will only drive will
supply. The expectation is that a market for earlier rides will draw drivers from
their preferred driving time. All people who travel as passengers in the earlier
time period will receive the bonus, even if it is their preferred travel time. The
number of people receiving the go early bonus is modeled by reference to the
travel preferences of drive-alone people, assuming the remaining empty spaces
will be filled by vehicles with passengers. These are modeled for each year-end
number of commuters, commercial vehicles, and passengers, and the mid-point
is estimated.

Marketing

An allowance for the cost of telling people about the program. It is expected
to be relatively easy to communicate, and it is further expected that there will
be signage at the bottleneck, and a high level of interest from people who
would like the congestion reduced. There might also have been a lot of public
discussion about the solution while it was being approved as a budget item. It
is also assumed that the main way of communicating changes to the incentives
or bonuses will be by SMS or inside the App. The model allows a reasonable
amount for the first year, when there will be costs of getting started, but the
total incentives will be low. The same amount is allowed for the second year
when the total incentives paid out will be greater. Thereafter, the annual amount
increments by the growth of the total incentives over the previous year. In the
model the cost of marketing is 2.42% of the total incentives paid out.

Administration

The allowance for the cost of operating the solution is calculated in the same
way as for the marketing, above. The allowance for administration includes an
assumption of detailed monitoring and ongoing research and reporting of the
impact of the solution. Administration works out to 7.3% of the total incentives
paid out.
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Description and Explanation

Bottleneck flexible
carpool parking

The first protocol calls for meeting-place-based carpool formation. It may be
necessary to provide a ‘park and pool’ facility that can be used, such that
people can drive to the bottleneck, leave their car as they form fuller cars with
others, and collect the car on the return journey. For a conservative projection,
costs for such a facility have been assumed and modeled to be incurred as
the number of passengers grows over the years. The number of car parking
spaces has been set at 75% of the number of passengers. There are potential
alternatives to this cost. Least cost would be to find that creating a thicker
market for passenger trips would deliver carpool formation apps that work
effectively. Another alternative could be to provide frequent shuttles during
the peak periods from the residential communities to the bottleneck and back.
Such shuttles would probably have to run on 10-minute frequencies to be
successful. A daily charge for parking has not been included, though one could
be introduced to encourage efficient use of space provided. Finally, no residual
value has been recognized for the facilities at the end of twenty years, even
though such a value would exist.

Vehicle delay reduced

This number is the amount of time experienced by the people who are delayed
by the current traffic congestion. The total delay is calculated for the traffic
based on survey results (though an on-the-ground metric would be preferable
and should be used when available). Total hours of delay are incremented
each year based on an assumption of growth. In the absence of the solution,
delay would be increasing due to population growth. The total hours of delay
are applied to a rate per hour and total days to give an annual cost. Delay is
assumed for the return journey to be 50% of the morning delay reduction. This
estimate is an arbitrary assumption because the project team has not focused
on evening delay. The delay so calculated is applied against a value of time
for private citizens and a value of time for commercial travelers on a weighted
average basis.

Fuel use reduced

This metric is an estimate of the amount of fuel used by vehicles idling while
being delayed at the bottleneck. There is an allowance made for vehicles
that have stop–start technology, with an assumption that these reduce fuel
consumption. The assumption in the model is that fuel is used on a per time
basis rather than a per mile basis while being delayed.

Emissions reduced

The amount of fuel-use reduced is converted to an amount of CO2-e (in metric
tons) and applied against a per metric ton rate for these emissions. The rate is
incremented in the model by the rate of the Socialized Cost of Carbon referred
to by U.S. DOT for calculating benefit-to-cost ratios.

Vehicle miles traveled

The solution successfully implemented will result in approximately half of
all commuters traveling as passengers instead of as drivers. For modeling
purposes, it is assumed these passengers will drive to the bottleneck and will
leave their cars near the bottleneck for the day. Therefore, the reduction in
VMT will be the number of passenger trips (morning only) times the round-trip
distance each day from the bottleneck to the destination and back. The model
uses the average round trip distance found from the survey. The model applies
the total miles reduced against a cost per mile for fuel and maintenance to
arrive at an annual savings amount. The modeling assumes the annual savings
amount will grow over time as the number of passenger trips increases. If the
model should instead only take account of existing trips avoided (ignoring
growth), the present value of 20-year benefits discounted at 3% would be
reduced by $90 million.

Emissions/Pollution
from reduced VMT

An average vehicle efficiency rate is used to calculate the fuel portion of the
above fuel and maintenance cost, and the amount of fuel not burned is modeled
to deliver a reduction in emissions. This reduction is valued in the same way as
the delay reduction emissions above.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Case Study
Cost or Benefit Item

76

Description and Explanation

Destination parking

The vast majority of people passing the bottleneck do not pay for parking at
their destination. But someone pays for the parking provided—the employer or
the local government, for example. An allowance is made for an avoided parking
cost at a fixed average rate per day, times the number of passenger trips. The
expectation is that in the face of a reduction in traffic based on the solution,
there would be a reduction in demand for parking at the various destinations,
and the reduced amount of parking would benefit either the passenger (if paying
for parking) or the business or other entity providing ‘free’ parking. The value in
the base case is $1 per space per day.

Congestion beyond
the corridor

The case study is focused on the costs and benefits of removing congestion at
the bottleneck. It is expected that there is a benefit to all the other traffic in the
region if these vehicles are not on the roads of the region. C/CAG of San Mateo
County has previously run a program in which they paid $8 per vehicle-roundtrip avoided for people who carpooled. The model assumes that the County will
value the reduction in regional traffic from this solution in the same way. The
rate per vehicle-round-trip-avoided is applied to the total passenger trips taken
each year.

Crash costs

The quantity of crashes, both minor and major, is considered to be a product of
the distance traveled and the probability of different intensity crashes. The cost
of such crashes, including a value of lives lost in fatal crashes, is a standard
component of benefit cost analysis. The project team used the method
outlined in U.S. DOT guidance to calculate the crash costs avoided and used a
California crash rate statistical set to predict the rate of crashes.74

Inconvenience cost
reduced

The traffic congestion at the bottleneck causes people to travel at less preferred
times than they otherwise would. The survey gathered information about the
change in times that people would travel, given a congestion-free option. Some
people would shift to traveling later, some to traveling earlier. As a benefit,
this shift reflects greater time at home, or greater time at work, both of which
can be valued as an important benefit. In the model, it is assumed that the
initial change benefits all travelers (drivers and passengers) as the congestion
is removed, and the benefit is reduced by the proportion of people who are
estimated to be traveling earlier to receive a bonus. Each year the proportion of
the original benefit that still applies is calculated. It is applied against the same
value of travel time factor used for commuters to value the reduction of delay.

Multiplier impact

In an ongoing implementation of this solution, the participants are expected
to gain disposable income through the working of the solution—income that
would most likely be spent in the local economy. It is expected that the funds for
ongoing operations will be provided by the local people in some way, except for
the regional benefit, which should be provided from regional funds. All the cash
benefits are summed, and the cash costs deducted, and the result, assumed to
be added purchasing power, is assigned a multiplier of 1.25, meaning that for
each additional dollar in the commuter’s hands, the local economy will gain a
further $1.25.

Expanded income
impact

As a result of the removal of congestion, survey respondents indicated that
they would start traveling to work past the bottleneck. Their earnings would
represent an increase in funds available to people in the Coastside to carry out
economic activity. The dollar amount is calculated based on the value of an hour
of earnings each day.
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Description and Explanation

Opportunity impact

As well as the actual new income earned, the removal of congestion at the
bottleneck would also give all residents a greater level of opportunity to earn
more money, get more education, or shop in different locations. This new level
of opportunity should have some value in the benefit-to-cost analysis. However,
this impact has not been valued in the benefit-to-cost analysis due to the
complexity involved and lack of existing methodology.

Wellbeing impact

Researchers in the UK found that the wellbeing from a reduced delay of 20
minutes in the daily commute was the same as receiving a 19% increase in pay.
All current commuters will experience a reduction in delay of about this amount.
However, this impact has not been valued in the benefit-to-cost analysis.

Emissions impact

The amount of CO2-e in metric tons has been calculated for each of the
emissions reduction line items.

Figure 25 provides information about how the level of incentives change over time. Total
incentives estimated for year 1 are $2.2 million, rising to $4.1 million in year 2, $6.7 million
by year 10, and $12.1 million by year 20 (all in 2019 dollars). The project team expects that
there would be many opportunities to reduce this cost by positive engagement with the
people who travel through the bottleneck.

Figure 25. Incentive Cost Per Trip and In Total

Sensitivity analysis
The project team wanted to assess the likely impact of variation in the major assumptions
underlying the benefit cost analysis. Table 19 shows the calculation of an adjustment of 5%
to key assumptions. Each line item stands alone; no cumulative effect has been calculated.
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The factors are ranked in the order of the impact on the present value of 20-year costs.
The factor with the largest impact, where a 5% increase in the factor brings a $9.3 million
increase in costs, is the proportion of the population who would commute between 7 am
and 9 am. A 5% increase would also bring a big increase in the total benefits ($17.2 million).
The combination of these impacts (adding $9.3 million in costs and adding $17.2 million in
benefits) reduces the overall benefit to cost ratio from 4.5 to 4.4. This factor also includes
people who are not already using the route, who would begin to use the route if congestion
were cleared. To maintain free flow, every additional person would have to travel as a
passenger: hence the cost increase. At the same time, every additional person would be
accruing benefits that would have value: low-cost trip-making, vehicle trips avoided, and
income that would grow the local economy.
Conversely, but for the same reasons each 5% reduction in the assumed rate of population
growth would reduce costs by $4.1 million.
Reducing the drive-alone rate by 5% would reduce costs by about $5 million, as would
reducing the number of days people are incentivized and increasing the departure rate from
the bottleneck.
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Reducing the drive-alone rate would also increase the total benefits. Combining the reduction
in cost and the increase in benefits, the drive-alone rate is the most valuable factor to adjust on
the basis of impact on the benefit to cost ratio. The second most valuable factor is increasing
the rate of departure from the bottleneck.
If greater levels of incentives were required per passenger, a 5% greater switching incentive
would add $3.4 million to total costs, while a 5% greater go-early bonus would add $1.6
million. Many of the factors assessed deliver no change to the total costs and only small
changes to the value of benefits at a sensitivity adjustment of 5%.
In addition to the 5% variation, the project team wished to identify the impact of variability
in factors the team was less confident about. The factor for which the project team has the
least confidence is the go-early bonus because this reward has not been previously tested
and was discovered as a requirement after the survey had been completed. If it took twice
as much to incentivize this shift, on a per hour basis, from $12 to $24, the impact on 20-year
costs would be $31.2 million ($2019), and the BCR would fall to 3.7.
The factor in the model that the project team feels is most likely understated is the value of
the benefit of reduced need for destination parking. This change has been incorporated into
the model at a value of $1 per space per day, which is considered to be very low. At a more
realistic $4 per day, the 20-year benefits would increase by $23.7 million ($2019), and the
BCR would rise to 4.7.

ADJUSTING FOR SELF-SELECTION BIAS IN THE SAMPLE
The use of the voter database was a compromise to seek randomness at a cost that was
within the budget for the research project.
Finding that 80% of adult residents are in the voter database, and that email and phone
contact details were available, the voter records were judged to be an appropriate avenue
for obtaining a representative sample.
The project team used several methods to satisfy themselves that the sample was in fact
representative.
The age distribution of the sample, the household income distribution, and the education
achievement distribution were sufficiently similar to the general population that it seemed a
representative sample had been achieved. However, once the multiplier was determined (see
below), it became clear that there was significant self-selection by people who use Highway
92 or are interested in doing so. Put another way, there was significant non-participation
by people who do not use Highway 92 or are not interested in doing so, even though the
invitation email asked for everyone’s input.
While each respondent who might currently be seen in Tuesday morning traffic was calculated
to represent about 67 people, each respondent who would not be seen in the traffic would
have to represent about 865 people.
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The survey found three groups of people: those who are currently in the traffic; those who
would join the traffic if congestion were removed; and those who would not be in the traffic
under any circumstances. The question to be answered is as follows: which multiplier
should be used for the middle group: those who would be in the traffic if the congestion were
removed? In the modeling for the project, the middle group has been assigned a multiplier
equal to the first group, a judgment call. The project team became comfortable with this
decision based on the analysis in Table 20.
Table 20. Impact Scores for Different Response Groups

Code
Y
S
N
NY
NS
NN

Description
Avg impact for Ys
Avg Impact for Ss
Avg impact for Ns
Avg impact for NYs
Avg impact for NSs
Avg impact for NNs

Impact
72.71154
69.26923
63.66667
78.14286
72.94737
46.3125

N
52
26
42
7
19
16

Table 20 shows the average score that different groups of respondents assigned to the
impact that the congestion has on them. Respondents could choose an impact from 0–100,
where 0 was ‘not much impact at all’ and 100 was ‘the congestion has a very large impact
on my decision about how and when to use this route.’ The table shows the simple average
of these ratings by the groups subsequently determined by responses to later questions.
The codes (groups) are as follows:
Y = yes, I travel every Tuesday;
S = I travel some Tuesdays;
N = I do not travel on Tuesdays;
NY = I do not travel on Tuesdays but would regularly if congestion went away;
NS = I do not travel on Tuesdays but would sometimes if congestion went away; and
NN = I do not travel on Tuesdays and would not travel on Tuesdays even if congestion
went away.
What is interesting here is the average scores of the NYs and NSs. The impact they perceive
the congestion has on them is higher than that perceived by any of the other groups.
Comparing the desire to respond to the survey (self-selection bias) of the different groups,
it would be suggested that NN people would be least interested (they imagine change on
the route having little impact on them), consistent with a low average impact score. It is
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suggested that NY and NS people, on the other hand, would be most interested (change on
the route might have a big impact on them, allowing them to seek work, or education, that they
perceive as unavailable because of the congestion), consistent with a high average impact
score. The Y and YS people are already making trips and so understand the congestion
(though they are interested in it improving), so they have a mid-level average impact score.
On the basis of the above discussion, it could be argued that the multiplier for the NY and NS
group (people who would start to travel if congestion were tamed) should be lower than for
the Y and YS group because they are more likely to self-select based on the impact score.
Because there is no way to estimate the size of the actual population who would be NY and
NS, the project team decided to use the multiplier that had been calculated for the Y and YS
people.
In order to avoid the problem of self-selection bias, the project team recommends that future
projects carry out a survey of a true random sample of the catchment for the target route as
an important first step in the pilot project to test the protocols developed herein.
In this regard, the team had rejected an internet-based panel survey provider as a supplier to
gather the project sample on the basis that such a supplier would not be able to sufficiently
reach the users of the target route–because early in the project this group was expected to
be the target of the survey. This decision could be revisited on the basis that the eventual
survey specification was for a representative sample of all residents, rather than users of
the route. Only about 8% of Coastside residents 16+ years of age are users of the case
study route during the peak morning hours of 7 am to 9 am. An internet-based panel survey
provider may be able to deliver a sample of residents without the self-selection bias.
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VI. DISCUSSION
The objective of the project was to develop a Method for estimating the costs and benefits
of congestion-clearing payments to passengers that could be repeated for many different
locations. As described, a draft Method was documented, and a case study developed.
The draft Method was followed for the case study, but where necessary it was modified or
departed from. A benefit-to-cost analysis has been completed.
The objective of the whole project was to conceptualize congestion-clearing payments to
passengers as a real alternative, in order to establish a method for estimating the costs and
benefits that would support its inclusion in decision-making processes for resolving traffic
congestion if in fact such inclusion is warranted. In the absence of such a method, the
alternative of CCPTP would never be seriously considered against other options for solving
congestion. The litmus test for the Method is whether it can deliver information that truly
supports such decision-making. The development of the method is just a first step, because
it is highly probable that an actual implementation would unfold differently from the estimates.
Hence, a sub-objective has been to create an ‘order of magnitude’ estimate to help decide
whether to carry out pilot projects that could be used to establish the reliability of the Method.
There were advantages and disadvantages to the route chosen for the case study. On the
one hand, the Coastside community is relatively affluent and has an extremely low share of
passenger travel (except for driving students to school). There are almost no transit users and
almost no carpoolers, so there is no existing culture of traveling as a passenger. Commuters
travel to a relatively high number of different destinations. On the other hand, the route is
relatively simple to understand: there is a single catchment; no existing advantages for HOV
travel; and the vast majority of commuters have a large part of the route in common.
The following discussion highlights the key lessons learned from the combined development
of the Method and the case study.

ESTIMATING THE VOLUME OF TRAFFIC TO BE REMOVED
Current excess traffic
It was originally envisaged that existing traffic flow data could be used to calculate the
excess traffic, but lack of data about the length of the queue made this approach impossible.
Instead, the project team calculated the excess traffic using a spreadsheet model based on
the survey responses. The proportions of traffic in the model for each hour were compared
with actual historical counts and found to be reasonable. However, it would be much more
reliable to have actual data about the ebb and flow of the queue. Such reliable data would
also provide an informational basis for ongoing management of congestion at the bottleneck.
A new implementation of technology may be called for, for capturing and communicating
reliable data about queue formation and dissipation.
An allowance was made that 10% of the current traffic is non-commuter traffic. This proportion
is an educated estimate based on discussion with the Half Moon Bay City Traffic Engineer
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and should be based on better data in the future.

Queue length analysis
Google Maps Typical Traffic and Google Maps Live Traffic were used to identify the periods
of bad congestion and to estimate the maximum length of the queue, but while low-cost
and easily available, these online sources are not highly reliable, and the algorithms
used by Google for calculating typical traffic are not available. Traffic estimated from the
spreadsheet model was compared with traffic from Google and found to be reasonable.
However, anecdotal descriptions of the traffic at this bottleneck paint a much worse picture
than either Maps or the spreadsheet model describe. The project team was unable to
resolve this discrepancy. Future projects should gather much more detailed information
about the actual traffic on the ground. Future projects in other areas might also have better
existing traffic count data, and or data available from commercial providers of traffic data
based on probes or smart-phone tracking.

Suppressed demand
The survey provided a method for estimating increased use by existing travelers and new
use by non-travelers. There is an issue with the multiplier for non-travelers who would start
to use the route if congestion went away, and it is possible this quantity is over- or understated. This problem will be resolved with a better sampling technique, as described earlier.
The most significant lesson learned in the project is the strength of the intra-peak demand
shift. Having observed it from the survey for Highway 92, the project team suggests that
it provides a generalizable explanation for how congestion behaves. It is predictable and
obvious, but it has not been described in a minute-by-minute way before. Once congestion
is removed, people’s travel times can be expected to drift towards their preferred travel time,
and most people seem to prefer a similar travel time. In the case study, 88% of people would
change their departure time if congestion went away.
The implication of this intra-peak demand shift insight for the CCPTP concept—and it
probably holds across most long-standing bottleneck locations—would be that within the
first year it would be necessary to get every person willing to be a passenger to make the
switch, so the solution would almost immediately gravitate to the highest level of incentive
and a significant go-early bonus.

Induced traffic
No information was found upon which to base assumptions of non-commuter traffic growth,
partly because there is no information about the current amount of non-commuter traffic.
There is historical information about population growth in the catchment, and the modeling
has assumed the recent growth rate of 3.27% per year will be maintained. The spreadsheet
model shows modest increases in costs if the 3% growth rate for non-commuter traffic
is raised, even as high as 5%. It is thought by the project team that the bottleneck has
constrained economic growth in the catchment, so these assumptions (3.27% and 3%)
could be low—they are the growth that is assumed to already exist, rather than growth that
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a free-flowing highway could generate.
The challenge for the case study route is that the majority of the impact of current congestion
is experienced by the City of Half Moon Bay, which has some ability to manage its growth
rate. However, the catchment also includes all of the Coastside, and there were no reports of
intentions to manage population growth in the rest of the catchment outside the City of Half
Moon Bay. While the City has limited its growth over the past five years to just 2% per year
(against a target of 1%), the catchment itself has grown by 3.27%.

Traffic volume to remove
Two spreadsheet models were developed. The first converted the survey data into minuteby-minute traffic flows and queues for both the current traffic and the traffic after removing
congestion. The second spreadsheet modeled the changes to the traffic over twenty years.
The combination of the two spreadsheets delivered volumes of people required to travel
as passengers, each year, to keep traffic at free-flowing levels, supported by a myriad of
assumptions about a dynamic system that is challenging to predict. It is in part challenging
to predict (and therefore somewhat unreliable) because the CCPTP solution has not been
attempted before, so there is no track record of how the system will respond.

INCENTIVES
Reward curves and go-early bonus
The case study catchment is a relatively affluent area with higher than average household
incomes compared to other parts of the state and country. The project team’s expectation is
that because the population is affluent, their propensity to travel as passengers will be lower
than for less affluent areas, and the deal for traveling as a passenger would have to be better
to attract a similar number of passengers. Therefore, the team expects that the overall cost
of the solution for the case-study route would be higher than would likely be the case for a
corridor involving a less affluent area.
The reward curve for traveling as a passenger was created and bears a strong resemblance
to the one from Comsis, even giving similar amounts in 2019 dollars: see Figure 26. Note that
the ‘new reward curve’ represents the combination of the people who are already traveling
plus the new people who would start to travel if congestion was defeated. The number of
people to convert to passengers sits at the very highest level of the reward curve. The goearly bonus is in addition to the reward curve and was one of the key lessons learned from
the project. Note that there could equally be a go-later bonus for passengers to travel later
than the peak-of-the-peak, and this bonus would work in the same fashion. For simplicity, the
modeling has been limited to go-early.
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Figure 26. Reward Curves with Comsis for Comparison
The annual cost of the go-early bonus grows to a high level, and it would incentivize
passengers as early as 5:15 am, with many 15-minute periods at the peak of the peak of
solely SOV traffic, if there is no limit on SOV traffic. However, as shown in Table 21, if the
proportion of drivers who would only drive alone were reduced from 25% of commuters
to 20% of commuters (more in line with the project team’s expectations), the number of
15-minute periods of solely SOV traffic would be much lower (than shown in Table 16 (page
71)). Also, the 20-year cost would be reduced by $17 million.
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Table 21. Passengers Per 15 Minutes (if drive alone proportion is 20% of commuters)

Passengers per 15-Minute Period at End of Each Year
Note 0 Passengers Means 100% SOV Demand in Period.
Note Assumption is that All Passengers are Incentivised,
Those Traveling Before 8 am Receive Going-Early Bonus
From
8:45 AM
8:30 AM
8:15 AM
8:00 AM
7:45 AM
7:30 AM
7:15 AM
7:00 AM
6:45 AM
6:30 AM
6:15 AM
6:00 AM
5:45 AM
5:30 AM
5:15 AM
5:00 AM
5:00 AM

To
9:00 AM
8:45 AM
8:30 AM
8:15 AM
8:00 AM
7:45 AM
7:30 AM
7:15 AM
7:00 AM
6:45 AM
6:30 AM
6:15 AM
6:00 AM
5:45 AM
5:30 AM
5:15 AM
9:00 AM

1
348
310
340
128
458
140
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1725

2
338
300
330
112
452
248
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1782

3
328
288
320
96
444
364
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1843

4
318
276
310
78
438
480
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1904

5
308
264
300
58
434
490
108
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1967

6
298
252
288
40
426
486
236
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2032

7
284
238
276
18
418
478
320
60
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2099

8
274
224
264
0
410
472
310
206
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2168

9
262
212
250
0
382
470
298
356
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2239

Year
10 11
250 236
198 182
240 224
0
0
352 322
462 456
286 276
380 374
136 308
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2314 2389
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12
224
166
212
0
292
452
264
366
436
44
0
0
0
0
0
0
2468

13
208
152
196
0
256
444
252
354
432
244
0
0
0
0
0
0
2551

14
194
136
184
0
224
440
240
346
424
432
0
0
0
0
0
0
2634

15
180
118
166
0
190
430
226
336
416
574
70
0
0
0
0
0
2721

16
166
102
152
0
154
422
212
326
408
572
280
0
0
0
0
0
2810

17
148
84
136
0
118
418
198
316
402
570
496
0
0
0
0
0
2903

18
134
68
120
0
78
412
182
306
394
568
568
150
0
0
0
0
2998

19
116
48
104
0
38
402
168
294
386
566
566
390
0
0
0
0
3097

20
100
26
86
0
0
396
154
284
378
564
564
564
62
0
0
0
3198
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Incentive structure options
The case study survey did not explore the detail of incentive structure options. The addition
of the go-early bonus is tentative in terms of the amount required, because this option was
not surveyed. A further survey is recommended to test ideas for structures and to inform the
go-early bonus to fine-tune a pilot implementation in due course.

THE NEED FOR BOTTLENECK PARKING AND LIMITS ON SOV TRAVEL
The project team had not anticipated the magnitude of the switch to being passengers
required for congestion clearing in the case study corridor. In order to make this particular
project work, it was identified that parking would be required near the bottleneck for fast
formation of fuller vehicles to common destinations, while combining travelers from multiple
origin communities. Also, there would need to be some limit on SOV travel so that vehicles
carrying passengers would be able to access the route without the queue re-forming. The
team had anticipated a lower number of passengers required, and therefore the need for
transactions with a smaller proportion of the traffic, than has turned out to be the case for this
corridor. One argument put forth in favor of incentives rather than tolls was that incentives
required transactions with far fewer people. However, in the case study, there would be
incentive transactions with 50% of the commuters each day and trip-recording activity by
75% of commuters (drivers with passengers, and passengers).
Limits on SOV travel could operate through tolls, HOV bypass, SOV flow restriction, or
another method to be determined. If it operated through tolls, the revenue from the tolls could
be a source of funds for the CCPTP solution.

SOURCE OF FUNDS
It is possible that existing funding mechanisms would not provide ongoing funding for a
CCPTP solution. On the basis that the beneficiaries of a solution should fund the solution,
it may be that an implementation on the case study corridor should be funded in part by
the Coastside residents, and in part by the region that benefits from fewer vehicles arriving
from the Coastside (as valued in the benefit/cost analysis, including destination parking,
congestion beyond the corridor, and crash costs as set out in Tables 17 and 18, from page
73). It is likely that Coastside property values would increase as a result of the benefits from
the solution, justifying residents providing some contribution towards the costs of the solution,
perhaps through property taxation. The project team notes that existing legislation might
constrain the use of property tax funds and might require new legislation or the passage of a
referendum (or both) to make that source of funds available.
Because of the risks inherent in implementing a new solution, however, and the potential
for the benefit of the lessons learned to flow to a much wider national and international
community, the project team envisages that a pilot project to prove the concept would not
require funding from residents.
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PILOT PROJECT RECOMMENDATION
The project team recommends that a pilot project be carried out on the case study route as
a means of calibrating the lessons learned from the project. It is highly likely that the reward
curve derived in the project will be different when the solution is implemented. The following
are considerations for the design of the pilot project:
1. Develop project with community and commuter involvement in line with commons
governance best practices;
2. A period of funding that encourages long-term culture change (5 years for example);
3. Random sample survey to confirm findings and estimates from the project survey;
4. Monitor traffic and queues daily to build case and confirm estimates;
5. Survey for structure of incentives and size of go-early bonus;
6. Explore and confirm mechanism for limiting SOVs during peak.

COMMONS GOVERNANCE
As discussed in the literature, Ostrom proposed eight principles for successful governance
of the commons. The proposed solution is evaluated against these principles in Table 22.
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Table 22. Evaluation of Solution Through a Commons Governance Lens
Principle

Discussion

Define clear group boundaries

The roadways are quite well defined, the bottleneck is easy to describe,
and the times of heavy use are well established and can be monitored.
The users of the highway during the morning peak are quite easy to
define in groups, including commuters, commercial travelers, and
freight.

Match rules governing use of
the common goods to local
needs and conditions

The envisaged rules would appear to fit local circumstances; however,
the assumed compatibility needs to be checked. In particular, the idea
of putting limits on SOV travel during peak-of-the-peak is expected to
require buy-in to succeed.

Ensure that those affected by
the rules can participate in
modifying the rules

Moving the concept forward should involve the local community and
users of the bottleneck, and ideally, they would collectively be given the
right to set rules for use during the morning peak.

Make sure the rule-making
rights of community members
are respected by outside
authorities

The reality is that the users of the highway control how well the highway
works. The implementation should involve tacit agreement by outside
authorities (Caltrans for the case study route?) that the users have the
right to set rules for use during the morning peak.

Develop a system, carried out
by community members, for
monitoring members’ behavior

The technology exists to build a monitoring system that knows when
people travel as passengers and computes the daily impact of the
solution.

Use graduated sanctions for
rule violators

The immediate sanction is the opportunity cost of traveling as a
passenger and being rewarded, versus traveling alone and not being
rewarded. On some basis, the community should decide if they want to
pay incentives and make other relevant rules to resolve the bottleneck,
such as HOV bypass, or scheduling for SOVs. The design of sanctions
would be up to the community as they design the rules.

Provide accessible, low-cost
means for dispute resolution

It is hoped that the incentive structure itself helps to avoid disputes;
however, it is possible that it will raise new ones that the solution has not
yet identified.

Build responsibility for
governing the common
resource in nested tiers from
the lowest level up to the
entire interconnected system

The catchment of each bottleneck should have responsibility for
managing its use of the bottleneck. Some users might be in the
catchment of more than one bottleneck. The entire interconnected
system is the transportation system.

A NEW PARADIGM FOR LAND USE REGULATION
If congestion could be tamed, economic development that had previously been suppressed
could emerge, to the detriment of the new situation. It might be necessary to update land
use regulations and other local rules to reflect the new environment. For example, consider
jurisdictions where approval of a new use for a parcel of land is contingent on the impact that
the project will have on the level of traffic and developers have to make financial contributions
to offset their added traffic impact. The traffic mitigation rules may need to be changed to
require developers to fund passenger payment incentives needed to absorb the new trips
into existing vehicles.
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UNADDRESSED QUESTIONS/LIMITATIONS
Destination convergence
The case study commuter population travels to as many as twenty major and twenty minor
destinations around Silicon Valley. It is not possible to model and draw conclusions about
destination convergence based on the small sample size obtained in the survey. The
project team expects that, with about 3,000 commuters in total traveling to these various
destinations, there will be sufficient opportunity for shared journeys without unrealistic effort
by those involved. However, while a multiplier was used to gross up the population traveling
in each time period, no similar multiplier was available to inform adjusting the population
by time period and destination. Because everyone using the corridor passes through the
bottleneck, it is as if they have the same origin, so people from diverse residential areas can
join together for artificial density to any one destination. What is not known is the amount of
effort it will take on the part of commuters to achieve the target level of passenger trips.

Single corridor, multiple bottlenecks
The Method anticipated analyzing a corridor that might have extensive congestion and
multiple potential bottlenecks. The case study analyzed a single bottleneck in a corridor
without needing to consider the impact of downstream bottlenecks. As a result, the case
study does not provide an example of the process by which multiple bottlenecks might
be analyzed and how they might impact each other. This process has therefore not been
developed beyond the discussion in the Current Excess Traffic section of this report.

Technological ubiquity
Over 80% of Americans use a smartphone.75 However, the project did not assess the ubiquity
of smart phones in the catchment, nor the extent of their use by potential passengers. For
this catchment with above-average household income, the project team expects almost
ubiquitous access to smart phones and the internet. For other catchments it would be a valid
survey question. The CCPTP solution relies on smart phones for its effectiveness–both for
capturing instances of passenger travel and for communication within the system (advising
potential participants of the current offers)–so rather than establishing work-arounds it is
more likely that an implementation would find a way to enable access to smart phones for
those who wanted to participate but did not have the technology. In case accommodations
are needed for non-smart-phone users, there are models for other app-based systems that
could be instructive here.76

Safety
Safety was raised as a concern in the focus groups, but no questions were asked in the survey
about the issue of safety. The project team made a conscious choice here. The assumption
made was that people who would not travel as a passenger due to safety concerns would
not indicate a willingness to be a passenger in the survey, so would be part of the commuter
group who would continue to drive. Safety is, of course, an important consideration, and
the CCPTP solution is not likely to succeed in an environment that lacks sufficient safety
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considerations. The app anticipated for the CCPTP solution is not an app that commuters
would use to arrange rides, with strangers or otherwise. It would be an app for recognizing
and rewarding travel as a passenger. Commuters would use other mechanisms to arrange
their passenger trips. If carpooling, they might use a commercially available app, and would
rely on the safety mechanisms built into that app. They also might arrange rides with known
neighbors or co-workers. Under the protocols set out above, they might join a carpool at a
meeting-place near the bottleneck. The use of the CCPTP rewarding App would capture
information about who is driving and who is riding. The safety rules that apply to Casual
Carpooling, discussed in the literature, would apply here also: that there should always
be two or more passengers for each driver; and that anyone lining up for a meeting-placebased carpool can always step back and let someone else go first if they do not like the look
of a vehicle or driver. Casual carpooling has operated for decades without serious safety
issues, and without technology for capturing details of who is traveling in which vehicle.

Return journeys and trip chaining
The project has also been silent on a key issue associated with traveling as a passenger:
the return journey. Traditional carpooling is a round-trip concept, while a flexible carpool trip
is clearly a one-way facilitation. Is there a risk that some incentivized morning passengers
might have trouble arranging their return journey? If so, what proportion? What can be done
to help? Would it change the cost and benefit calculations?
Further, the complexity of modern commute patterns involving for example childcare and after
school pick-ups and drop offs, other household errands, or multiple employment locations,
might further exacerbate the difficulty for people to travel as passengers77,78 Is it possible
some people could just be unable to travel as passengers in spite of a willingness to do so?
The answers to these questions are not yet known. The underlying idea is that if the ‘deal’
is right, the participants, or potential participants, will figure out how to solve such issues.
The solution will be creating a thick market (one with many buyers) for people prepared
to (and funded to) travel as a passenger in both directions each day. It seems likely that
the market would respond with mechanisms that resolve the issue. Some people will
arrange traditional carpools; others might find an appropriate meeting place at the morning
destination end of the corridor to facilitate carpools or other shared modes for the return
journey at very low cost. Guaranteed ride home (GRH) might provide a fallback position
to help resolve these issues.

The cost of alternative solutions
Using typical cost per lane mile data from FHWA, inflated to 2019 dollars, the project team
has calculated that the cost of doubling the capacity of the 11-mile stretch of Highway 92
that is the focus of the case study (adding a lane each way) would be between $71.5 million
and $369.1 million depending on whether the existing lanes needed to be improved, and
which sections qualified as ‘rolling’ versus ‘mountainous.’79 Such an expansion could be
expected to take several years, if indeed approval could be achieved. Once developed, such
an expanded facility could be expected to ‘fill up’ again with congestion within five years. It
would certainly be congested again within a year, based on the calculations for the case
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study. If evaluated on equivalent assumptions to the case study benefit-to-cost analysis,
the project team expects that the total benefits would also be much lower for highway
expansion than for the congestion-clearing alternative. Table 23 compares the impacts of the
two alternatives of doubling infrastructure capacity and implementing congestion-clearing
payments to passengers across the range of factors included in the benefit cost analysis.
Table 23. Comparison of Impacts of Building Infrastructure vs CongestionClearing Payments to Passengers
Factor

Double Infrastructure Capacity

CCPTP

Cost

$71–$369 Million plus annual
outgoings

$143 million

Delay

Reduce but not eliminate, builds up
again over time

Eliminate

VMT

No change, or increase due to
expanded capacity

Large reduction that is sustained
over time

Crash costs

Increase with increased VMT

Reductions with VMT

Fuel-use and emissions

Increase with increased VMT, reduce
with reduced delay

Reductions with VMT, reductions
with eliminated delay

Destination parking

Increase with build-up of trips over
time

Reduce with reduction of trips

Congestion beyond the
corridor

Increase with build-up of trips over
time

Reduction and maintained
reduction over time

Inconvenience cost for
traveling at less preferred
times

Reduced with increased capacity, but
over time reverts and impacts more
people

Reduced with removal of
congestion, and offset by goingearly payments

Incentive multiplier impact

Some job creation during construction
will have equivalent impact in the
short term

Ongoing impact as incentive is
distributed in community

Expanded income impact

Some improvement as delays are
reduced, but reducing over time

Ongoing impact as congestion is
kept under control

It is noted that Caltrans has no plans in the pipeline to expand the Highway 92 facility.

Commons governance mechanics
The project has not designed a commons governance process for making the decision to
implement CCPTP, nor the setting of local rules. The project team anticipates arranging
funding for one or more pilot routes. In a commons governance sense, the local community
would be given the opportunity to accept an apparently generous offer, in which they would
receive a significant flow of incentives into their community in return for changing how they
travel and agreeing to some limits on SOV travel at peak-of-peak. Commons governance
experts will be consulted to ensure optimal processes are developed and adopted.

COMPLEMENTARY MITIGATIONS
In the introduction, there was a reference to decarbonization of transport. CCPTP is a very
expensive method for achieving this end (at an average cost of almost $800 per metric ton
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of carbon dioxide emissions avoided on the case study route). However, as a co-benefit of
a project with a decongestion goal, it is worthwhile. What might be more valuable for the
solution is that the drive to avoid climate change might make the ‘deal’ less costly in future
than the estimates in the case study if commuters become oriented to seeking less carbonintensive solutions for everyday life activities such as commuting to work.
The survey avoided invoking thoughts of climate change when asking people whether they
would travel as a passenger, and for what amount of money. It was feared that invoking this
important societal issue would muddy the thought process. However, in the absence of other
significant emission reduction opportunities, it seems plausible to suggest that many potential
passengers and drivers would put some carbon emission reduction value on participation,
thereby reducing the total incentives required to achieve the congestion-reduction goal.
Consistent with the above, the idea of electric carpools is also worthy of consideration.
As electric vehicles penetrate the Coastside market, variable incentives could be used to
encourage electric vehicle drivers to use their vehicles to provide rides for passengers in the
CCPTP solution, adding to the emissions reduction benefits of the pilot project.

GENERALIZABILITY
The foregoing results for the case study route are not intended to be generalizable to other
routes or corridors. The results give an impression of how valuable a CCPTP implementation
could be, but without undertaking a similar amount of analysis for other routes it would be
dangerous to make any assumptions for other locations based on the case study route. It is
possible that after a number of locations have been carefully surveyed and analysed some
rules of thumb might emerge, but the project team advises caution.
It is likely that some conclusions could be made that are generalizable. The project team
proposes the following list:
• The concept of intra-peak demand shift, in which a large proportion of commuters
are traveling at an earlier of later time than they would prefer and given the removal
of congestion would shift to more preferred departure times and cause the queue to
reform. That 88% of case study participants shift to later or earlier departure is not
expected to be generalizable to other routes.
• The need for a concept such as the go-early bonus to offset the intra-peak demand
shift in order to keep congestion away.
• The concept of segmentation of commuters into three groups as follows: those who
would only drive, alone; those who would only drive but would provide rides; and
those who are prepared to be passengers. That 27% of case study participants would
categorize into the only drive, alone, segment is not expected to be generalizable to
other routes.
• The concept of a reward curve for people to switch to being passengers, in which
greater levels of reward attract greater levels of people to being passengers. That
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the required reward for 47% of case study participants to switch is $15 per trip is not
expected to be generalizable to other routes.
• The concept of calculating a BCR for a CCPTP solution, in which 20 years of benefits
and 20 years of costs are calculated, discounted to the present, and compared. That
the result for the case study route was a BCR of 4.5 is not expected to be generalizable
to other routes.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
This report has described the methodology for route-by-route evaluation of an idea that
could potentially have dramatic impacts on transportation as it is experienced around the
world. The passenger-payments project at the Mineta Transportation Institute could be the
first step in a revolution.
Analysis of a challenging case study route provides a positive community return on the
costs of providing congestion-clearing payments to passengers. The present value of 20
years of costs, discounted at 3%, falls within the range of estimated costs of expanding
the facility, and the benefits of ongoing congestion-relief are likely much greater than for
facility expansion.

THE REVISED METHOD
The project team developed a draft Method and then applied it to a case study route in
order to refine the Method. The revised method is now summarized in six steps as shown
in Figure 27.

Figure 27. Revised Method
A number of aspects of the draft Method were modified or discarded. Table 24 lists
methodological thoughts and insights that may be useful for future research to further develop
the CCPTP solution concept.
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Table 24. Methodological Thoughts After Applying Method to Case Study Route
Step

Methodological thoughts and insights

Understand current
traffic

Corridor definition is required, including identification of consecutive
bottlenecks. The case study evaluated a single bottleneck. Consecutive
bottlenecks in a corridor will necessitate more complex modeling.
If the corridor has parallel routes, data will be needed for all routes. The case
study evaluated a route that did not have parallel routes. Parallel routes in a
corridor will necessitate more complex modeling because removing congestion
on one route will attract traffic from the parallel route.
Existing traffic flow data are not sufficiently precise for queue and excess traffic
measurement and new sources or protocols should be developed.
New data collection about queue formation on a minute by minute basis would
facilitate analysis and management of the queue for each bottleneck.
A representative catchment survey can provide useful data about the current
traffic.
Real counts of the split between commuter and non-commuter traffic are
necessary, as are vehicle occupancy rates, destinations, presence and
utilization of public transport through the bottleneck, downstream congestion
and existing initiatives in place to limit it, and parking prices at the destinations.
Validate traffic flow calculations based on the survey with actual traffic counts.

Understand nature of
people on route

A true random sample of residents in the catchment for the corridor will deliver
the most reliable information about existing use and likely future use absent the
congestion.
An online survey panel that delivers random selection within a defined
catchment might provide a sufficiently representative sample as a lower cost
alternative to a true random sample. This alternative should be tested.
The SurveyMonkey survey instrument used in the project is available for
replication on other routes.
The survey should be used to determine existing use, propensity to travel as
a passenger for money or not, and propensity, if not a potential passenger, to
provide rides for money or not, if for money how much, to calculate a reward
curve for the route.
The case study assumed a ‘go early bonus’ but did not survey to find out how
much this incentive would need to be. Future surveys should investigate the
concept of the go-early bonus as a mechanism for responding to intra-peak
demand shift.

Understand growth
trends, anticipate
demand response

Survey to determine how departure times, frequency of travel, and travel by
those not currently using the route would change absent the congestion.
If parallel routes exist, survey and model for route-change reactions.
Consider whether existing population and economic growth trends would
change if there were no congestion. Note that this might be highly subjective if
the corridor under consideration is sub-regional and if population and economic
growth data is not available for sub-regions.
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Methodological thoughts and insights

Choose operational
protocols for the
solution

The case study adopted three protocols in addition to incentives to travel as
a passenger: incentives for passengers to ‘go early’; meeting places near
bottlenecks for carpool formation; and methods to limit SOV travel in peak
of peak. The case study route required the maximum number of people
to travel as passengers from the very beginning of implementation. Other
implementations might not need to achieve so much, or to achieve something
different, and thus might settle on a different set of protocols.
The case study assumed a level of use of prize draw entries to lower the cost
of the solution. Subsequent surveying could determine the likely success of this
strategy.
A further optional protocol is the use of distance-based rewards, especially if
dealing with consecutive bottlenecks.
Other operational protocols could include provision of shuttles to the bottleneck;
evening meeting-places for the return journey; charges for parking if a meetingplace parking facility is provided.

Model 20-year
traffic flows based
on operational
assumptions

Calculate how many people will be incentivized each day to achieve the target
level of traffic and forecast forward for each year. This calculation should allow
for growth in demand due to population growth and economic growth. Estimate
factors such as the reduction in delay compared with the current situation,
and the impact on fuel use and vehicle crash rates. The case study generally
used the midpoint each year as the average number to incentivize for different
purposes.

Estimate 20-year
costs and benefits and
calculate NPV and
BCR

Investigate the rates that would put benefits and costs into financial terms on a
year by year basis and apply to the model. Determine the discount factor(s) to
use.
Carry out a sensitivity analysis around changes in parameters.
For the case study, several benefit categories were not modeled such as
a general economic uplift, and improvements in job satisfaction. Over time
methods may become available for valuing these benefits and adding them to
the assessment of congestion-clearing payments to passengers.

A SOLUTION THAT USERS WOULD DESIGN
The positive nature of passenger-payments is consistent with many of Ostrom’s principles
for governing the commons, as long as the users are involved in the decision-making.
Because it is app-based the solution incorporates effective monitoring. Because it would be
necessary to be a passenger to receive the incentives the solution does not reward people
who are not part of the solution. If successful, the solution will help alleviate the tragedy of
the commons usually associated with transportation systems.

A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE CHALLENGE
However, this proposal involves change on an unprecedented scale: to go from what
is essentially 0% passengers to 50% passengers on the corridor, in a year, and then to
maintain that level, while using incentives to spread peak demand to prevent a congestion
queue at a significant bottleneck. Even though the target appears achievable based on
the results of the survey, it would still be a considerable achievement. With reference to
the paper by Van Vugt et al. from the Netherlands in 1982, in which a carpool lane was
defeated by a combination of low usage and a challenge from those who didn’t want
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to qualify to use it, great care should be taken to build the case, obtain positive media
coverage, engage the community in a commons governance process, and establish an
approach and culture that give the solution the maximum opportunity for success.

NEXT STEPS
This research from Mineta Transportation Institute began exploring the concept of passengerpayments with a positive outlook that it might make sense as a response to the peak period
congestion faced every weekday by millions of U.S. workers. Following the year of research
work described in this report, the concept still makes sense to the project team.
The case study corridor with its long-standing bottleneck is a single point of reference.
The project team hopes to carry out research on additional corridors with different traffic
conditions in order to leverage the lessons learned from this project and determine whether
there are features of corridors that could be used help estimate the magnitude of, and predict
the likely success of a CCPTP solution across different locations. Approaches by people in
congested jurisdictions are welcomed.
Additionally, the findings of the Half Moon Bay case study justify a pilot project in that location
to test the concept. The project team will pursue funding for such a pilot project in order to
firm up the estimates and calibrate the findings of this study.

IMPLEMENTATION NOTES
In moving forward to a pilot project on the case study route, the project team recommends as
follows to the California Department of Transport, San Mateo County, City of Half Moon Bay,
and other public agencies that would be responsible for bringing it about:
1. Make commitments to fund a five-year pilot, circa $40 million present value in 2019
dollars, discounted at 3%;
2. Convene a process of Coastside community participation aligned to commons
governance principles;
3. Implement detailed monitoring of the bottleneck and queues, perhaps developing or
adapting some technologies to make this more effective than is currently the case;
4. Carry out counts of existing traffic for commuter:non-commuter mix and average
occupancies;
5. Carry out a random sample survey of Coastside residents to validate (or adjust) the
calculations contained in this report;
6. Develop options for limiting SOV travel in peak-of-peak;
7. Document a business/implementation plan that is consistent with the above;
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8. Present all information to the community and seek decisions and community support
for the solution;
9. With support from the community, and issues resolved, implement the plan.
The project team expects that the total 5-year cost will be below the modeled level of $40
million, because in years 3–5 a key focus will be to achieve the target level of traffic with the
lowest possible cost. Gamification, prize draws, and other mechanisms including machine
learning will be explored in greater detail once the commuters understand the underlying
concepts of the solution.
As an end note, CCPTP is a solution that could be used for a number of years and then
discontinued. The use of a 20-year timeframe for benefit and cost analysis was chosen for
consistency with the usual evaluation of other alternative solutions. Especially if the cost of
bottleneck location parking can be avoided, there will be minimal cost involved in shutting
down the CCPTP solution if it fails to deliver the required results, or if the arrival of shared
robotaxis with very low price-points renders alternative solutions unnecessary. Further, it is
possible that at some point the benefit-to-cost ratio of providing incentives will fall below that
of expanding the facility, at which juncture pricing will truly signal the point at which a facility
should be expanded.

COVID-19
A further end note regarding COVID-19, the disease that is causing worldwide disruption to
economic activity at the time the revisions to this report are being completed in April 2020.
COVID-19 has removed traffic congestion to a low level that could not have been imagined.
Many cities and countries are in some form of lockdown and the roads are practically empty.
But this will pass.
As economies restart, the project team anticipates that there will be some permanent changes
to commuting patterns as a result of two factors:
• The shift to working from home that has rapidly been achieved by middle and upper
management of many organizations. This new knowledge of how to operate distributed
teams will allow organizations to be leaner and more efficient and reduce demand for
sustained office presence. This in turn will reduce the volume of commuter traffic.
• The mistrust by people who perceive shared transport, especially public transport, to
be unsafe due to potential virus transmission. This will make it more difficult for public
transport passenger counts to return to pre-virus levels, threatening the viability of
transit agencies and adding to the volume of commuter traffic.
As volumes regrow, CCPTP could provide an opportunity to achieve two important things:
• Encourage commuters in a post-virus world to return to sharing by rewarding them for
doing so;
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• Encourage post-virus traffic to operate at a level that keeps it moving, rather than
returning to the severely congested levels that the above changes might predict.
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APPENDIX A: FOCUS GROUP REPORT
DESCRIPTION OF THE FOCUS GROUP METHOD
Much of what is considered standard procedure for focus group interviews may be traced to
Robert Merton et al.’s classic work The Focused Interview.80 The concept has been embraced
wholeheartedly by market researchers, and recently has received renewed attention from
academic social scientists. Richard Krueger and Mary Ann Casey define the focus group as
“a special type of group in terms of purpose, size, composition, and procedures.”81,82 A focus
group is typically composed of seven to ten participants who do not know each other but
share common interests.
With focus groups, the researcher creates a relaxed open environment which encourages all
participants to express their opinions without any mandate to reach consensus. The group
discussion is repeated several times with similar types of participants to identify a broad
range of perceptions.
Focus groups generally last for one to two hours. The procedure is repeated until the groups
are producing relatively little that the researcher has not already heard. They are a prime
example of qualitative research: Jane Farley Templeton compares and contrasts focus groups
with surveys and other more quantitative research: “Focus groups do not result in numbers—
or at least they should not.”83 Instead, Templeton notes the method’s strength is its ability
to generate working hypotheses for phenomena that can later be explored and analyzed
via surveys.84
The method is well-suited to the exploration of topics and the generation of hypotheses.
The fact that group interviews can produce useful data with relatively little direct input from the
researcher, is a distinct advantage, especially in comparison to other interview techniques.85
Focus groups can cover a broader range of topics compared to formal interviews, but they
are more structured than ethnographic studies or participant observation, since they are in a
controlled setting and not the world at large.
Adaptation of the Focus Group Method to the Research Goals: The purpose of the focus groups
was to connect with and learn from the experiences of current Silicon Valley commuters. The
project team wanted to provide the opportunity to discuss ideas for improving the transport
system, and to introduce the concept of paying passengers as a strategy for congestion
reduction as it might work for them. The participants’ responses would also allow the team to
generate a corpus of words, terms, and phrases related to traffic and carpooling which would
inform the creation of a more detailed survey that would resonate with typical commuters’
experiences, needs and issues.

Protocol Development
The protocol (see later) was formulated to include research related to how parking price and
availability influences the choice to drive, to uncover information about latent demand, as
well as to think about the reward curve necessary to nudge drivers to change to passengers.
Questions were also included to get at psychographic segmentation: e.g., identify types of
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people
• who would be interested in carpooling,
• who could be convinced to give carpooling a try,
• for whom no amount of financial incentive could make carpooling appealing.
The final focus group protocol contained nine open-ended discussion questions and one
written activity. Questions were structured to allow participants to talk about their experiences
of commuting in congestion, to elicit suggestions for making improvements, and then to
steer the conversation toward carpooling. Once the discussion of carpooling had begun,
the moderator segued into evaluating pros and cons of carpooling, and eventually to asking
participants to generate an incentive program for encouraging carpooling. Carpooling was
not emphasized in the promotional or introductory materials, only that researchers were
seeking commuters’ ideas for addressed the impacts of congestion on the journey to and
from work.

Participant Recruitment
Participants were recruited through a variety of means. Efforts were made to reach out to
commuters who typically travel on freeways, in congestion, and alone. It was desirable to
avoid recruiting people who were already involved in congestion reduction or alternative
transportation. An ad was placed on Facebook targeting commuters in the area: see Figures
28-30. An incentive of $75USD in the form of a Visa gift card was offered for participants.

Figure 28. Audience Specification for Facebook Ad
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Figure 30. Facebook Ad
Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

104

Appendix A: Focus Group Report

105

San Mateo County published the survey ad from their NextDoor account, and a local traffic
reporter, Gary Richardson, ran an ad for the focus groups is his weekly newspaper column
“Mr. Roadshow.” The wording of the ad in the Mr. Roadshow column unfortunately included
references to carpooling, but the participants recruited from his column did not appear more
likely to bring up carpooling in the focus group itself. Respondents from Mr. Roadshow’s
column were much more likely to be male, whereas respondents from NextDoor were more
likely to be female.
Potential participants were asked to complete a Google form providing their email address,
commute distance, commute duration, and preferred focus group session. When reaching
out to potential participants, efforts were made to achieve a balance between male and
female participants. In the end, the gender breakdown of the focus groups was as follows:
• Focus Group 1: 4 women, 4 men
• Focus Group 2: 3 women, 8 men
• Focus Group 3: 7 women, 3 men
Other demographics of the focus groups were reflective of the South Bay and Peninsula
workforce: most were in their 30s and 40s with a few younger and several older
participants. Latinos, Asians and Non-Hispanic Whites were well represented; one
participant was African-American.

Conducting the Focus Groups
Each focus group took place in a conference room. Participants were offered beverages
and refreshments. They were asked to wear name tags indicating their first names, and to
complete a consent form. One of the researchers (Dr. Lee) acted as moderator, asking
questions and keeping the dialogue flowing. Brittany Bogue acted as scribe and notated the
responses generated by the participants. The papers from the participants were collected and
the notes taken in each session were photographed to be reviewed later. Audio recordings
were made of each session.
As mentioned above, the focus groups were structured to allows participants to discuss
their personal experiences with commuting in traffic, then to elicit ideas for improving the
transport system, and then to steer the conversation toward a discussion of carpooling.
Once there, participants were asked to provide suggestions for designing a carpool incentive
program. Once the group had collectively designed this program, participants were asked if
such a program would influence them to begin carpooling, and if not, why not. Individually,
participants were asked to write down the following:
• Their top three concerns about being a carpool driver or passenger;
• Weights for the importance of each concern by dividing 100 points among the three
(e.g., if flexibility is the most important, it might receive 60 of the points, and the other
40 points would be apportioned between the other two concerns);
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• The amount (incentive) they would require to travel as a carpool driver; and
• The amount they would require to travel as a carpool passenger.

Review and Analysis
After collecting the notes generated by the participants, their responses were tabulated
into a spreadsheet that included the amount s/he would require to travel as a driver, as
a passenger, the three most strident concerns, and the weights of each concern. Not all
notes were legible, but most were. The amount required ranged from -$3 (two participants
indicated they would not need to be paid if the carpool was convenient, and one even said
they would pay to carpool) to $150 per day. The average amount per day was $31.24, and the
median was $10. One participant suggested being paid $0.58/mile based on the government
reimbursement rate. In a comment that supports the research about free parking as a driving
force in the decision to drive alone, one participant indicated that free parking would be
enough of an incentive to carpool. At present, this participant’s destination does not offer
free parking.
A frequent tirade concerned the state of enforcement of the carpool lane. In every focus
group, multiple people referenced carpool cheaters who shamelessly clog up the carpool lane
without having a passenger. Every group seemed to share consensus that there should
be more enforcement, apart from one person who acknowledged that police presence on
the road also slows down traffic. One person was particularly incensed about the carpool
scofflaws and mentioned daydreams of participating in citizens’ arrest and vigilante justice
for wayward drivers who do not respect the sanctity of the carpool lane. Though it was a
comical aside, the perception that the carpool lane is not a reliable amenity is a challenge to
be overcome in efforts to reduce the number of vehicles on the road.

Survey Implications
Parking: As anticipated, very few participants pay for parking at the origin or destination
of their commute. Those who pay for parking, or for whom parking is constrained tended
to have a more favorable view of carpooling from the outset. These are important data for
determining the price for any corridor, and questions about parking will need to be included
in the survey.
Safety: Participants want to be assured that the person driving, and the person riding have
been somehow vetted. This safety and comfort measure should be addressed or otherwise
accounted for.
Liability: Participants were concerned about liability ramifications of carpooling.
Interpersonal Comfort: Many participants were concerned not only about the difficulty
of finding a potential carpool mate, but about the suitability of that mate once identified.
Segmentation should address how many of them are people who would never carpool who
may place a higher premium on alone time, or the “car as inner sanctum,” as one participant
phrased it.
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During the third focus group, in which one participant explained his experience with Scoop
and implied that he was able to carpool without having to be locked into traveling with the
same (potentially annoying) person(s), these concerns seemed to be assuaged. It could
be that carpooling still conjures images of physical bulletin boards and rigid meeting times.
While reliability is important, newer technologies make it possible to choose to carpool with
potentially less advance notice and with fewer long-term social contracts.
In light of the previous bullet point, it may be beneficial to ask a question in the survey along
the lines of: “How would knowing you would not need to carpool with the same people
change your willingness to carpool? (less willing, no change, more willing?)”
The survey should ask about the degree of variability in the person’s commute, including
variations in start and end times, and the frequency and nature of side trips on the way
to and from work. It will be important to identify how necessary such deviations are in the
eyes of the commuter. This assessment could help gauge how much complexity is built into
respondents’ commutes, and what percentage of commuters travel to and from work without
too much variability.

General Observations
Almost all the participants were currently drive-alone commuters, though most had
some knowledge and experience with other modes including carpooling. Most dislike
their commute, though they have adapted to it in various ways to varying degrees.
Congestion, particularly severe or unexpected congestion was clearly a major if not the major
factor in making their commute stressful and unpleasant. Often the trip time endured was
longer than the free flow time by a factor of two or more. Most commute within or between
Santa Clara and San Mateo Counties, with a few traveling to San Francisco, Santa Cruz
or Alameda Counties. While some made frequent trips to the Central Valley, none resided
there: several noted that they felt their own commutes were not nearly as painful as those
of co-workers living in the Central Valley who endure two-hour-plus journeys to work under
the best of circumstances. As expected, the afternoon commute was more congested and
longer than the morning commute in almost all instances.
Driving alone in traffic is a frustrating experience in many ways. Many described their
schedules as severely constrained. Typically, commuting in serious congestion means
waking and leaving for work earlier than would be preferred. Some participants avoid
afternoon congestion by leaving work early, but then doing some work at home in the
evening. Dealing with bad and aggressive drivers was a common complaint, as were
perceived roadway design deficiencies such lane drops, closely-spaced on- and offramps, and poorly coordinated traffic signals. Many commuters reported a notorious
bottleneck; some proffered solutions, generally involving infrastructure (spot widening) or
technology (better information regarding incidents, accidents, and alternative routes). Poor
pavement conditions exacerbated several participants commutes, and accidents added
not only travel time, but a stressful reminder that commuting can turn deadly. Several
bemoaned the lack of transportation improvements, and the delays and shortcomings
of those in the works. Wistful envy was expressed by some for the heyday of freeway
construction in the 20th century and for “overnight” construction of major transportation

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix A: Focus Group Report

108

infrastructure in China today.
Several women reported that their relatively short-distance commutes were lengthened
temporally and complicated by the need to take children to and from school: for these
commuters, enabling children to independently travel to school would facilitate carpooling.
One participant noted that school holidays resulted in significant reductions in congestion,
and that minor holidays (e.g. Columbus Day) that are observed by most of the public sector
but not by most private firms relieve most congestion.

Takeaways for the Overall Research
Almost all the participants expressed concerns about the challenges of finding a suitable
carpool companion for reasons including their location, schedule, and demeanor. Several
participants were also concerned about “stranger danger” and agreed that it would be
important to vet possible drivers and passengers in some manner. The number of variables
concerned several participants and seemed impossible to overcome to others. To quote one
participant from the second focus group, “The only way I would carpool is if the perfect
person, in the perfect place could carpool with me. Money is less of a factor than location
and time. Nothing would incentivize me … no amount they could pay me would make me go
5 miles out of my way.”
It’s worth noting that this comment was made during the second focus group, in which there
was also a person who had attempted to use WAZE and Scoop to carpool. They had difficulty
being matched with drivers or passengers. During the third focus group, a participant whose
employer partners with Scoop was able to provide concrete examples of how he was able
to carpool using the app with minimal inconvenience. The participant indicated that it was
possible to draw a map of acceptable pick-up and drop-off locations, and to review the queue
of pending riders if no one was available in the preferred zone. Having a person who could
describe how one provider is able to address the perceived challenges of carpooling seemed
to assuage the concerns of several of the participants in the final focus group.
Several commuters expressed tentative willingness to carpool on an occasional basis, e.g.
one or two days a week. Some would like to be able to carpool one-way, e.g., ridesharing
in the morning but not back in the evening. Third-party provision of carpool vehicles was
proposed as an attractive strategy, as it would enable drivers as well as passengers to
avoid both operating costs and liability issues. Others objected that this source of vehicles
could lead to more cars on the road overall, and thus be counter-productive to energy and
emissions goals and policies. Personal cars left at home might be used by other family
members adding to overall vehicular travel.
During the introductions when participants were sharing details about the duration and routes
of their commutes, it was clear that each driver is juggling a complex decision-making process
that includes, time of day, time of year, route options, errands, and a host of other factors.
Though each participant could exasperatedly rattle off the series of interchanges, departure
times, durations, and bottlenecks, the descriptions of key aspects of their commute also
seemed to be rote. That is to say, the number of decisions and contingency plans each driver
made did not seem to carry the mental load that several perceived aspects of carpooling
would require. Explicating the number of choices inherent in the decision to “just drive
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alone” might be instructive when communicating the mental requirements and means for
shifting modes. Addressing such elements as linked trips, breakdowns, and emergency
transportation is important. There is a somewhat paradoxical need to both maximize options
and choices regarding carpooling, while minimizing cognitive demands and the need for
complex decision-making by commuters.

FOCUS GROUP PROTOCOL
1. Recruitment
a. Recruit on the basis of ‘help improve the transport system’ (not mentioning
carpooling)
b. Recruit people who make regular trips to work at the same location each day
(or most days) and mostly drive alone, at peak, on a congested corridor
c. 6–8 people for each group, meeting somewhere near their wok or their
residential area
d. A token ‘thank-you’ gift card worth $75
2. Introductions
a. Inform people of their ‘rights’ to not answer any question, to leave at any time,
to not do anything that might make them uncomfortable, to not be identified
in any reports, ask them to sign the consent form, explain that we will audiorecord the discussion for further analysis by team members.
b. Ask each participant to say their name, and a description of their daily commute
(type of residential area, type of work destination, amount of time it takes, and
how long it would take without congestion), and how they feel about it.
c. Quick question and answer so that everyone has a good understanding of
where each other are coming from.
3. General discussion item: “What would you do to improve the transport system?”
a. Use proper brainstorming technique where you go around the group and each
person add an idea, builds on a previous idea (theirs or others’), or passes
b. Go until all pass in a round
c. No judgmental comments about the ideas
d. Do a short exercise creating a classification of the ideas listed.
4. Starting to get specific:
a. If anyone mentioned anything to do with ‘encourage more carpooling’ in the
brainstorm, it gives us a hook into the next discussion with it being ‘their’ idea.
Once item 3 is completed, go to that item and ask, “how would you do that?”
and “what would be the issues associated with that?”
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b. If the brainstorm ideas didn’t include carpooling, say “you didn’t say anything
about encouraging more carpooling. Why not?”
c. You have to go with the flow here a bit. We can assume that they will engage in
a discussion that either says “gosh, we missed that one, it should be there,” or
“here are several good reasons why we think it is a lousy idea,” or something
along those lines.
d. Either way, capture all the points they make about encouraging more carpooling
on the whiteboard and probe each as far as you can [but without suggesting
anything about incentives, though they might raise this].
e. Record on the board columns of ‘pros’ and cons’ for encouraging more
carpooling.
5. Getting more specific:
a. In the question 4 discussion, someone might mention ‘incentivize carpooling.’
If so, it gives us a hook into the next discussion with it being ‘their’ idea. Once
item 4 is completed, go to that item and encourage a broader discussion of
this idea, saying “how might you do that?” and “what would be the issues
associated with that?”
b. If their ideas didn’t include incentivizing carpooling, say “how about providing
incentives to get more people to carpool, how would that work?”
c. Once again go with the flow. Capture points on the whiteboard about
incentivizing carpooling, in columns of ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ or other categories if
they seem more appropriate. Try to keep it general rather than personal.
6. And more specific:
a. Hopefully on completion of question 5 it is an easy transition to ask: “what
features would an incentive program have to have, to encourage more
carpooling” or “lets design the ideal incentive program for encouraging more
carpooling—what does it have to have? Is there anything it should not have?”
Capture the ideas on the whiteboard. [Note: this is a task even the most ‘anticarpooling’ person could actively participate in].
b. Do some classifying and ranking work with what is on the whiteboard—which
do they think are the most and least important features, are there some features
that are really important to some people but not to others?
7. And very specific:
a. Say “if an incentive program existed on your route to work like the one you
have just described on the whiteboard; would you participate in it? What do
you think of as the barriers and enablers for you if you were to be a carpool
driver?” [Capture all comments.]
b. Say “What do you think of as the barriers and enablers for you if you were to
be a carpool passenger?” [Capture all comments.]
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c. Say “How much would the incentive need to be, each day, for you to overcome
those barriers and participate as a carpool driver?” [Get them all to write down
their answer.]
d. Say “How much would it need to be to overcome the barriers and be a carpool
passenger?” [Get them all to write down their answer.]
e. Say: “List up to three key issues that you personally considered as you answered
each of those last two questions—to be a driver, and to be a passenger.”
f. Say: “Please share 100 points between each of the items for being a driver,
and each of the items for being a passenger (total 200 points), in proportion to
how relatively important each issue was to you as you thought about it.”
g. Please each share your answers to this set of questions and then we will
discuss. [Record all info on the whiteboard and lead a brief discussion about
interesting aspects that they talk about.]
8. Somewhat general again:
a. Say: “The purpose of our project is to develop a method for estimating the
amount of incentive needed to get enough people in a corridor to switch to
being passengers so that we get rid of congestion in a transport corridor. You
have helped us to better understand all the issues associated with incentivizing
people to become carpoolers. Some of you have indicated that you would
become a carpooler for a certain amount of incentive, while others [say this if
true] have said that no amount would be sufficient. Do you think that there are
different personalities of people who will carpool and people who will not? Or is
it always situational? Do you have any suggestions to help us understand how
personality is involved in the decision to carpool or not? What are the main
factors that you think make people unwilling to carpool?”
b. In above, pause each time to gather answers. Probe and discuss as appropriate.
9. Finally, a general question: “Our next step is (some more focus groups and) to
survey a few hundred people in one corridor to find out how much these issues exist
in that corridor. As we go ahead and create the survey, do you have any ideas or
suggestions for us?”
Thanks for your time today. You have helped us a lot. Here is a brief summary of our project
and how we are going to use the information that we have gathered today. If you have any
further questions or comments, please feel free to contact Richard Lee at 123-4567 (actual
contact number was provided to the participants).
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY INSTRUMENT
INTRODUCTION
This appendix is made up of three components:
1. Survey summary;
2. Skip logic map for the survey; and
3. The survey itself as downloaded from SurveyMonkey.
The survey administered via SurveyMonkey had a large number of skipped pages and
branches that were dependent on the earlier answers by the respondent. While the survey
itself had about 105 questions, most respondents answered about 30 questions. The main
driver of the skipping and branching was the mode-choice of the respondent, though there
were other causes as well.
To make it easier for readers to follow the survey, it is first presented in summary form,
covering the substantive content in the order that the respondents saw it, but without skips,
and with wording that is similar to the survey but paraphrased for accessibility.
The two components that follow the summary could be accessed in either order, or
concurrently: the questions themselves and the skip/branch logic that takes a respondent
from one question to another.

SURVEY SUMMARY
1. In which community do you live?
2. On a typical Tuesday, would you usually travel on the [named] highway between 5
am and 9 am?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday
3. On a zero to 100-point scale, how much impact does the congestion at the bottleneck
have on your decision about how and when to use the highway? (Zero = no impact,
100 = very large impact.)
4. What do you do differently because of the morning congestion at the bottleneck?
a. I just take it as it comes
b. I have no need to travel on the highway
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c. I leave earlier to avoid the congestion at the bottleneck
d. I leave earlier to allow for the congestion at the bottleneck
e. Congestion further downstream is a bigger issue and I adjust for that
f. I leave later to avoid the congestion at the bottleneck
g. I work from or near home, I do not travel on the route because of the
congestion at the bottleneck
5. What is the main purpose of your Tuesday morning trip?
6. What time do you usually leave home for your typical Tuesday morning trip?
7. Where is the destination of your typical Tuesday morning trip?
8. What mode of transport do you usually use for your typical Tuesday morning trip?
a. Drive alone in a car, truck, or SUV
b. Drive alone by motorcycle
c. Drive a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus with passengers
d. Drive a motorcycle with passengers
e. Travel as a passenger in a car, truck, SUV, van or minibus (but not Uber/
Lyft), or on a motorcycle
f. Travel as a sole passenger in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
g. Travel with multiple passengers in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
h. Travel as a passenger on a public transport bus
9. If in Q2 you said ‘some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday, how often do you make a
Tuesday morning trip?
a. One Tuesday a month
b. Two Tuesdays a month
c. Three Tuesdays a month
d. One Tuesday every two months
e. One Tuesday every three months
f. One Tuesday every six months
10. If in Q8 you said e or g (travelled as a passenger) how many people, including the
driver, would be in the vehicle for the Tuesday morning trip?
11. If you answered Q10, do all the people in the vehicle live in the same household, or
are they from the same family?
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12. If you answered Q10, is an app used to arrange these shared trips? If so, which one?
13. If in Q8 you said you travel as a driver with passengers (c or d), how many people,
including the driver, would be in the vehicle for the Tuesday morning trip?
14. If you answered Q13, do all the people in the vehicle live in the same household, or
are they from the same family?
15. If you answered Q13, how many of the passengers are school-age children?
16. If in Q8 you said you travel as a driver (a, b, c, or d), do you pay for parking at the
destination? Is it by the hour, day, month, or year? How much is it?
17. If you answered Q16, how many seats are in your vehicle?
18. Would other days (other than Tuesday) be much different to Tuesday?
19. If you answered yes, or ‘some Tuesdays’ to Q2, imagine for a moment that the
traffic congestion at the bottleneck has gone away. Leave aside exactly how this has
happened, just imagine that it has happened. You could make trips onto the highway
without any delay except the traffic lights. How would this change your use of the
route on Tuesday mornings? Would you change the time you leave home? If so,
what would the new time be?
20. If you answered Q19, would you change your mode of travel? If so, what would you
change to?
21. If you answered Q19, if you currently travel some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday,
would you change your frequency of making a Tuesday morning trip? Please select
new frequency.
22. If you answered Q19, is there anything else you would change about your Tuesday
morning trip-making?
23. If you answered No to Q2, imagine for a moment that the traffic congestion at the
bottleneck has gone away. Leave aside exactly how this has happened, just imagine
that it has happened. You could make trips onto the highway without any delay
except the traffic lights. Would you start making a trip on a typical Tuesday morning?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday
24. If you answered Q23 with Some Tuesdays, how often would you make your new
Tuesday morning trip?
25. If you answered Q23 with Yes or Some Tuesdays, what would be the main purpose
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of your new Tuesday morning trip?
26. If you answered Q25, by what mode would you travel?
27. If you answered Q25, what time would you leave home?
28. If you answered Q25, what would be your destination?
29. If you answered as a driver (a to d) for Q8: As we wait and hope for a change that
makes the traffic congestion disappear, are there actions that you could take in
the meantime that would help make the traffic better? We are interested in what it
would take for people who currently drive to travel as a passenger some of the time.
This would reduce the number of cars in the backed-up traffic. This could be as a
passenger on a bus, in a vanpool, in a carpool, or in a multi-passenger service such
as a shuttle, UberPool, or LyftLine. Are you the sort of person who already travels as
a passenger, or would travel as a passenger if it were easy to do?
a. Yes, I already travel as a passenger (excluding sole occupant of taxi/Uber/
Lyft) some of the time (just not Tuesday mornings).
b. Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger, including a
multi-passenger taxi/Uber/Lyft if it were easy to do.
c. No, I do not think I am that sort of person.
30. Some people have suggested that people who travel as passengers (in buses,
vanpools, carpools, shared Uber/Lyft) should be rewarded (paid money) for doing
so. Would it change your answer to the previous question if a program were in place
to pay an incentive to people who travel as passengers during the times when there
is traffic congestion?
a. Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger if it were easy
to do, and if I were paid enough money each day to do so.
b. No, I don’t think I would travel as a passenger even if there was money
involved.
31. You said you would not travel as a passenger even if there was money involved.
Would you, instead, be prepared to give other people a ride in your vehicle?
a. Yes, I already give other people rides some of the time (just not Tuesday
mornings)
b. Yes, I would give other people rides, if it were easy to do
c. No, I do not think I am that sort of person
32. Would it change your answer to the previous question if passengers were being
paid money for traveling as a passenger, and they were prepared to share that
money with you?
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a. Yes, I am the sort of person who would give people rides if it were easy to do,
and if I were paid enough money each day to do so.
b. No, I don’t think I would provide people with rides even if there was money
involved.
33. If you are already providing rides, or if you think about providing rides, we assume
it takes some effort to do so. How big is that effort? And how much money would it
take to overcome that effort? On a scale of 0–100, where 0 is no effort at all and 100
is a great degree of effort, how much effort do you think it would take for you to give
people a ride on your Tuesday morning trip on the [named] highway?
34. Now please imagine that a fund of money is available, say from a federal program, to
pay people incentives for traveling as passengers, and the passengers are prepared
to share this money with drivers. Assuming it does not add any time to your journey
to do so, (perhaps it saves time) how much would you need to be paid, on Tuesdays,
to provide people with a ride? (Drop down box with a list of daily amounts, with an
annual equivalent assuming it is done every work day.)
35. If you answered as a passenger to Q8: If you are already traveling as a passenger,
or if you are thinking about traveling as a passenger, we understand that it takes
some effort compared with driving alone. We’d like to know how much effort it takes
for you, or how much effort you think it would take. Please answer on a scale of
0–100 where 0 is no effort at all, and 100 is a great degree of effort.
a. To travel as a passenger on a bus?
b. To travel as a passenger in a vanpool?
c. To travel as a passenger in a carpool?
36. Now please imagine that a fund of money is available, say from a federal program,
to pay people an incentive for traveling as a passenger. Assuming it does not add
any time to your journey to do so, (perhaps it saves time) how much would you need
to be paid, on Tuesdays, to switch from being a driver to being a passenger in:
a. A bus (state amount)
b. A vanpool (state amount)
c. A carpool (state amount)
d. A shuttle or Uber-Pool or Lyft-Line type of multi-passenger shared ride service
that picks you up at your door? (state amount)
37. [Depending on previous answers, there are variations of the above such as how
much to keep a person traveling as a passenger who said they would change to
driving if the congestion had cleared.]
38. [For people who do not travel on the route but say they will start to, there are variation
on the above to find out what it would take to get someone who said they would drive
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to become a passenger instead.]
39. [As appropriate] You said you do not travel on the [named] highway on typical
Tuesday mornings, and would still not do so if the traffic congestion went away.
Would the answer be the same for other days of the working week?
40. Please could you tell us what year you were born?
41. Please tell us your gender identity.
42. What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?
a. Less than high school graduate
b. High school graduate
c. Some college
d. College graduate
e. Postgraduate degree
43. Including yourself, how many people currently live in your household (including
children)?
44. How many children in your household are age 15 or younger?
45. Number of cars usually available to people who live in your household?
46. How many people who live in your household have a driver’s license?
47. Household income: what was the approximate income from employment and all
other sources for all members of your household, before taxes, last year?
a. Under $15,000
b. Between $15,000 and $29,999
c. Between $30,000 and $49,999
d. Between $50,000 and $74,999
e. Between $75,000 and $99,999
f. Between $100,000 and $150,000
g. Over $150,000
h. Prefer not to say
48. Thank you for your time and effort completing this survey. If you have any comments
about the survey, or about improving the traffic for [named] highway, please answer
in the boxes below.
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SKIP LOGIC MAP FOR THE SURVEY
Survey construction allows for skipping pages that are not relevant to some survey
participants, based on their answers to earlier questions. While the survey itself has about
105 questions, most respondents answer about 30 questions. The main branches in this
survey respond to mode-choice.
The following describes the skip logic that is built into the survey instrument on SurveyMonkey
and relates to the survey questions that follow in the next section. P1 (immediately below)
refers to the questions on Page 1 of the survey. Q1 refers to question 1. A1 refers to answer
choice 1. And so on. Skip logic can be seen in each page header where relevant and following
an answer-choice where a skip is present. For example:
• If the respondent chooses answer A1 to question Q1 on P1, the program will skip to
the top of page 4;
• If the respondent chooses answer A2 to question Q1 on P1, the program will skip to
the top of page 2;
• For P2 if there was no over-riding question-based skip, all respondents would go to
the top of page 4. Because there is question-based skip logic (P2, Q2, A1, skips to
top of page 4, and P2, Q2, A2, skips to the top of page 39.
The question numbers are sequential throughout the skip logic map, and link to the questions
with the same number in the survey.
P1
Text

No logic

Q1

Skip logic
A1.
Yes, I agree to participate. Let’s get started.

TOP OF PAGE 4

A2.
Yes, I agree to participate. But I would like to come back later.
A3.
No, I have decided that I do not want to do it.

P2

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Text

TOP OF PAGE 2

TOP OF PAGE 3

P4

No logic

Q2

Skip logic
A1.
Okay, I have a bit of time, let›s get started.

TOP OF PAGE 4

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix B: Survey Instrument
A2.
No, I really have to go. I will close the link and come back later.

P3

TOP OF PAGE 39

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q3

P41

Skip logic
A1.
I didn›t mean to end up here. Please let me start the survey.

TOP OF PAGE 4

A2.
I don›t think I know enough about the issues to answer any questions.
A3.
I am just too busy right now.
A7.
Other (please tell us why)

P4
Q4

TOP OF PAGE 41

TOP OF PAGE 41

TOP OF PAGE 41

No logic

P5
Q5

Skip logic
A1.
Half Moon Bay
A2.
El Granada
A3.
Miramar
A4.
Moss Beach
A5.
Montara
A6.
Lobitos
A7.
Pescadero
A8.
San Gregorio
A9.
I do not live in this area at all
A10.
Other (please specify)

TOP OF PAGE 41

P6
Q6

Skip logic
A1.
Yes
A2.
No

TOP OF PAGE 7
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A3.
Some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday

Q7

TOP OF PAGE 19

TOP OF PAGE 8

No logic

Q8

No logic

P7
Q9

No logic

Q10

No logic

Q11

No logic

Q12

No logic

Q13

No logic

Q14

Skip logic
A1.
Drive alone in a car, truck, or SUV
A2.
Drive alone by motorcycle

TOP OF PAGE 11

TOP OF PAGE 11

A3.
Drive a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus with passengers
A4.
Drive a motorcycle with passengers

TOP OF PAGE 10

TOP OF PAGE 10

A5.
Travel as a passenger in a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus, (but not Uber/Lyft), or on a motorcycle
TOP OF PAGE 9

A6.
Travel as a sole passenger in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 12

A7.
Travel with multiple passengers in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 9

A8.
Travel as a passenger on a public transport bus
A9.
Some other answer

P8
Q15

TOP OF PAGE 14

TOP OF PAGE 11

No logic

Q16

No logic

Q17

No logic

Q18
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No logic

Q19

No logic

Q20

No logic

Q21

Skip logic
A1.
Drive alone in a car, truck, or SUV
A2.
Drive alone by motorcycle

TOP OF PAGE 11

TOP OF PAGE 11

A3.
Drive a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus with passengers
A4.
Drive a motorcycle with passengers

TOP OF PAGE 10

TOP OF PAGE 10

A5.
Travel as a passenger in a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus, (but not Uber/Lyft), or on a motorcycle
TOP OF PAGE 9

A6.
Travel as a sole passenger in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 12

A7.
Travel with multiple passengers in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 9

A8.
Travel as a passenger on a public transport bus

TOP OF PAGE 14

A9.
Some other answer

TOP OF PAGE 11

P9

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q22

P13

No logic

Q23

No logic

Q24

No logic

P10

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q25

P11

No logic

Q26

No logic

Q27

No logic

P11
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Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q28

P15

No logic

Q29

No logic

Q30

No logic

P12

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q31

P16

No logic

P13

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q32

P17

No logic

P14

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q33

P18

No logic

P15
Q34

No logic

Q35

Skip logic
A1.
No change
A2.
Drive alone in a car, truck, or SUV
A3.
Drive alone by motorcycle

TOP OF PAGE 21

TOP OF PAGE 21

TOP OF PAGE 21

A4.
Drive a car, truck, SUV, van or minibus with passengers
A5.
Drive a motorcycle with passengers

TOP OF PAGE 21

TOP OF PAGE 21

A6.
Travel as a passenger in a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus (but not Uber/Lyft), or on a motorcycle
TOP OF PAGE 29

A7.
Travel as a sole passenger in a taxi/Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 21
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A8.
Travel with multiple passengers in a taxi/Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 29

A9.
Travel as a passenger on a public transport bus

TOP OF PAGE 29

A10.
Other new mode

TOP OF PAGE 21

Q36

No logic

Q37

No logic

P16
Q38

No logic

Q39

Skip logic
A1.
No change
A2.
Drive alone in a car, truck, or SUV
A3.
Drive alone by motorcycle

TOP OF PAGE 27

TOP OF PAGE 27

TOP OF PAGE 27

A4.
Drive a car, truck, SUV, van or minibus with passengers
A5.
Drive a motorcycle with passengers

TOP OF PAGE 27

TOP OF PAGE 27

A6.
Travel as a passenger in a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus (but not Uber/Lyft), or on a motorcycle
TOP OF PAGE 29

A7.
Travel as a sole passenger in a taxi/Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 27

A8.
Travel with multiple passengers in a taxi/Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 29

A9.
Travel as a passenger on a public transport bus

TOP OF PAGE 29

A10.
Other new mode

TOP OF PAGE 27

Q40

No logic

Q41

No logic

P17

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q42

P30
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No logic

Q43

Skip logic
A1.
No change
A2.
Drive alone in a car, truck, or SUV
A3.
Drive alone by motorcycle

TOP OF PAGE 29

TOP OF PAGE 30

TOP OF PAGE 30

A4.
Drive a car, truck, SUV, van or minibus with passengers
A5.
Drive a motorcycle with passengers

TOP OF PAGE 30

TOP OF PAGE 30

A6.
Travel as a passenger in a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus (but not Uber/Lyft), or on a motorcycle
TOP OF PAGE 29

A7.
Travel as a sole passenger in a taxi/Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 30

A8.
Travel with multiple passengers in a taxi/Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 29

A9.
Travel as a passenger on a public transport bus

TOP OF PAGE 29

A10.
Other new mode

TOP OF PAGE 30

Q44

No logic

Q45

No logic

P18
Q46

No logic

Q47

Skip logic
A1.
No change
A2.
Drive alone in a car, truck, or SUV
A3.
Drive alone by motorcycle

TOP OF PAGE 29

TOP OF PAGE 31

TOP OF PAGE 31

A4.
Drive a car, truck, SUV, van or minibus with passengers
A5.
Drive a motorcycle with passengers
A6.

TOP OF PAGE 31

TOP OF PAGE 31
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Travel as a passenger in a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus (but not Uber/Lyft), or on a motorcycle
TOP OF PAGE 29

A7.
Travel as a sole passenger in a taxi/Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 31

A8.
Travel with multiple passengers in a taxi/Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 29

A9.
Travel as a passenger on a public transport bus

TOP OF PAGE 29

A10.
Other new mode

TOP OF PAGE 31

Q48

No logic

Q49

No logic

P19
Q50

Skip logic
A1.
Yes

P20 : Q52

A2.
No
A3.
Some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday

P20
Q51

TOP OF PAGE 36

TOP OF PAGE 20

No logic

Q52

No logic

Q53

Skip logic
A1.
Drive alone in a car, truck, or SUV
A2.
Drive alone by motorcycle

TOP OF PAGE 33

TOP OF PAGE 33

A3.
Drive a car, truck, SUV, van or minibus with passengers
A4.
Drive a motorcycle with passengers

TOP OF PAGE 33

TOP OF PAGE 33

A5.
Travel as a passenger in a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus, (but not Uber/Lyft), or on a motorcycle
TOP OF PAGE 29

A6.
Travel as a sole passenger in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 33

A7.
Travel with multiple passengers in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
TOP OF PAGE 29
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A8.
Travel as a passenger on a public transport bus

TOP OF PAGE 29

A9.
Other (please specify)

TOP OF PAGE 33

Q54

No logic

Q55

No logic

Q56

No logic

P21
Q57

Skip logic
A1.
Yes, I already travel as a passenger (excluding sole occupant of taxi/Uber/Lyft) some of the time (just not
Tuesday mornings).
TOP OF PAGE 26

A2.
Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger, including a multi-passenger taxi/Uber/Lyft, if
it were easy to do
A3.
No, I do not think I am that sort of person.

P22
Q58

TOP OF PAGE 26

TOP OF PAGE 22

Skip logic
A1.
Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger if it were easy to do, and if I were paid enough
money each day to do so.
TOP OF PAGE 26

A2.
No, I don’t think I would travel as a passenger even if there was money involved.
TOP OF PAGE 23

P23
Q59

Skip logic
A1.
Yes, I already give other people rides some of the time (just not Tuesday mornings).
TOP OF PAGE 25

A2.
Yes, I would give other people rides, if it were easy to do
A3.
No, I do not think I am that sort of person.

P24
Q60

TOP OF PAGE 25

TOP OF PAGE 24

Skip logic
A1.
Yes, I am the sort of person who would give people rides if it were easy to do, and if I were paid enough
money each day to do so.
TOP OF PAGE 25

A2.
No, I don’t think I would provide people with rides even if there was money involved.
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TOP OF PAGE 37

P25

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q61

P37

No logic

Q62

No logic

Q63

No logic

P26

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q64

P37

No logic

Q65

No logic

Q66

No logic

Q67

No logic

Q68

No logic

P27
Q69

Skip logic
A1.
Yes, I already travel as a passenger (excluding sole occupant of taxi/Uber/Lyft) some of the time (just not
on Tuesday mornings).
TOP OF PAGE 29

A2.
Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger, including a multi-passenger taxi/Uber/Lyft, if
it were easy to do
A3.
No, I do not think I am that sort of person.

P28
Q70

TOP OF PAGE 29

TOP OF PAGE 28

Skip logic
A1.
Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger in a car, van, motorcycle, bus, or multipassenger shuttle/Uber/Lyft service if it were easy to do, and if I were paid enough money each day to do so.
TOP OF PAGE 29

A2.
No, I don’t think I would travel as a passenger even if there were money involved.

P29

TOP OF PAGE 37

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

P37
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Q71

No logic

Q72

No logic

Q73

No logic

Q74

No logic

Q75

No logic

P30

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q76

P37

No logic

Q77

No logic

Q78

No logic

Q79

No logic

P31
Q80

Skip logic
A1.
Yes, I could be convinced to continue traveling as a passenger if it were easy to do, and if I were paid enough
money each day to do so.
TOP OF PAGE 32

A2.
No, I don’t think I would continue traveling as a passenger even if there were money involved.

P32

TOP OF PAGE 37

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q81

P37

No logic

Q82

No logic

Q83

No logic

Q84

No logic

Q85

No logic

P33
Q86

Skip logic
A1.
Yes, I already travel as a passenger (excluding sole occupant of taxi/Uber/Lyft) some of the time (just not on
Tuesday mornings).
TOP OF PAGE 35
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A2.
Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger, including a multi-passenger taxi/Uber/Lyft, if
it were easy to do
A3.
No, I do not think I am that sort of person.

P34
Q87

TOP OF PAGE 35

TOP OF PAGE 34

Skip logic
A1.
Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger if it were easy to do, and if I were paid enough
money each day to do so.
TOP OF PAGE 35

A2.
No, I don’t think I would travel as a passenger even if there were money involved.

P35

TOP OF PAGE 37

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Q88

P37

No logic

Q89

No logic

Q90

No logic

Q91

No logic

Q92

No logic

P36
Q93

No logic

Q94

No logic

P37
Q95

No logic

Q96

No logic

Q97

No logic

Q98

No logic

Q99

No logic

Q100

No logic

Q101

No logic

Q102

No logic
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P38

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

P40

Q103

No logic

P39
Q104

Skip logic
A1.
Yes

TOP OF PAGE 1

A2.
No (you will not be able to leave this page, you can only close the link).

P40

Skip logic
After the current page is completed…
Skip to

Text

END OF SURVEY

No logic

P41
Q105

Skip logic
A1.
Yes, I am happy with my answers and wish to exit the survey
A2.
No, I would like to go back and start over

END OF SURVEY

TOP OF PAGE 1

A3.
Please add a comment here if you would like to tell us your thoughts about the traffic or the survey before
you exit.
END OF SURVEY

You have reached the end of the survey.
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Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Introduction

Thanks for agreeing to complete this survey.
Your name was chosen at random from the Coastside voter database.
As a token of our appreciation for your time and effort, once you have completed the survey you will automatically go into a prize
drawing for one of five prizes: 1 x $250, 2 x $150, and 2 x $75: Total prize pool: $700. Good luck in the prize draw, which will be
drawn in August.
The purpose of this survey is to find out how (if) people use Highway 92 from Half Moon Bay towards San Mateo; how they might
change how they use it if the morning congestion at the intersection with Route 1 was reduced; and what they might do in the
meantime. We want to hear from people who currently travel and those who do not.
The survey takes between 7 and 13 minutes to complete. There are different pathways depending on your answers. Most people
will answer around 30 questions.
Although the results of this study may be published, no information that could identify you will be included. Your responses will be
kept in a password protected computer. We will separate your email and physical address data from the other fields of data so that
your answers cannot be linked to you.
Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you choose to participate, you may quit the survey at any time without negative
consequences.
Questions about this research may be addressed to Dr. Richard Lee by email at richard.lee@sjsu.edu or by phone at (510) 3870996.
For questions about participants’ rights or if you feel you have been harmed in any way by your participation in this study, please
contact Dr. Pamela Stacks, Associate Vice President of the Office of Research, San Jose State University, at (408) 924-2479.
If you would rather complete this survey by telephone interview, please telephone Brittany Bogue at (208) 794-7504 to make
arrangements.
For any question with a * before the question number, the computer will insist that you respond before moving forward.
We ask that you be as accurate as you can in your answers. There are no right or wrong answers. If you are unsure about
something, please make a comment to let us know at the end of the survey, or take a screenshot and send it to
richard.lee@sjsu.edu.
AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE
Please select from the choices below. If you click agree, it is implied that you have read the information above about the research,
your rights as a participant, and give your voluntary consent. Please print out a copy of this page and keep it for your records
Kind regards,
Dr. Richard Lee
San Jose State University
richard.lee@sjsu.edu
(510) 387-0996

1
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* 1. Do you agree to participate in the survey?
Yes, I agree to participate. Let's get started.
Yes, I agree to participate. But I would like to come back later.
No, I have decided that I do not want to do it.

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Come Back Later

If you do not have time to do the whole survey right now, you could get started and then come back later to finish it off.
As long as you do not click 'done', and use the same computer, it will remember how far you got, and the answers you gave so far.
If you do not have time right now, please use the same link to come back later. We would really like to hear your opinions.

* 2. Would you like to get started now and see how far you get?
Okay, I have a bit of time, let's get started.
No, I really have to go. I will close the link and come back later.

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Reasons for not completing the survey

* 3. You have decided not to do the survey.
No worries. We would have liked to hear your opinions, but we respect that you do not want to tell us.
Would you take a moment to tell us why not?
I didn't mean to end up here. Please let me start the survey.
I don't think I know enough about the issues to answer any questions.
I am just too busy right now.
Other (please tell us why)

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
What should we call you?

2

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix B: Survey Instrument

133

* 4. What would you like us to call you while you complete the survey? Please write your preferred name
or nickname in the box.

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
In which suburb do you live?

* 5. Thanks [Q4]. We want to hear from people who live in the vicinity of Half Moon Bay, California. In
which community do you live?
Half Moon Bay
El Granada
Miramar
Moss Beach
Montara
Lobitos
Pescadero
San Gregorio
I do not live in this area at all
Other (please specify)

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Typical Tuesday Morning Trips

3
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* 6. Thanks [Q4] from [Q5]. This survey is about how people use Highway 92 from Half Moon Bay to San
Mateo.
We know that there is a lot of traffic congestion in the morning around the intersection with Route 1.
In order to focus our work, we are asking people about the trips they make on typical Tuesday mornings
throughout the year.
[Q4], on a typical Tuesday, would you usually travel on Highway 92 from Half Moon Bay towards San
Mateo between the hours of 5 am and 9 am?
Yes
No
Some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday

7. Does the morning traffic congestion have an impact on your decision about if, how, and when to
travel on this route?
Please tell us on a 100 point scale, from zero, where it has no impact, to 100, where it has a very large
impact.
The morning traffic
congestion has no impact
on my decision about how
and when to travel this
route.

The morning traffic
congestion has a
very large impact on my
decision about how and
when to travel this route.

8. Please briefly explain your answer to the previous question. What do you do differently because of
the morning traffic congestion on the route? Please select one answer that BEST reflects your
meaning, or describe more fully in the comments box.
I don't do anything differently because of the traffic congestion, I just take it as it comes.
I have no need to travel on Highway 92.
I leave earlier in the morning to avoid the congestion at Route 1/Highway 92.
I leave earlier in the morning so that I have enough time for the congestion at Route 1/Highway 92.
The congestion after the SR 280 is more of an issue than the Route 1/Highway 92 congestion and I adjust for that.
I leave later in the morning to avoid the congestion at Route 1/Highway 92.
I work from or near home; I do not travel on Highway 92 because of the congestion.
Other or additional explanation:

4
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Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Trip purpose, details, and mode

9. [Q4], what is the main purpose of your Tuesday morning trip? Please choose one answer from the
list below, or write another purpose in the box.
Work
Education (for self)
Education for passenger(s) under 16 years
Education for passenger(s) over 16 years
Social or Recreational
Shopping
Health related (doctor's appointments, for example)
Some other purpose? Or if it is difficult to say what is the main purpose for a mixed-purpose trip? Please record these
purposes here:

* 10. What time do you usually leave from home for your typical Tuesday morning trip? Please choose
the time from the drop-down box that is closest to when you leave, or if you prefer, put the exact time in
the box.

* 11. Where is the destination of your typical Tuesday morning trip? Please choose from the alphabetical
drop-down list, or, if your destination is not listed, please write it in the box below.

12. How many miles is your trip? (one way)?

13. How long (in minutes) does it take you to get there on a typical Tuesday morning? Please choose
from the drop-down list, or if you prefer, write a more precise time in the box below.

A more precise time? Please record it here.

5
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* 14. [Q4], what mode of transport do you usually use for your Tuesday morning trip?
Please select the most accurate response from the list below, or if what you do is not listed, please tell
us in the 'other' box.
Drive alone in a car, truck, or SUV
Drive alone by motorcycle
Drive a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus with passengers
Drive a motorcycle with passengers
Travel as a passenger in a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus, (but not Uber/Lyft), or on a motorcycle
Travel as a sole passenger in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
Travel with multiple passengers in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
Travel as a passenger on a public transport bus
Some other answer

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Trip purpose, details, and mode

* 15. When you said 'some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday', how often do you make a Tuesday morning
trip? Please select your frequency from the list below.

6
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16. [Q4], what is the main purpose of your occasional Tuesday morning trip? Please choose one
answer from the list below, or write another purpose in the box.
Work
Education (for self)
Education for passenger(s) under 16 years
Education for passenger(s) over 16 years
Social or Recreational
Shopping
Health related (doctor's appointments, for example)
Some other purpose? Or if it is difficult to say what is the main purpose for a mixed-purpose trip? Please record these
purposes here:

* 17. What time do you usually leave from home for your occasional Tuesday morning trip? Please
choose the time from the drop-down box that is closest to when you leave, or if you prefer, put the exact
time in the box.

* 18. Where is the destination of your occasional Tuesday morning trips? Please choose from the
alphabetical drop-down list, or, if your destination is not listed, please write it in the box below.

19. How many miles is your trip? (one way)?

20. How long (in minutes) does it take you to get there on a typical Tuesday morning? Please choose
from the drop-down list, or if you prefer, write a more precise time in the box below.

A more precise time? Please record it here.
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* 21. [Q4], what mode of transport do you usually use for your Tuesday morning trip?
Please select the most accurate response from the list below, or if what you do is not listed, please tell
us in the 'other' box.
Drive alone in a car, truck, or SUV
Drive alone by motorcycle
Drive a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus with passengers
Drive a motorcycle with passengers
Travel as a passenger in a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus, (but not Uber/Lyft), or on a motorcycle
Travel as a sole passenger in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
Travel with multiple passengers in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
Travel as a passenger on a public transport bus
Some other answer

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Traveling as a passenger, details

22. You said you travel as a passenger in a car, truck, SUV, van, minibus or motorcycle, or in a multipassenger Uber/Lyft. Please indicate how many people (in total including the driver and
passenger(s)) would be in the vehicle for the Tuesday morning trip.

Some other answer? Please put it here.

23. And in the case of these trips with passengers, do all the people in the vehicle live in the same
household, or are they all from the same family? Please choose the answer that fits best with your
situation.
Yes, all in the same household or from the same family
No, none are in the same household or from the same family
Some do and some don't/some are and some aren't (please explain)

24. Is an app used to arrange these shared trips? If so, which app(s).

8
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Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Driving with passengers, details

25. You said you travel as a driver with passenger(s). Please indicate how many people (in total
including the driver and passenger(s)) would be in the vehicle for the Tuesday morning trip.

Some other answer? Please put it here.

26. And in the case of these trips with passengers, do all the people in the vehicle live in the same
household, or are they all from the same family? Please choose the answer that fits best with your
situation.
Yes, all in the same household or from the same family
No, none are in the same household or from the same family
Some do and some don't/some are and some aren't (please explain)

27. How many of the passengers are school-age children?

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Parking Costs

28. Do you pay for parking at the destination? If so, is it by the hour, day, week, month, or year? And
how much is it? Please choose from the drop-down lists, and if your amount is not in the list please
write it in the box below.
Pay for Parking?

Time paid for

Amount paid

I pay the following for
parking
Other Amount

29. How many seats are there in your vehicle?

9
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30. Thanks [Q4] for all that information. We picked Tuesday to focus on because Tuesday's traffic is
usually the worst of the week. If we had asked about a different day of the work-week, would your
answer be any different? If so, please explain briefly what you do differently on other days of the workweek.
My answer would be the same for any day of the work-week
Other days are different as follows:

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Is Tuesday typical?

31. Thanks [Q4] for all that information. We picked Tuesday to focus on because Tuesday's traffic is
usually the worst of the week. If we had asked about a different day of the work-week, would your
answer be any different? If so, please explain briefly what you do differently on other days of the workweek.
My answer would be the same for any day of the work-week
Other days are different as follows:

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Is Tuesday typical?

32. Thanks [Q4] for all that information. We picked Tuesday to focus on because Tuesday's traffic is
usually the worst of the week. If we had asked about a different day of the work-week, would your
answer be any different? If so, please explain briefly what you do differently on other days of the workweek.
My answer would be the same for any day of the work-week
Other days are different as follows:

Improving Highway 92 Traffic

10
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Is Tuesday typical?

33. Thanks [Q4] for all that information. We picked Tuesday to focus on because Tuesday's traffic is
usually the worst of the week. If we had asked about a different day of the work-week, would your
answer be any different? If so, please explain briefly what you do differently on other days of the workweek.
My answer would be the same for any day of the work-week
Other days are different as follows:

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
What would you do if the traffic congestion went away?

Please imagine for a moment that the morning traffic congestion around the Route 1/Highway
92 intersection has gone away. Leave aside exactly how this has happened, just imagine that it
has happened.
You could reliably make trips onto Highway 92 without any delay except the traffic lights.
How would this change your use of the route on Tuesday mornings? If you leave early at the
moment, would you leave later? If you leave later at the moment, would you leave earlier?
Would you change your mode of travel? If you travel occasional Tuesdays at the moment, would
you increase your frequency of Tuesday travel?
* 34. If the congestion was gone, [Q4], would you change the time you leave home? If so, what time
would you leave home?

* 35. If the congestion was gone, [Q4], would you change your mode of travel? If so, what would you
change to?

36. If you currently travel 'some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday', would you change your frequency of
making a Tuesday morning trip? If so, please select your new frequency from the list below.
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37. Is there anything else that you would change about your Tuesday morning trip-making?

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
What would you do if the traffic congestion went away?

Please imagine for a moment that the morning traffic congestion around the Route 1/Highway 92
intersection has gone away. Leave aside exactly how this has happened, just imagine that it has
happened.
You could reliably make trips onto Highway 92 without any delay except the traffic lights.
How would this change your use of the route on a typical Tuesday morning? If you leave early at
the moment, would you leave later? If you leave later at the moment, would you leave earlier?
Would you change your mode of travel? If you travel occasional Tuesdays at the moment,
would you increase your frequency of Tuesday travel?
* 38. If the congestion was gone, [Q4], would you change the time you leave home? If so, what time
would you leave home?

* 39. If the congestion was gone, [Q4], would you change your mode of travel? If so, what would you
change to?

40. If you currently travel 'some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday', would you change your frequency of
making a Tuesday morning trip? If so, please select your new frequency from the list below.

41. Is there anything else that you would change about your Tuesday morning trip-making?

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
What would you do if the traffic congestion went away?
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Please imagine for a moment that the morning traffic congestion around the Route 1/Highway 92
intersection has gone away. Leave aside exactly how this has happened, just imagine that it has
happened.
You could reliably make trips onto Highway 92 without any delay except the traffic lights.
How would this change your use of the route on a typical Tuesday morning? If you leave early at
the moment, would you leave later? If you leave later at the moment, would you leave earlier?
Would you change your mode of travel? If you travel occasional Tuesdays at the moment,
would you increase your frequency of Tuesday travel?
* 42. If the congestion was gone, [Q4], would you change the time you leave home? If so, what time
would you leave home?

* 43. If the congestion was gone, [Q4], would you change your mode of travel? If so, what would you
change to?

44. If you currently travel 'some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday', would you change your frequency of
making a Tuesday morning trip? If so, please select your new frequency from the list below.

45. Is there anything else that you would change about your Tuesday morning trip-making?

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
What would you do if the traffic congestion went away?

Please imagine for a moment that the morning traffic congestion around the Route 1/Highway 92
intersection has gone away. Leave aside exactly how this has happened, just imagine that it has
happened.
You could reliably make trips onto Highway 92 without any delay except the traffic lights.
How would this change your use of the route on a typical Tuesday morning? If you leave early at
the moment, would you leave later? If you leave later at the moment, would you leave earlier?
Would you change your mode of travel? If you travel occasional Tuesdays at the moment,
would you increase your frequency of Tuesday travel?
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* 46. If the congestion was gone, [Q4], would you change the time you leave home? If so, what time
would you leave home?

* 47. If the congestion was gone, [Q4], would you change your mode of travel? If so, what would you
change to?

48. If you currently travel 'some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday', would you change your frequency of
making a Tuesday morning trip? If so, please select your new frequency from the list below.

49. Is there anything else that you would change about your Tuesday morning trip-making?

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
What would you do if the traffic congestion went away?

Please imagine for a moment that the morning traffic congestion around the Route 1/Highway 92
intersection has gone away. Leave aside exactly how this has happened, just imagine that it has
happened.
You could reliably make trips onto Highway 92 without any delay except the traffic lights.
Would you start making a trip on a typical Tuesday morning? If so, what would it look like?
* 50. If the congestion was gone, [Q4], would you start making a trip on a typical Tuesday morning?
Yes
No
Some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
New Tuesday Traveler trip details
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* 51. When you said 'some Tuesdays but not every Tuesday', how often would you make your new
Tuesday morning trip? Please select your frequency from the list below.

52. And what would be the main purpose of your new Tuesday morning trip?
Work
Education (for self)
Education for passenger(s) under 16 years
Education for passenger(s) over 16 years
Social or Recreational
Shopping
Health related (doctor's appointments, for example)
Some other purpose? Or if it is difficult to say what is the main purpose for a mixed-purpose trip? Please record these
purposes here:

* 53. By what mode would you travel?
Drive alone in a car, truck, or SUV
Drive alone by motorcycle
Drive a car, truck, SUV, van or minibus with passengers
Drive a motorcycle with passengers
Travel as a passenger in a car, truck, SUV, van, or minibus, (but not Uber/Lyft), or on a motorcycle
Travel as a sole passenger in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
Travel with multiple passengers in an Uber/Lyft type of rideshare service
Travel as a passenger on a public transport bus
Other (please specify)

* 54. What time in the morning would you leave home?
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* 55. What would be your destination for your new Tuesday morning trip? Please choose from the
alphabetical drop-down list, or, if your destination is not listed, please write it in the box below.

56. How far is it, in miles, one way?

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
What will you do in the meantime?

As we wait and hope for a change that makes the traffic congestion disappear, are there actions
that you could take in the meantime that would help make the traffic better?
We are interested in what it would take to get people who currently drive to travel as a
passenger some of the time. This would reduce the number of cars in the backed up traffic.
This could be travel as a passenger on a bus, in a vanpool, or in a carpool, or a multi-passenger
service such as a shuttle, UberPool, or LyftLine.
* 57. [Q4], are you the sort of person who already travels as a passenger, or would travel as a passenger
if it was easy to do?
Yes, I already travel as a passenger (excluding sole occupant of taxi/Uber/Lyft) some of the time (just not Tuesday mornings).
Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger, including a multi-passenger taxi/Uber/Lyft, if it were easy to do
No, I do not think I am that sort of person.
Would you like to explain your answer in any way?

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Would you do it for money?
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* 58. Some people have suggested that people who travel as passengers (in buses, vanpools, carpools,
shared Uber/Lyft) should be rewarded (paid money) for doing so. Would it change your answer to the
previous question if a program were in place to pay an incentive to people who travel as passengers
during the times when there is traffic congestion?
Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger if it were easy to do, and if I were paid enough money each day
to do so.
No, I don’t think I would travel as a passenger even if there was money involved.
Add a comment if you would like to.

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Will you provide rides for other people?

* 59. [Q4], you said you would not travel as a passenger, even if there was money involved. Would you,
instead, be prepared to give other people a ride in your vehicle?
Yes, I already give other people rides some of the time (just not Tuesday mornings).
Yes, I would give other people rides, if it were easy to do
No, I do not think I am that sort of person.
Would you like to explain your answer in any way?

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
How much money?

* 60. Would it change your answer to the previous question if passengers were being paid money for
traveling as a passenger, and they were prepared to share that money with you?
Yes, I am the sort of person who would give people rides if it were easy to do, and if I were paid enough money each day to
do so.
No, I don’t think I would provide people with rides even if there was money involved.
Add a comment if you would like to.
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Improving Highway 92 Traffic
How much effort to provide rides, how much money?

If you are already providing rides, or if you think about providing rides, we assume it takes some
effort to do so. How big is that effort? And how much money would it take to overcome that
effort?
61. How much effort do you think it would take for you to give people a
ride on your Tuesday morning trip on Highway 92? Please answer on a
scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and 100 is a great degree of
effort.

No effort at all

GIVE PEOPLE
A RIDE

A great amount
of effort

62. [Q4], now please imagine that a fund of money is available, say from a federal program, to pay
people incentives for traveling as passengers, and the passengers are prepared to share this money
with drivers. Assuming it does not add any time to your journey to do so, (perhaps it saves time) how
much would you need to be paid, on Tuesdays, to provide people with a ride?
Daily amounts
Your price for providing a
ride
If you would like to specify an amount that is different to what is offered above, please do so here.

63. You have told us the amount you would want to be paid to give someone a ride for your [Q12][Q19]
[56] mile trip. Other people will tell us different amounts for different distances. To make it easier for us
to compare, please think about if your trip were from Half Moon Bay to downtown San Mateo, which is
13 miles, how much would you need to be paid to give someone a ride for that trip (please skip if your
trip is from Half Moon Bay to San Mateo):
Daily amounts
Your price for providing a
standard distance ride
If you would like to specify a different amount please do so here:

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Effort to travel as a passenger
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If you are already traveling as a passenger, or if you are thinking about traveling as a passenger,
we understand that it takes some effort compared with driving alone. We'd like to know how
much effort it takes for you, or how much effort you think it would take.
64. How much effort do you think it would take for you to travel as a
passenger on a BUS for your Tuesday morning trip on Highway 92?
Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and 100
is a great degree of effort.
A great amount
No effort at all

BUS

of effort

65. How much effort do you think it would take for you to travel as a
passenger in a VANPOOL for your Tuesday morning trip on Highway
92? Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and
100 is a great degree of effort.

No effort at all

VANPOOL

A great amount
of effort

66. How much effort do you think it would take for you to travel as a
passenger in a CARPOOL for your Tuesday morning trip on Highway
92? Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and
100 is a great degree of effort.

No effort at all

CARPOOL

A great amount
of effort
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67. [Q4], now please imagine that a fund of money is available, say from a federal program, to pay
people an incentive for traveling as a passenger. Assuming it does not add any time to your journey to
do so, (perhaps it saves time) how much would you need to be paid, on Tuesdays, to switch from being
a driver, to being a passenger in:
Daily amount you would need to be paid
A bus?
A vanpool?
A carpool?
A shuttle or Uber-Pool or
Lyft-Line type of multipassenger shared ride
service that picks you up
at your door?
If you would like to specify an amount that is different to what is offered above, please do so here. Please write 'bus amount',
'vanpool amount', etc.

68. You have told us the amount of incentive you would need to travel as a passenger for your [Q12]
[Q19][Q56] mile trip. Other people will tell us different amounts for different distances. To make it
easier for us to compare, please think about if your trip were from Half Moon Bay to downtown San
Mateo, which is 13 miles, how much would you need to be paid to travel that trip as a passenger in:
(please skip if your trip is from Half Moon Bay to San Mateo):
Daily amount you would need to be paid for standard distance trip
A bus?
A vanpool?
A carpool?
A shuttle or Uber-Pool or
Lyft-Line type of multipassenger shared ride
service that picks you up
at your door?
If you would like to specify a different amount please do so here:

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
What will you do in the meantime?

As we wait and hope for a change that makes the traffic congestion disappear, are there actions
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that you could take in the meantime that would help make the traffic better?
We are interested in what it would take to get people who currently drive, or travel as solo
passengers in taxi/Uber/Lyft services, to travel as a passenger in car, van, bus, motorcycle, or
multi-passenger shuttle/Uber/Lyft services some of the time.
* 69. [Q4], are you the sort of person who already travels as a passenger, or would travel as a passenger
if it was easy to do?
Yes, I already travel as a passenger (excluding sole occupant of taxi/Uber/Lyft) some of the time (just not on Tuesday
mornings).
Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger, including a multi-passenger taxi/Uber/Lyft, if it were easy to do
No, I do not think I am that sort of person.
Would you like to explain your answer in any way?

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Would you do it for money?

* 70. Some people have suggested that people who travel as passengers (in buses, vanpools, carpools,
shared Uber/Lyft) should be rewarded (paid money) for doing so. Would it change your answer to the
previous question if a program were in place to pay an incentive to people who travel as passengers
during the times when there is traffic congestion?
Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger in a car, van, motorcycle, bus, or multi-passenger
shuttle/Uber/Lyft service if it were easy to do, and if I were paid enough money each day to do so.
No, I don’t think I would travel as a passenger even if there were money involved.
Add a comment if you would like to.

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Effort to travel as a passenger

If you are already traveling as a passenger, or if you are thinking about traveling as a passenger,
we understand that it takes some effort compared with driving alone. We'd like to know how
much effort it takes for you, or how much effort you think it would take.
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71. How much effort is or would be involved for you to travel as a
passenger on a BUS for your Tuesday morning trip on Highway 92?
Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and 100
is a great degree of effort.
A great amount
No effort at all

BUS

of effort

72. How much effort is or would be involved for you to travel as a
passenger in a VANPOOL for your Tuesday morning trip on Highway
92? Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and
100 is a great degree of effort.

No effort at all

VANPOOL

A great amount
of effort

73. How much effort is or would be involved for you to travel as a
passenger in a CARPOOL for your Tuesday morning trip on Highway
92? Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and
100 is a great degree of effort.

No effort at all

CARPOOL

A great amount
of effort

74. [Q4], now please imagine that a fund of money is available, say from a federal program, to pay
people an incentive for traveling as a passenger. Assuming it does not add any time to your journey to
do so, (perhaps it saves time) how much would you need to be paid, on Tuesdays, to switch to, or
continue being a passenger in:
Daily amount you would need to be paid
A bus?
A vanpool?
A carpool?
A shuttle or Uber-Pool or
Lyft-Line type of multipassenger shared ride
service that picks you up
at your door?
If you would like to specify an amount that is different to what is offered above, please do so here. Please write 'bus amount',
'vanpool amount', etc.
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75. You have told us the amount of incentive you would need to travel as a passenger for your [Q12]
[Q19] mile trip. Other people will tell us different amounts for different distances. To make it easier for
us to compare, please think about if your trip were from Half Moon Bay to downtown San Mateo, which
is 13 miles, how much would you need to be paid to travel that trip as a passenger in: (please skip if
your trip is from Half Moon Bay to San Mateo):
Daily amount you would need to be paid for standard distance trip
A bus?
A vanpool?
A carpool?
A shuttle or Uber-Pool or
Lyft-Line type of multipassenger shared ride
service that picks you up
at your door?
If you would like to specify a different amount please do so here:

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
What will you do in the meantime?

As we wait and hope for a change that makes the traffic congestion disappear, are there actions
that you could take in the meantime that would help make the traffic better?
You said you currently travel as a passenger, but if the traffic congestion disappeared, you
would switch to traveling as a driver or solo taxi/Uber/Lyft rider. We are interested in what it
would take to keep you traveling as a passenger on a bus, in a vanpool, or in a carpool, or a
multi-passenger service such as a shuttle, UberPool, or LyftLine.
76. How much effort do you think it would take for you to travel as a
passenger on a BUS for your Tuesday morning trip on Highway 92?
Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and 100
is a great degree of effort.

No effort at all

BUS

A great amount
of effort

23

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix B: Survey Instrument

154

77. How much effort do you think it would take for you to continue your
travel as a passenger in a car, van, motorcycle, or multi-passenger
shuttle/Uber/Lyft service for your Tuesday morning trip on Highway 92?
Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and 100
is a great degree of effort.
EXISTING
PASSENGER
No effort at all

TRAVEL

A great amount
of effort

78. [Q4], now please imagine that a fund of money is available, say from a federal program, to pay
people an incentive for traveling as a passenger. Assuming it does not add any time to your journey to
do so, (perhaps it saves time) how much would you need to be paid, on Tuesdays, to NOT switch to
being a driver, but switching or continuing to be a passenger in:
Daily amount you would need to be paid
A bus?
A car, van, motorcycle?
A shuttle or Uber-Pool or
Lyft-Line type of multipassenger shared ride
service that picks you up
at your door?
If you would like to specify an amount that is different to what is offered above, please do so here. Please write 'bus amount', 'car
amount', etc.

79. You have told us the amount of incentive you would need to continue traveling as a passenger for
your [Q12][Q19][Q56] mile trip. Other people will tell us different amounts for different distances. To
make it easier for us to compare, please think about if your trip were from Half Moon Bay to downtown
San Mateo, which is 13 miles, how much would you need to be paid to NOT switch to driving but travel
that trip as a passenger in: (please skip if your trip is from Half Moon Bay to San Mateo):
Daily amount you would need to be paid for standard distance trip
A bus?
A car, van, or
motorcycle?
A shuttle or Uber-Pool or
Lyft-Line type of multipassenger shared ride
service that picks you up
at your door?
If you would like to specify a different amount please do so here:
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Improving Highway 92 Traffic
What will you do in the meantime?

As we wait and hope for a change that makes the traffic congestion disappear, are there actions
that you could take in the meantime that would help make the traffic better?
You currently travel by bus, but you have said you would switch to being a driver if the traffic
congestion disappeared. We are interested in what it would take to get you to continue traveling
as a passenger some of the time. This could be continuing to travel as a passenger on a bus,
or in a van, a car, or a multi-passenger service such as a shuttle, UberPool, or LyftLine.
* 80. Some people have suggested that people who travel as passengers (in buses, vanpools, carpools,
shared Uber/Lyft) should be rewarded (paid money) for doing so. Would it convince you to not start
driving if a program were in place to pay an incentive to people who travel as passengers during the
times when there is traffic congestion?
Yes, I could be convinced to continue traveling as a passenger if it were easy to do, and if I were paid enough money each
day to do so.
No, I don’t think I would continue traveling as a passenger even if there were money involved.
Add a comment if you would like to.

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Effort for bus passengers to change

If you are already traveling as a bus passenger, or if you are thinking about traveling as a bus
passenger, we understand that it takes some effort compared with driving. We'd like to know
how much effort it takes for you, or how much effort you think it would take.
81. How much effort is involved, or would be involved, in traveling as a
passenger on a BUS for your Tuesday morning trip on Highway 92?
Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and 100
is a great degree of effort.

No effort at all

BUS

A great amount
of effort
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82. How much effort do you think it would take for you to travel as a
passenger in a VANPOOL for your Tuesday morning trip on Highway
92? Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and
100 is a great degree of effort.
A great amount
No effort at all

VANPOOL

of effort

83. How much effort do you think it would take for you to travel as a
passenger in a CARPOOL for your Tuesday morning trip on Highway
92? Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and
100 is a great degree of effort.

No effort at all

CARPOOL

A great amount
of effort

84. [Q4], now please imagine that a fund of money is available, say from a federal program, to pay
people an incentive for traveling as a passenger. Assuming it does not add any time to your journey to
do so, (perhaps it saves time) how much would you need to be paid, on Tuesdays, to not
switch to being a driver, but continuing to be, or becoming a passenger in:
Daily amount you would need to be paid
A bus?
A vanpool?
A carpool?
A shuttle or Uber-Pool or
Lyft-Line type of multipassenger shared ride
service that picks you up
at your door?
If you would like to specify an amount that is different to what is offered above, please do so here. Please write 'bus amount',
'vanpool amount', etc.
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85. You have told us the amount of incentive you would need to continue traveling as a passenger for
your [Q12][Q19][Q56] mile trip. Other people will tell us different amounts for different distances. To
make it easier for us to compare, please think about if your trip were from Half Moon Bay to downtown
San Mateo, which is 13 miles, how much would you need to be paid to travel that trip as a passenger
in: (please skip if your trip is from Half Moon Bay to San Mateo):
Daily amount you would need to be paid for standard distance trip
A bus?
A vanpool?
A carpool?
A shuttle or Uber-Pool or
Lyft-Line type of multipassenger shared ride
service that picks you up
at your door?
If you would like to specify a different amount please do so here:

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
What will you do in the meantime?

As we wait and hope for a change that makes the traffic congestion disappear, are there actions
that you could take in the meantime that would help make the traffic better?
You have indicated that you do not currently travel on Highway 92 on Tuesday mornings but that
you would begin to do so as a driver or solo taxi/Uber/Lyft rider if the traffic congestion
disappeared. We are interested in what it would take to get you to travel as a passenger
instead. This could be travel as a passenger on a bus, in a vanpool, or in a carpool, or a multipassenger service such as a shuttle, UberPool, or LyftLine.
* 86. [Q4], are you the sort of person who already travels as a passenger, or would travel as a passenger
if it was easy to do?
Yes, I already travel as a passenger (excluding sole occupant of taxi/Uber/Lyft) some of the time (just not on Tuesday
mornings).
Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger, including a multi-passenger taxi/Uber/Lyft, if it were easy to do
No, I do not think I am that sort of person.
Would you like to explain your answer in any way?
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Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Would you do it for money?

* 87. Some people have suggested that people who travel as passengers (in buses, vanpools, carpools,
shared Uber/Lyft) should be rewarded (paid money) for doing so. Would it change your answer to the
previous question if a program were in place to pay an incentive to people who travel as passengers
during the times when there is traffic congestion?
Yes, I am the sort of person who would travel as a passenger if it were easy to do, and if I were paid enough money each day
to do so.
No, I don’t think I would travel as a passenger even if there were money involved.
Add a comment if you would like to.

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Effort involved in starting as a new passenger

If you are thinking about traveling as a passenger, we understand that it takes some effort
compared with driving alone. We'd like to know how much effort you think it would take.
88. How much effort do you think it would take for you to travel as a
passenger on a BUS for your new Tuesday morning trip on Highway 92?
Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort at all, and 100
is a great degree of effort.

No effort at all

BUS

A great amount
of effort

89. How much effort do you think it would take for you to travel as a
passenger in a VANPOOL for your new Tuesday morning trip on
Highway 92? Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort
at all, and 100 is a great degree of effort.

No effort at all

VANPOOL

A great amount
of effort
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90. How much effort do you think it would take for you to travel as a
passenger in a CARPOOL for your new Tuesday morning trip on
Highway 92? Please answer on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 is no effort
at all, and 100 is a great degree of effort.
A great amount
No effort at all

CARPOOL

of effort

91. [Q4], now please imagine that a fund of money is available, say from a federal program, to pay
people an incentive for traveling as a passenger. Assuming it does not add any time to your journey to
do so, (perhaps it saves time), how much would you need to be paid, on Tuesdays, to make your new
trip as a passenger (instead of as a driver) in:
Daily amount you would need to be paid
A bus?
A vanpool?
A carpool?
A shuttle or Uber-Pool or
Lyft-Line type of multipassenger shared ride
service that picks you up
at your door?
If you would like to specify an amount that is different to what is offered above, please do so here. Please write 'bus amount',
'vanpool amount', etc.
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92. You have told us the amount of incentive you would need to travel as a passenger for your new
[Q12][Q19][Q56] mile trip. Other people will tell us different amounts for different distances. To make it
easier for us to compare, please think about if your new trip were from Half Moon Bay to downtown San
Mateo, which is 13 miles, how much would you need to be paid to travel that trip as a passenger in:
(please skip if your trip new trip would be from Half Moon Bay to San Mateo):
Daily amount you would need to be paid for standard distance trip
A bus?
A vanpool?
A carpool?
A shuttle or Uber-Pool or
Lyft-Line type of multipassenger shared ride
service that picks you up
at your door?
If you would like to specify a different amount please do so here:

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Are Tuesdays Typical?

93. [Q4], you have said that you do not travel on Highway 92 on typical Tuesday mornings, and would
still not travel on Highway 92 on typical Tuesday mornings if the traffic congestion went away. Would
the answer be the same for the other days of the working week?
Yes
No
If no, please could you tell us what happens on other days, in this answer box:

94. Our sample was generated at random, and we wanted to hear from people who use the Highway
and people who do not. You are an important part of the total population, for helping us get a complete
picture. We appreciate that you have taken the time to tell us. Except for a few demographic questions
that come next, we have no further questions for you.
However, if you have any comments for us about the congestion on Highway 92, and any ways it
impacts on you, please tell us in the box.

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
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Demographic Details

We have almost finished. To end the survey we ask that you answer the following questions so
that we can make sure our sample is representative of the general population.
95. Please tell us in what year you were born? Please select the year from the drop down box.

96. [Q4], please tell us your gender identity?
Male
Female
Other

97. What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?
Less than high school graduate
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Postgraduate degree

98. Including yourself, how many people currently live in your household (including children)? (Please
answer in number format).

99. How many children in your household are age 15 or younger?

100. Number of cars usually available to people who live in your household?

101. How many people who live in your household have a driver's licence?

31

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix B: Survey Instrument

162

102. Household Income: What was the approximate annual income from employment and all other
sources for all members of your household, before taxes, last year?
Under $15,000
Between $15,000 and $29,999
Between $30,000 and $49,999
Between $50,000 and $74,999
Between $75,000 and $99,999
Between $100,000 and $150,000
Over $150,000
Prefer not to say

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Thanks for your time

103. Thank you so much, [Q4] from [Q5], for your time and effort completing this survey.
If you have any comments about the survey, or about improving the traffic for Highway 92, please
answer in the boxes below.
Comments about this survey: what you liked or didn't like, or
suggestions.

Comments about improving the traffic on Highway 92 that we
might not have covered.

If you would like us to respond to these comments, please say so
here.

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Close the link and come back later

You chose to come back later. Please just close the link. Use the same computer and use the
same link, and you will be returned to this page.
104. Would you like to go to the beginning of the survey?
Yes
No (you will not be able to leave this page, you can only close the link).
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Improving Highway 92 Traffic
End of Survey

That is the end of the survey. When you click 'Next' the survey will close. Thank you for contributing your ideas, experiences,
opinions, and time. As promised, completing the survey qualifies you to go into our prize drawing for one of five prizes. Thanks
again, and good luck in the draw.

Improving Highway 92 Traffic
Rejection Page

If you have arrived at this page, you have been rejected from completing the survey due to an
answer that you have given. If you didn't intend to give that answer, please say so below and
you will be returned to the beginning of the survey. If you did intend to give that answer, please
click 'Done' and you will exit the survey. Thank you for your time and interest.
105. [Q4], did you intend to give the answer that rejected you from the survey?
Yes, I am happy with my answers and wish to exit the survey
No, I would like to go back and start over
Please add a comment here if you would like to tell us your thoughts about the traffic or the survey before you exit.
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APPENDIX C: CASE STUDY BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS
The case study estimates the benefits and costs of resolving a persistent bottleneck condition
on a main commuting highway leading away from Half Moon Bay, CA that currently occurs
between 7 am and 9 am each weekday with a queue length over 200 vehicles deep, with
over 2,800 vehicles experiencing 220 hours of delay, daily. The analysis is based on the
assumption that the bottleneck will be resolved by incentivizing enough people to travel as
passengers rather than as drivers, that the queue that forms at the bottleneck will be reduced
to practically nothing—and maintained at that level for 20 years. The benefit-to-cost analysis
is shown in Table 25. A 20-year timeframe is used for the analysis in order to be consistent
with evaluation of other alternative solutions that might be considered.
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The key case study assumptions are that:
1. Congestion-clearing payments to passengers will be implemented on the route, in a
combination of
a. payments for traveling as a passenger, and
b. graduated payments for traveling as a passenger earlier (or later) than the
peak-of-the-peak demand period;
sufficient to clear existing congestion, respond to resulting intra-peak demand
shift, and absorb growth in travel demand.
2. To facilitate passenger travel, it is anticipated a meeting-place-based carpool formation
solution will be implemented with parking provision near the bottleneck location in Half
Moon Bay;
3. Some form of limitation will be placed on SOV travel during the peak-of-the-peak to
maximize passenger travel during that time.
The key findings are that on the basis of 20 years operation discounted at 3% the project
would have a benefit cost ratio (BCR) of 1.6 using traditional valuation of transport benefits,
and 4.5 using a broader valuation that captures the likely social and economic uplift that
would result from solving this long-running bottleneck. Total costs in present day dollars
would be in the order of $141.0 million, while total benefits would be in the order of $639.8
million, representing value creation of almost half a billion dollars. Some further perceived
benefits have not been included in the analysis.
The project survey established that for this route, 50% of the commuters would be prepared
to travel as passengers, if the deal is right. The other 50% would only be drivers, but of
those a further 50% (25% of the total commuters) would be prepared to provide rides for
passengers, again if the deal is right. Also, with the removal of congestion, an additional 985
people would begin to travel the route during the morning rush (a 41% increase in travelers).
The base case is modeled on the assumption that while just over 500 people will initially
need to shift to being passengers, within a year fully 50% of all travelers will need to be
passengers, and many of these will be incentivized to travel earlier (or later) than their
preference in order to maintain zero congestion.
The incentive for 50% of the people to travel as passengers, based on the ‘new’ curve shown
in Figure 31 (including the people who would begin to travel if congestion goes away) is $15
per day, with the qualification that traveling as a passenger must be easy.
Currently, the peak-of-the-peak travel period is from 7 am to 8 am. The initial removal of
congestion by incentivizing 500 people would cause an ‘intra-peak demand shift’ in which
commuters’ departure times would shift towards a more preferred, slightly later peak-ofthe-peak between 8 am and 9 am. In fact, almost all travelers would prefer this later time
(see Figure 32). The intra-peak demand shift would cause the queue to re-form. To prevent
the queue reforming a second incentive is envisaged that would pay people traveling as
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passengers to travel earlier (or later).

Figure 31. Incentive curves, existing and new commuters, Half Moon Bay bottleneck

Figure 32. Case Study Intra-Peak Demand Shift
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This second incentive is modeled on the basis that it is greatest for people traveling at 7 am
and declines as people travel later. While modeled with a reduction every 15 minutes, it might
work more smoothly in practice if it reduced every 5 minutes, or even every minute, so that
bunching behavior that could be driven by the changing levels of incentive is avoided. Note
that a ‘Go Later Bonus’ has not been modeled, though it would be appropriate and would
likely reduce overall costs.
As the population grows and demand to travel increases, the number of people each year
needing to be incentivized to travel as passengers, and early (or late), will increase because
the goal is to keep the amount of traffic at a congestion-free level. The going-early incentive
will need to be increased to include ever earlier time periods. See Figure 33. The modeling
grows the going-early incentive to a high of $33 (in 2019 dollars) for passing the bottleneck as
a passenger at 5:15 am in year 20. Some cost saving techniques would likely be developed
by then.

Figure 33. Going Early Incentives for Half Moon Bay bottleneck
The modeling underlying these figures also finds that the peak period is being decongested
for the benefit of SOV drivers—those who would only drive, alone. As can be seen in Table
26, without a mechanism for preventing it (and such a mechanism has not been defined
for the case study corridor), SOVs crowd out passenger-carrying vehicles, and passengers
have to be incentivized to travel at ever earlier times to prevent a new queue forming.
A mechanism to limit SOV travel would make these projections more realistic in terms of
the cost and likely success of incentives achieving the ongoing congestion removal goal.
Ideas for such a mechanism include:
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• the imposition of variable charges for SOVs during peak (which would provide funds
to offset the costs of CCPTP);
• a HOV bypass that gives HOVs priority access to the bottleneck and forces SOVs to
queue, awaiting a space in the stream of HOVs;
• a solution that allows but is limited to a fixed number of SOVs per minute.
Any such mechanism would be likely to reduce project costs because more passengers
would be able to travel in the preferred peak period of 8 am to 9 am, therefore reducing the
need for as much go early bonus. On the other hand, such a mechanism might incur costs
for installation of control equipment and access and raise opposition to the overall project.
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Table 26. Passenger Travel under Incentive Conditions without a Limitation on SOV Travel

Passengers per 15-Minute Period at End of Each Year
Note 0 Passengers Means 100% SOV Demand in Period.
Note Assumption is that All Passengers are Incentivised,
Those Traveling Before 8 am Receive Going-Early Bonus
From
8:45 AM
8:30 AM
8:15 AM
8:00 AM
7:45 AM
7:30 AM
7:15 AM
7:00 AM
6:45 AM
6:30 AM
6:15 AM
6:00 AM
5:45 AM
5:30 AM
5:15 AM
5:00 AM
5:00 AM

To
9:00 AM
8:45 AM
8:30 AM
8:15 AM
8:00 AM
7:45 AM
7:30 AM
7:15 AM
7:00 AM
6:45 AM
6:30 AM
6:15 AM
6:00 AM
5:45 AM
5:30 AM
5:15 AM
9:00 AM

1
290
242
280
14
428
490
326
86
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2157

2
278
228
268
0
416
486
316
234
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2228

3
266
216
256
0
386
480
306
390
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2303

4
254
202
242
0
360
474
294
392
156
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2378

5
242
186
230
0
330
470
282
384
328
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2457

6
228
172
218
0
298
464
272
376
444
60
0
0
0
0
0
0
2538

7
214
154
202
0
262
458
258
366
436
264
0
0
0
0
0
0
2621

8
200
140
188
0
230
452
246
356
432
456
0
0
0
0
0
0
2708

9
186
124
172
0
198
446
234
348
424
588
68
0
0
0
0
0
2797

Year
10 11
172 154
106 88
160 142
0
0
160 124
438 432
220 206
336 328
418 410
586 584
284 506
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2890 2985
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12
140
70
126
0
88
426
192
318
402
582
582
146
0
0
0
0
3084

13
122
50
108
0
46
418
178
306
394
580
580
390
0
0
0
0
3185

14
106
32
92
0
6
414
162
296
386
578
578
578
48
0
0
0
3290

15
88
12
72
0
0
366
148
284
376
574
574
574
314
0
0
0
3397

16
70
0
48
0
0
316
128
272
368
572
572
572
576
0
0
0
3510

17
52
0
4
0
0
266
114
260
360
570
570
570
610
232
0
0
3625

18
34
0
0
0
0
176
96
248
350
568
568
568
610
508
0
0
3744

19
12
0
0
0
0
76
78
234
342
566
566
566
608
608
192
0
3867

20
0
0
0
0
0
0
28
224
330
564
564
564
606
606
486
0
3992
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Note that the total number of passengers increases each year, while total number of drivers
(combined drive alone and with passengers) increases by the same amount.

Base Case Assumptions
Table 27 shows the base-case values and sources for all assumptions in the benefit cost
analysis shown in Table 25.
Table 27. Assumptions and Values for Modeling Benefits and Costs
Assumption
Name

Description/Rationale

Base Case
Value

Days per year

Days per year that incentives are needed on
this route. It is perceived that some weekdays
through the year do not require incentives
to avoid a queue at the bottleneck. Days not
needing incentives include statutory holidays
and school holidays.

200

Value of time
for travelers’
delay

$25
The fair rate per hour to allow for delay time,
for people who are currently delayed by the
bottleneck. The 2019 Urban Mobility Report
(TTI and Inrix) uses “the median hourly wage
rate for all occupations as produced by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (1) as a base”—
which is $18.12 (2017 dollars) and $18.98
(2019 dollars).
This rate will be far lower than the median
hourly wage rate for people who are subject
to this bottleneck, which the project team
estimates to be on the order of $35 per
hour. The survey asked household income
rather than individual income. The median
household income for the catchment (per ACS)
is $124,159, and per the survey is $121,862
based on the lower parameter of each bracket,
and $166,277 based on the upper. Allowing
that two people per household are earning, this
calculation would deliver an average income
per person of between $62,000 and $83,000.
At 2000 hours per year this comes to $31 to
$41.50 per hour. This has been adjusted by the
project team for reasonableness.
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Source

Value of Time
for travelers’
reduced
inconvenience

88% of the traveling population (in the
sample) travel at a time that is different to
their preferred time: either earlier or later.
Removing congestion theoretically makes it
possible for them to travel at their preferred
time. Certainly, if congestion is removed,
they will travel at a time that is more to their
liking. This benefit is not usually modeled in
transportation analysis, but for the purpose of
congestion-clearing payments to passengers
is clearly an important benefit, providing either
additional time spent before leaving home in
the morning, or additional time arrived at the
destination. Because there is no conventional
wisdom or method for valuing this ‘reduction of
inconvenience’, the project team proposes that
it should be at the same value of time that is
used to value delay.

$25

Project team assertion

Value of Time
for commercial
travel saved

Non-commuter travel is a component of the
traffic caught up in delay at the bottleneck. The
Urban Mobility Report uses $52.14 ($2017) for
this factor, $54.59 (2019 dollars)

$54.59

TTI Report

Proportion of
delay reduction
that happens in
first year

At the start of the first year there will still
be congestion and delay. By the end of the
year there will be no delay. For simplicity
of modeling the reduction in the amount of
delay, it is assumed this reduction occurs as
a gradual transition through the year. Hence
the adjustment to the full delay reduction for
reasonableness.

50%

Project team estimate

Proportion of
existing 7–9 am
traffic that is
commercial

The value of delay is calculated as the
weighted average of the delayed traffic value
of time: percent that is commercial times the
commercial rate and percent that is personal
times the personal rate

10%

Verbal estimate by
HMB Engineer

Ratio of
evening delay
to morning
delay

50%
It is reasonable to expect that reducing the
morning traffic (and delay) will reduce the
evening traffic (and delay). However, the focus
of the project was on managing the morning
congestion, so no specific data have been
collected on the existing shape of the evening
traffic or estimates of how it will change as
a result of CCPTP. Therefore, a reasonable
allowance is used, based on the morning delay
reduction.

Project team estimate/
judgement

Ratio of actual
to perceived
value of a
lottery entry

It is expected that incentives will be offered at
a cash value, that can be converted into lottery
entries, as a cost-reducing strategy – because
the value of a lottery entry is generally valued
at double its actual value. The survey did not
explore the expectations that would be held by
respondents in this regard, so an estimate has
to be used.

60%

Project team estimate
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Source

Population
Growth rate,
annually,
current

The population of people aged 16+ in the
catchment of the bottleneck has been growing
at 3.27% average for the past five years.
While there is a growth limitation of 1% within
the Half Moon Bay City limits, and the actual
growth rate of HMB City is 2%, it is clear
that the rural areas have been growing more
quickly.

3.27%

Project team sees no
reason for this average
to fall.

Commercial
traffic growth
rate, annual

The project has no information about the
amount of commercial traffic nor how it is
changing over time, except the estimate that it
is 10% of morning traffic provided by the City
Engineer.

3%

Project team estimate

Starting
number of
commercial
vehicles 7–9
am

The commercial vehicle counts modeled on the 271
survey data and the historical counts of vehicle
throughput at and beyond the bottleneck, and
the assumption from the HMB Engineer that
current commercial vehicle make up 10%.

10% of current
throughput.

Proportion of
population who
would travel
7–9 am if there
was no traffic

15.46%
The survey exposed a number of people
who would start to travel if there was no
congestion. These should be added to the
people who already travel. The total of these
people divided by the current population is the
proportion of people who would travel. In the
modeling this ratio is assumed to be a constant
proportion that would travel as the population
grows over time.

Calculated based
on the results of
the survey and the
estimated population
at the end of 2019.

Maximum
In order to calculate the number of people
2-hour vehicles: who are needed to travel as passengers, it is
start
necessary to determine the maximum number
of vehicles that can depart during the peak
period. Based on historical records this flow
is assumed to be 1,300 per hour, or 2,600
through the morning 2-hour peak.

2600

Historic traffic flow
data from Caltrans

Starting
incentive level
per passenger
per day

The initial proportion of people who are needed $5
to travel as passengers, as a percentage of all
commuters, delivers a price for rewards on the
reward curve. The starting percentage is 35%
and the starting price is $5. This assumption
pre-supposes that switching to passenger
travel is easy to do.

Set by the team based
on survey results,
converted to a reward
curve.

First discount
factor, and
second
discount factor

USDOT advice for benefit cost analysis
suggests the use of two different discount
factors to apply over 20 years: 3%, and 7%.
These would usually be the actual cost of
capital but comparing on a consistent basis
makes it easier to compare between different
projects. 3% is used for discounting carbon
emissions reduction values.

USDOT Guidance.86

3%, 7%
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Source

Starting
number of
passengers
as a target for
incentive

The initial offer needs to be made to the
estimated current excess traffic, the number
of vehicles that if removed across the morning
peak would get rid of delay. The target level is
calculated in the model based on the survey.
In a real implementation it should be based
on actual delay and varying queue length
observed on the ground.

514

The modeled result
from the survey.

Catchment
population:
starting

The population of 16+ people in the
catchment—that will grow by the population
growth factor.

27,003

Most recent population
report plus growth
estimate in current
year.

Current delay
in minutes per
day

The value of delay that will be reduced is
based on the starting level of delay. This
number of minutes of daily delay should be
determined by observing the actual queueing
activity on the ground. For the case study it
was based on modeling based on the survey

13,213

The modeled result
from the survey

Percent of fleet
with stop–start
control

Stop-start control allows a car to not idle when 5.1%
not moving. The car automatically shuts off
when stopped, and automatically starts when
the driver presses the accelerator. This fraction
has an impact on the amount of fuel use and
emissions from idling caused by delay. This
factor is incremented annually for increasing
penetration of the technology.

Derived from data
in the 2018 EPA
Automotive Trends
Report: Greenhouse
Gas Emissions,
Fuel Economy, and
Technology since
1975.87

Minimum
proportion of
commuters who
are drivers

People divide up into three groups: those
50%
who are prepared on some basis to travel as
passengers, and those who will only drive, with
the latter divided into those who would take
passengers and those who would not. These
proportions provide a limit on the amount
of traffic reduction that is possible. Used to
allocate total travelers into passengers and
drivers to determine the amount of incentive
required each year.

Based on the survey.

Current year
value of a
metric ton of
CO2

USDOT BCA guidance provides the socialized $50
cost of carbon in $2015. These can be
converted to the current year for calculating the
value of emissions reduced.

USDOT BCA analysis
guidance88

Number
of people
adjusting to
going early,
year 1

This quantity is the starting assumption for
how many people adjust to going early. This
quantity grows based on the modeling growth
for population and travelers. The incentive
is paid to these people and those who are
already traveling early. These people are
removed from the calculation of convenience
benefit.

Project team
calculation based on
survey and modeling

431
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Source

Go-early bonus
per increment
of 15 minutes

This monetary amount is the rate at which
each additional 15 minutes early is paid as
an incentive to convince passengers to travel
earlier. The hourly rate is 4 times this amount.

$3.00

Project team
calculation based on
assumption of $12 for
going 1 hour early, $9
for going 45 minutes
early, $6 for going 30
minutes early, and $3
for going 15 minutes
early. All are designed
to shift travel volume
from the peak-of-thepeak. With the peakof-the-peak being 8
am to 9 am (based
on the survey, the
desired peak not the
actual current peak),
going an hour early
means, all people who
travel as a passenger
from 7 am to 7:15 am
would receive the $12
incentive.

Percent of
passengers
arriving at
bottleneck
needing to park

The meeting-place-based protocol for carpool
formation (or vanpool, or bus for that matter)
works most easily if there is a parking space
(a park and ride) near the bottleneck. Some
proportion of people will choose to drive
to the meeting place. Provision of parking
enables the best concentration of people
going to common destinations and reduces
complexity for the return journey. However, it
also imposes a cost on the solution: the need
to provide parking. It is necessary to estimate
the proportion of people arriving as drivers
wishing to park and be passengers to arrive
at a realistic estimate of the size of parking to
provide.

75%

Project team estimate.
Allows for some
people who might
walk, cycle, catch a
shuttle, or get dropped
off rather than driving
to park. Note that the
model doesn’t include
a charge for parking,
but that a charge or
other mechanism
might be needed to
reduce demand for this
parking.

Cost per
parking space
to develop atgrade parking
(in addition to
land cost)

Builds on the previous item

$5,563

Per Coffell et al., 2012,
midpoint of range
given, updated to 2019
dollars

Cost per
square foot for
land near the
bottleneck

Builds on the previous item

$15

Per real-estate
advertisement,
November 2019

Area in square Builds on the previous item
feet per parking
space at grade

350

Per Coffell et al.,
201289

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix C: Case Study Benefit Cost Analysis
Assumption
Name

Description/Rationale

Base Case
Value
$135

176
Source

Annual
operating cost
for parking, per
space

Builds on the previous item

Initial year cost
for marketing

An allowance for effective marketing of the
$100,000
solution to the local population who might use
it. Note that this solution needs the involvement
of everyone who uses the route during the
weekday morning rush.

Project team estimate.
Note that the cost
for marketing is kept
the same for the
second year, and then
grows in proportion
to the total value of
incentives being paid
out each year.

Initial year
cost for
administration

An allowance for effective administration of the
solution, including customer service, the app,
audit, all aspects of operations, and ongoing
reporting and research into methods for
minimizing incentive cost.

$300,000

Project team estimate.
Note that the cost
for administration is
kept the same for the
second year, and then
grows in proportion
to the total value of
incentives being paid
out each year.

Monetized
value of crash
avoided

An important benefit of the project will be the
reduction of vehicle miles driven, which can be
expected to reduce the rate of crashes.
This item relates to the weighted average
value of a crash of undetermined severity. It
will be applied against the total vehicle miles
traveled reduction due to people traveling as
passengers instead of as drivers.

$139,805

USDOT rate for
2015, adjusted to
2019 dollars, it is the
probability of each
type of crash severity
times the monetization
rate for each type of
crash severity, except
fatality.90

Monetized
value of a
fatality avoided

As for above, but for fatalities rather than just
crashes

$10,399,968

As for above, but for
fatalities rather than
just crashes.

Probability of a
fatality, per 100
million vehicle
miles traveled

Statistically speaking, a fatality will occur
with some level of predictability based on
accumulated vehicle miles traveled.

0.598

SWITRS statistics,
focused on San Mateo
County. Avoided
miles will be across a
variety of routes and
destinations countywide. While some
might venture into
other counties, the
vast majority will be in
San Mateo County.

Probability of a
serious injury
crash per 100
million vehicle
miles traveled

As above, but for injury crashes.

2.681

As above. Note that
the statistic from
SWITRS is for ‘serious
injury crashes,’ while
the monetization
value above is for all
crashes.
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Assumption
Name

Description/Rationale

Base Case
Value

177
Source

Rate of growth
of delay if there
is no solution

Assuming that nothing is implemented to
reduce delay, it is reasonable to expect that
delay will grow, even at a saturated location
such as the focus of the case study, because
population and business grows.

3%

Project team estimate.
It is aligned with the
assumption of the
rate of population and
commercial activity
growth.

Percent of new
commuters
going to work
(as opposed
to other trip
purposes)

The survey established that a significant
number of people who are not currently
traveling would be likely to start traveling if
the congestion was defeated. The majoring
of these people would be heading to jobs in
other parts of the county. This increment in
employment of people living on the Coastside
is a benefit that flows from the solution.

75%

Project team estimate

Attribution of
benefit per new
worker from
above

The challenge is to know how much to attribute $4,800
to the solution, for the increase in employment
of people living on the Coastside.

The project team
considers it reasonable
to attribute one hour
of earnings per day,
240 days per year, at
the national median
hourly rate, which is
approximately $20.

New
commuters,
first year

The survey finds that a number of people
985
would start to travel if the congestion was
defeated. Most of these people would travel for
employment. This number is incremented by
commuter growth each year.

Project team
calculation based on
survey and model

Average oneway trip miles
for people
traveling in
current morning
rush

For calculation of VMT avoided by people
traveling as passengers rather than as
drivers. This mileage is the distance from the
bottleneck to the destination.

21.76 miles

Project team
calculation based on
survey

Average cost
Estimate of cash costs that commuters will
of fuel and
avoid when stopping driving and starting to
maintenance
travel as a passenger.
per vehicle mile

$0.25

Project team
allowance based on
averages accessed via
the internet.

Value per day
of parking
spaces not
used at
destinations

$1.00

Project team
allowance.

The vast majority of people driving past
the bottleneck do not pay for parking at
their destination. A reduction in demand for
destination parking would result in savings to
someone, either by avoiding adding parking,
or by reducing the amount of free parking
provided. This assumed allowance is probably
well below the actual cost.
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Assumption
Name

Description/Rationale

Base Case
Value

178
Source

Value per day
of vehicleround-trip travel
beyond the
corridor

Each vehicle trip from the Coastside puts
$8.00
demand on the infrastructure of San Mateo
County. The County recently provided an
incentive of $8 per vehicle-round-trip reduced
for people who carpool. It is assumed that this
dollar amount is a fair assessment of the value
to the County of having fewer vehicles from the
Coastside.

Sourced from C/
CAG, the project team
feels this amount of
money is a reasonable
allowance. It is noted
that the current
payment amount is
lower than $8, but also
that far fewer people
are participating as a
result.

Multiplier
effect on local
economy of
each $1 cash
gain

Several of the benefits from the congestion1.25
clearing payments to passengers project will
be felt in cash terms in the hands of the people
who live on the Coastside. This additional
disposable income in the hands of residents
can be reasonably expected to be spent in the
community, thereby generating an economic
uplift. There are many opinions of the extent of
such an uplift in the literature.
Note that the calculation of the benefit doesn’t
include the incentives themselves, because it
is assumed that the local people will pay for the
program. It is likely a pilot project would return
different values.

Project team
assumption. For each
dollar gained, an
additional $1.25 will be
generated through the
local economy.

Sensitivity Analysis
Table 28 shows the changes in the present value of 20-year costs and benefits and resulting
BCR in 2019 dollars discounted at 3%, under variations of the key assumptions by 5% each.
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Table 28. Sensitivity Analysis, Impact of Adjusting Factors by 5%
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In a worst-case scenario, for this solution to deliver no net benefit over 20 years (a BCR of
1.0), the required incentive rate would need to be more than five times the level included
in the base case.

Individual Benefit and Cost Tables
The following pages show the 20-year estimates of cost and benefit that support the base
case shown in Table 25.
Table 29. Estimated Costs of Incentive to Travel as a Passenger Half Moon Bay
Bottleneck
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Table 30. Estimated Costs of Incentives for Passengers to Go Early, Half Moon
Bay Bottleneck

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix C: Case Study Benefit Cost Analysis

182

Table 31. Estimated Marketing Cost for Communicating Incentives Solution for
Half Moon Bay Bottleneck
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Table 32. Estimated Administration Costs for Operation of Incentives Solution for
Half Moon Bay Bottleneck
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Table 33. Estimated Cost of Providing Park and Ride Capacity Near Bottleneck
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Table 34. Estimated Value of Morning Delay Avoided by Implementation of Congestion Clearing Solution at Half
Moon Bay Bottleneck
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Table 35. Estimated Value of Evening Delay Avoided by Implementation of
Congestion-Clearing Payments to Passengers at Half Moon Bay
Bottleneck
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Table 36. Estimated Reductions in Fuel Use and Emissions from Reduced Delay at Half Moon Bay Bottleneck
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Table 37. Estimated Value of Convenience of Traveling at Preferred Times Due to
Congestion-Clearing at the Half Moon Bay Bottleneck
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Table 38. Estimated Savings in Fuel and Maintenance Cost for VMT Avoided Due
to Traveling as Passengers Instead of Drivers Through Half Moon Bay
Bottleneck (Round Trip) of 43.52 Miles.
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Table 39. Estimated Value of Emissions Avoided as a Result of Reduced VMT by
Passengers Past Half Moon Bay Bottleneck
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Table 40. Estimated Value of Parking Costs Avoided at Destination End Due to
Passenger Travel Though Half Moon Bay Bottleneck
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Table 41. Estimated Reduction to Regional Congestion Costs of Passengers
Through Half Moon Bay Bottleneck

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

192

Appendix C: Case Study Benefit Cost Analysis

Table 42. Estimated Value of Reduction to Crash Risk Due to Reduced VMT by Passengers Through the Half Moon
Bay Bottleneck
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Table 43. Local Economy Impact of Savings Due to Congestion-Clearing Payments to Passengers at the Half Moon
Bay Bottleneck
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Table 44. Allocation of Benefit of New Employment of People who Start
Commuting Through the Half Moon Bay Bottleneck
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AAPOR

American Association for Public Opinion Research

ACS

American Community Survey

App

A computer application, typically installed on a smart phone

BCA

Benefit Cost Analysis

BCR

Benefit-to-Cost Ratio

C/CAG

City and County Association of Governments

CA

California

Caltrans

The California Department of Transportation

CAPRI

Congestion and Parking Relief Incentive, a program at Stanford
University

CBD

Central Business District

CCPTP

Congestion-Clearing Payments to Passengers

CO2-e

Carbon Dioxide Equivalent, the conversion of the impacts of
several different greenhouse gases into a common measure of
carbon dioxide equivalence

Coastside

The case study catchment; an area of Northern California along
the coast of San Mateo County from Montara to Pescadero

Comsis

A private consulting firm that coordinated the work for an analysis
of TDM methods in the 1990s

DOT

Department of Transportation

EPA

Environmental Protection Agency

FHWA

Federal Highway Administration

FL

Florida

GRH

Guaranteed ride home: a program that enables people who take
alternatives to driving alone to access a ride home, usually in a
taxi that is paid for by the program, in an emergency or if their
ride is cancelled

HMB

Half Moon Bay

HOV

High Occupancy Vehicle

Kg

Kilogram

MPG

Miles Per Gallon
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
MTI

Mineta Transportation Institute

NextDoor

A neighborhood private social network that operates on the
internet and is used for communication between people in a
geographic area

NPV

Net present value, based on discounting future cash flows to the
present at a given discount rate and deduction the present value
of cash outflows from the present value of cash inflows

OR

Oregon

PV

Present Value, the value in today’s money of a stream of cash
flows, positive or negative, in the future, discounted using a
discount rate

RFID

Radio Frequency Identification

SJSU

San Jose State University

SMS

Short Message Service

SOV

Single Occupant Vehicle

SR

State Route, a naming convention for highways controlled by the
state

StdDev

Standard deviation, a statistical measure of variability

SWITRS

Statewide Integrated Traffic Records System, a CA solution for
recording traffic and related incidents

TDM

Transportation Demand Management

The Method

Method for estimating the benefits and costs of a potential
congestion-clearing payments to passengers implementation

TMA

Transportation Management Association, generally a destinationbased agency that seeks traffic reduction for a destination

Tonne

A metric ton (1,000 kg)

USDOT

The United States Department of Transportation

VA

Virginia

VKT

Vehicle Kilometers Traveled

VMT

Vehicle Miles Traveled

VTPI

Victoria Transportation Policy Institute
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